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THE
MEANING OF PAKISTAN

by
F. K. KHAN DURRANI



1944

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KASHMIRI BAZAAR - - - LAHORE

First published, March 1944

Printed by
Mirza Mohammad Sadiq
at the Ripon Printing Press
Bull Road, Lahore
3d and
 § Published by
Sh. Muhammad Ashraf
Kashmiri Bazaar, Lahore
 §

P R E F A C E

IN the following pages I have stated the reasons for Pakistan as I understand them. Here I want to address a word or two exclusively to my Muslim readers.

Independence and sovereignty is a trust in the case of a free people and an obligation in the case of a subject people, which they owe to themselves and to mankind at large. If we do not strive to become a free, sovereign people, we shall remain a plague-spot on the face of the earth. Islam imposes upon us the duty of freedom and sovereignty. We cannot be true Muslims, we cannot lead a truly Muslim life, we cannot carry out the duties that Islam lays upon us, unless and until we become a free and sovereign people.

Pakistan will be the consummation of our hopes and aspirations. It will give us an opportunity and a scope for our national development, which politically and economically we shall never have in a common All-India federation. The prize is great, beyond the average man's dreams today, and the prize demands a tremendous amount of labour and sacrifice on the part of every one of us. For a subject people there is no greater prize than the achievement of freedom, and no achievement calls for greater sacrifice than

the attainment of freedom and sovereignty. For this sacrifice every one of us must prepare himself.

The Muslims of India have a very tough struggle before them. But no struggle is too great for a determined nation, and once a people has become a nation and developed that psychological make-up which is the necessary attribute of nationhood, it never dies. If we fail in the attainment of our objective today, we shall win it tomorrow. If we fail tomorrow, we shall win the day after. But win we must in the end if we feel and live and act as a nation ; for the spirit of nationalism when fully awakened galvanises a people. It inspires the individual and the people as a whole with an energy that recognises no obstacles and has an inherent urge to sweep everything before it. The Muslims of India, as indeed of the whole world since the days of the Umayyads, have for centuries lived a life of purposelessness, of selfish greeds and an otherworldly piety which had no reference to life and its problems. All this must now change, and selfish greeds must now be replaced by a fierce, fanatical passion for service of our people. "Islam and the Muslim nation first and everything else afterwards." This must now be the attitude of every single Muslim in this country.

It is true that the Indian Muslims now feel themselves to be a nation as against the Hindus. There are also those amongst us, and their name is legion, whose national consciousness has awakened to a

degree that they have been able to grasp the higher meaning of Pakistan, and facts of life are driving the whole people fast towards that meaning. But, on the whole, the nationalism of Indian Muslims is as yet of the defensive kind. They have been put on the defence and made to feel as one by their sense of an impending calamity that threatens to overwhelm them all. It is fear that has driven them into one common fold. And I would that they were not driven by fear alone, that they were not actuated by a mere desire for defence; for defences can be broken and fears allayed. Have they then nothing of their own to contribute to the life of the world? I would that deriving their inspiration from the Holy Quran they based their nationalism on positive values and high ideals. God Almighty raised this people, the Muslims, for a high purpose. We must grasp that purpose. We must refashion our individual lives in the light of that purpose and make it the foundation and goal of our nationalism.

In the above lines I have used the term 'nationalism' only for convenience of expression, and I hope my Muslim readers will not be misled by it. It is fairly widely understood by Indian Muslims by now, thanks to the labours of the late Allama Sir Muhammad Iqbal, that Islamic nationalism is basically different from the nationalism of other peoples. With others, a nation is a group of people united among themselves *against* all the world. When a territorial or racial nationality expands its frontiers,

it does so to reduce others to political servitude and to exploit them economically for its own benefit. The nationalism of the Hindus, for instance, means that Hindus should be an independent sovereign people, free to exploit the wealth of this country for their own benefit to the exclusion of every other people. Islamic nationalism, on the other hand, means that a people has adopted a certain way of life and is inspired by certain spiritual ideals, and the extension of its frontiers means not the reducing of others to political servitude or their economic exploitation, but letting those others become part of themselves with all the privileges and obligations that Islamic nationalism implies.

There has been a considerable insistence of late to have the form of the state in Pakistan and its economic order defined now. The people concerned have lived so long under a capitalistic system of society that it is very difficult for them to picture to themselves an alternative one, and imperialism for its own prop has created vested interests which it will be no easy task to overcome. Bolshevik Russia solved the problem by eliminating vested interests by force. Any attempt to employ the same method here would lead to a counter-revolution which, assisted by outsiders, would bring Pakistan itself to a speedy end. Besides, a state based upon violence has a tendency to grow in such a warped and perverse fashion that it is likely to defeat all those purposes which in Islam constitute the main justification of a

state. We, therefore, want no violence in Pakistan. The State in Pakistan will certainly seek to establish a new and healthier economic order; but it shall not be brought about by violence. The revolution we want to effect in the economic and social order in Pakistan must be preceded by a revolution, through education in the minds of the people, until they come to realize that capitalism and feudalism are harmful not only to the state but also to those individuals themselves and to their children and children's children for generation after generation, who apparently profit thereby. Such a revolution may take a hundred years for its fulfilment, but it must be peaceful. Any attempt at a violent revolution in the economic order will result in immense injury to the state, unless and until such a reversal of values has first taken place in the minds of men. Such mental revolution follows naturally when men have been duly instructed in the purposes which Islam has set for the life of the individual and in the character and aims of the Islamic State. Beginning in such instruction must be made now, and no time should be lost to prepare the people for the dawn of the new day we are all looking forward to. All those among us who understand the purposes of Islam in respect of the individual and the state should now commence spreading that knowledge among the Muslim masses, and all Muslim organisations, including the All-India Muslim League, should institute an intense and wide-spread propaganda in this behalf. Of course, it will be the duty of the State in Pakistan

to educate the citizen so as to pave the way for a smooth and peaceful economic revolution. But supposing for the sake of argument that we fail to obtain Pakistan immediately and are forced to enter an All-India federation of some sort, my suggestion is that our irreducible minimum demand in that case should be that the control and organisation of the whole education of the Muslims, from top to bottom, shall lie completely and without reserve in the hands of the Muslims themselves without the least adverse effect on the right of the products of that education for preferment in state services.

Then there are Muslims who will be left behind in Hindustan after the separate sovereign state of Pakistan has been established. The continued residence of these Muslims in Hindustan, even if they are exposed there to undue hardships, is indispensable for the security and well-being of Pakistan, and exchange of populations will be harmful not only to Pakistan, but also to the ultimate purposes of Islam. All Indian Muslims, whether they live in Pakistan or Hindustan, constitute one nation, and we of Pakistan must always treat our co-religionists in Hindustan as flesh of our flesh and blood of our blood.

It is to be understood that the responsibility for whatever has been said in this volume is mine alone. In order further to emphasise the strictly personal character of this responsibility, I declare that though I would do all in my power and have been doing all

I could to strengthen the cause of the Muslim League for many years, I do not enjoy the formal membership of any League body.

The Hindu Mahasabha's creed is 'India for the Hindus.' Their slogan is :

ہندوستان ہندو کا نہیں کسی کے باپ کا

—“India belongs to the Hindus and is nobody else's patrimony.” The Congress speaks differently, but means the same. My faith is exactly the reverse. I have a profound conviction that India shall never become a free sovereign country except through Islam. Hinduism has no healthy or enlightened political tradition or ideals, and the political ideology of the modern Hindu has developed altogether on wrong lines. The aggressive racial nationalism of the European pattern, which they have developed and upon which their leaders lay so much stress, can only lead to inter-racial hatreds, and so long as this ideology rules the Hindus, India shall never know inner peace or unity, and everything the Hindus do to obstruct Islam goes to perpetuate India's misery. But I am not going to make any appeal to the Hindus. They are not in a mood to listen. My prayer is addressed to my co-religionists alone, and the prayer is that they should never forget India.

Much emphasis has been laid in recent years on the geographical unity of India. This emphasis is in a large measure an irrelevancy ; for maps are made and remade as political forces change, and it is the creative mind of man rather than mountains and rivers that

determines the fate of nations. But that India is a geographical unity is also a fact which the Muslims must never forget. There is not an inch of the soil o India which our fathers did not once purchase with their blood. We cannot be false to the blood of our fathers. India, the whole of it, is therefore our heritage and it must be reconquered for Islam. Expansion in the spiritual sense is an inherent necessity of our faith and implies no hatred or enmity towards the Hindus. Rather the reverse. Our ultimate ideal should be the unification of India, spiritually as well as politically, under the banner of Islam. The final political salvation of India is not otherwise possible.

That is a very high ideal, but nothing is too difficult for a determined people. And the foundations of a free and sovereign India must be laid now in the heart of every Muslim. Our people are heir to many moral and spiritual ailments. We must purge ourselves of these and strive steadfastly and with vigour to put our own house in order first and build up a truly Islamic life individually as well as collectively. This is a primary condition of a healthy political life in a stable Pakistan and will enable us to build up in time a larger Islamistan.

LAHORE
Nov. 12, 1943.

F. K. KHAN DURRANI

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CHAPTER I

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF NATIONALISM

MUCH has been said about the geographical diversity observable in the sub-continent of India. The author of *Pakistan: a Nation* bases his whole argument on the geographical peculiarities that distinguish the north-western provinces, the Punjab, Kashmir, the N.-W. F. P., Sind and Baluchistan, from the rest of India. Some provinces get heavier rains than do the others. The staple food of some provinces is wheat; of others rice. Vegetation in the lands of the monsoon is rank and bush; in others it is scanty. The flora and fauna of the provinces differ considerably. The dry lands of the north-west are the natural home of the camel, while the wet lands of the South and of Assam and Bengal produce the unwieldy elephant.¹ The dry lands of the north-west have given birth to a racial type which in many respects is different from the softer and darker types met with elsewhere. In a large country like India, inhabited as it is by peoples of many races, enclosed within many degrees of latitude and longitude, and exposed to a variety of influences

¹ There is something wrong with the argument. Akbar, once on his way back from Mandu to Agra, captured eighteen elephants, which shows that elephants were native to Central India as late as the 16th century.

of sea, mountain and desert, such diversities of peoples and produce are natural and unavoidable, and to the politics of Muslim India they are wholly irrelevant ; for were we to follow this line of argument, we of the north-west will have of necessity to wash our hands of the larger portion of the Muslim population of India who live in lands other than those of Pakistan, dress differently and eat food which is not exactly the same as ours. We would have to treat them as aliens, with whom we can have no community of life or interests, a proposition which no Muslim of Pakistan would care to maintain even for a minute, which in fact every Muslim of the Punjab would dismiss forthwith as unthinkable.

I agree, on the contrary, with Dr. Beni Prasad, that "there is no country marked out by the sea and the mountains so clearly to be a single whole as India."¹ From the Suleman Range to the hills of Assam and from the Himalayas to the sea, in spite of all its variety of races, climes and topographical detail, India is one geographical unity. But I cannot agree with him when he says : "All history tends to show that there is room in India for only one political system." No doubt, whenever a powerful kingdom has risen in any part of India, north or south, it has sought to extend its sway to the uttermost limits of the sub-continent, the Mauryas and the Guptas pushing their conquests to the south, the Andhras and the Cholas pushing their way to the north, turn by turn,

¹ *The Hindu-Muslim Questions*, p. 83.

like the waves of the sea surging forward and receding, till the Muslims entered the land. The Muslims took a century to establish themselves securely in the north ; but once established, they turned their arms towards the south. The Khiljis plundered the Deccan, and Sultan Muhammad Tughlaq brought it under the dominion of Islam. Akbar did not lose a day to extend his empire into the Deccan when he felt the north secure in his hands. The British started their conquest from the east. They had to wage a ceaseless war for one whole century (1757-1857), and peace returned to the country only when the whole of it had been brought bit by bit under the rule of the foreign conquerors.

These are facts of history, but to argue as Dr. Beni Prasad does that they represent an urge to political unification is to misread the logic of these events.

In the whole course of her known history, India has never attained unity in the truly political sense. On but rare occasions she did attain administrative unity, and on each occasion the unity proved but of extremely short duration. The unity, in whatever terms we choose to define it, was never the culmination of any natural urge or tendency among the peoples of India. It was instead, in every case, an imposition by the conquering arms of some imperial despot. When the despot's grip weakened, the country fell apart forthwith. The history of India does not know of any the shortest period, prior to British rule, in which the peoples inhabiting this

sub-continent may have shown any desire or urge or tendency to hang on together. The centrifugal tendencies have always proved too strong to admit of the growth of a single political unit for the whole country. Even today, after one hundred and fifty years of administrative unity and more than half a century of conscious effort at national unification, the centrifugal tendencies, even apart from the Muslim demand for Pakistan, are so strong that if the British were to withdraw, the country would immediately fall to pieces, giving place to a number of independent sovereign states. The result would be the same if the British ruling class in India cut themselves adrift from Britain, became nationals of this country and tried to form a national state. This is so because, though geographically India is one unity, its peoples are not, and in the making of states and nations it is the people that count and not geography.

One of the stock arguments of the Hindu opponents of Pakistan is the geographical unity of India, though it should be evident to any one who gives serious thought to the subject that the living spirit of man cannot be enslaved, in the words of Renan,¹ "by the course of rivers or the direction of mountain ranges." "The land," says Renan, "provides a substratum, the field of battle and work; man provides the soul; man is everything in the formation of that sacred thing which is called a people. Nothing of

¹ The essay on Nationality in *The Poetry of Celtic Races and other Studies*.

material nature suffices for it." It is doubtful, in fact, whether geography has ever determined the formation of a nation. If geography were the determining factor, few nations in Europe would be justified in claiming separate national existence for themselves. Geography has provided no natural boundaries between Germany, Poland and Russia, between Russia and Finland, between Sweden and Norway, between Germany, Denmark, Holland, Belgium and even France, between Germany, Hungary Austria and Czechoslovakia, between Russia and Rumania, or between any of the Balkan States, or between Spain and Portugal. The same could be said about the countries of North America. Yet, who can deny the fact that all these several countries are the homes of separate sovereign nations whose existence as such is recognised by all the world? It would be absurd for anyone to suggest that, on the ground of geographical unity, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, Hungary, Austria and Poland, for instance, should be amalgamated with Germany, or that Russia should have the right of swallowing Finland, Poland and Rumania, or that Portugal should surrender her sovereignty to Spain and merge her identity in that of the latter.

The second great argument against partition is that of race. Mr. Gandhi, Mr. Savarkar, Dr. Moonje, Bhái Parmanand and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru are never tired of reminding the Muslims that they belong to the same race as the Hindus, and should,

on that account, form one nation with the Hindus and should not ask for partition. The persistence with which this argument is advanced by Hindu leaders is indeed amazing. The Muslims of India are sprung from many races, and for this reason have no race-consciousness of any kind. An argument based on the idea of racial unity can have, therefore, no appeal for them. In truth, it remains unintelligible to them, which, surprisingly enough, no Hindu leader seems yet to have realized. In fact, race too, like geography, is not a determining factor either for or against the formation of nations. As Renan points out, race has meaning for rodents and felines only, and men are neither cats nor mice. If race were such a vital factor, as Hindu leaders believe it to be, then the Germans, the Austrians, the Belgians, the Dutch, the Danes, the Norwegians, the Swedes, and the Finns should all form one nation ; the Spaniards and the Portuguese should also combine to constitute one nation ; while the Swiss should cease to be one nation, and the English, the Welsh and the Scots should form separate sovereign states, as they are racially quite different from one another.

Hindu leaders have been propagating the idea for two decades that religion should not be mixed with politics, and that a united nation should be formed on the basis of politics alone. Now, is it possible to create a nation on the basis of politics alone ? Political philosophers think that purely political ties do not suffice to create a nation. To support this thesis

Lord Bryce¹ refers to Austria-Hungary and says: "The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, though it was tied together into a sort of nation, was not a nationality, but a bundle of jarring nationalities. So today Czechoslovakia (Bryce wrote it in 1921) and Yugoslavia are political entities, whose populations are not yet sufficiently united by other ties to have acquired a sentiment of intellectual or moral unity, though they may in time acquire it."

Political philosophers are almost unanimous on this question. Sidgwick² writes : "A political society is in an unsatisfactory and comparative (*sic*) unstable condition when its members have no consciousness of any bond of unity among them, except their obedience to the same government. Such a society is lacking in the cohesive force required to resist the disorganising shocks and jars which foreign wars and domestic discontents are likely to cause from time to time. Accordingly, we recognise that it is desirable that the members of a State should be united by the further bonds vaguely implied in the term Nation." So, if we had a united Indian State, of the unitary type as the Mahasabha desires or of the federal variety to which the Congress, after kicking against it for fifteen years, has now agreed, it would be wholly unstable, incapable of withstanding the shocks and jars of foreign wars and domestic discontents because of the absence of those other

¹ *International Relations*, p. 118 f.

² *Elements of Politics*, p. 222 f.

bonds which are necessary to the formation of a nation.

What are those bonds that contribute to the creation of the sentiment of nationality? Lord Bryce defines nationality "as an aggregate of men drawn together and linked together by certain sentiments," and says, "the chief among these are Racial sentiment and Religious sentiment, but there is also that sense of community which is created by the use of a common language, the possession of a common literature, the recollection of common achievements or sufferings in the past, the existence of common customs and habits of thought, common ideals and aspirations. Sometimes all of these 'linking sentiments' are present and hold the members of the aggregate together; sometimes one or more may be absent. The more of these links that exist in any given case, the stronger is the sentiment of unity. In each case, the test is not merely how many links there are, but how strong each particular link is." Speaking of the Swiss he says that they derive their nation-hood from "a common pride in their historical traditions, a common literature, common political ideas and beliefs, and this although they have sprung from different races and use three—or rather four—languages." Again, speaking of the American States he writes: "By degrees some of the States grew into Nations, i.e., organised communities with a sense of political unity, and in a still later stage they developed the other feelings which make a real National

Sentiment, such as pride in their history, attachment to the memory of heroes, a type of character which began very slowly to be somewhat diverse from the types that grew up in their neighbours.”¹

Sidgwick² writes : “ What is really essential to the modern conception of a State which is also a nation is merely that the persons composing it should have, generally speaking, a consciousness of belonging to one another, of being members of one body, over and above what they derive from the fact of being under one government, so that, if their government were destroyed by war or revolution, they would still tend to hold firmly together. When they have this consciousness, we regard them as forming a ‘ Nation ’, whatever else they lack.”

Sophie Bryant writes : “ As human life develops, the common consciousness of each nation grows in interest and complexity. Every event in national history, every achievement in national literature, every reform in the national institutions, the customs, traditions, ways of thought, manners and even mannerisms—all contribute to the sense of national unity. The citizen from his youth up learns to love all the dear familiar things that mark the common life, learns also to be proud of and rejoice in them as in some peculiar sense his own. Nor is it by the merit of his country only that he is possessed. The history, the literature, the glory of his nation, the sufferings

¹ *International Relations*, pp. 116 f., 119, 121.

² *Elements of Politics*, p. 224.

also, even the shame and the crime, affect him as of his innermost soul.”¹

Renan writes : “A nation is a ‘living soul, a spiritual principle. Two things, which in truth are but one, constitute this soul, this spiritual principle. One is in the past, the other in the present. One is the common possession of a rich heritage of memories ; the other is the actual consent, the desire to live together, the will to preserve worthily the undivided inheritance which has been handed down. Man does not improvise. The nation, like the individual, is the outcome of a long past of efforts and sacrifices and devotion ... A heroic past, great men, glory,—I mean glory of the genuine kind—these form the social capital, upon which a national idea may be founded. To have common glories in the past, a common will in the present; to have done great things together, to will to do the like again,—such are the essential conditions for the making of a people. We love in proportion to the sacrifices we have consented to make, to the sufferings we have endured. We love the house that we have built and will hand down to our descendants ... In the past an inheritance of glory and regrets to be shared, in the future a like ideal to be realised ; to have suffered and rejoiced and hoped together—all these things are worth more than customs-houses in common and frontiers in accordance with strategical ideas.”

Lastly, as the true source of the individual’s

¹ *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*, art. Nationality.

national consciousness, Iqbal says : "I love the communal group which is the source of my life and behaviour, and which has formed me what I am by giving me its religion, its literature, its thought, its culture, and thereby recreating its whole past, as a living operative factor, in my present consciousness."¹

Citations of this kind could be multiplied, but these should suffice. We find that geography, race and language can neither be determining factors for nor deterrents to the formation of nations. Germany, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Holland, parts of Belgium and Austria either speak German or languages which have sprung from German and are as like German that they may be looked upon as being provincial dialects of it. Yet all these countries are separate nations recognised as such by all the world, and not one of them is willing to merge its identity into that of Germany on geographical, racial or linguistic grounds. Nationality is, in fact, a matter of consciousness only, a mere psychological condition, a common desire, which may differ from person to person in its degree of intensity but is present in almost every individual of a group, which makes the members of that group feel as of one kin, which makes them cling together and hold on together in fair weather and foul, in triumph and adversity, in rejoicing and in sorrow, and which makes that group feel different and separate from every

¹ Presidential Address at the annual Session of the All-India Muslim League at Allahabad in December, 1930.

other group, a consciousness, indeed, which, so long as it remains alive and actively operative, prevents that group from merging its identity into that of any other group, and would revolt against any attempt to do so. To quote Dr. Ambedkar, the sentiment of nationality "is a feeling of a corporate sentiment of oneness which makes those who are charged with it feel that they are kith and kin. This national feeling is a double-edged feeling. It is at once a feeling of fellowship for one's own kith and an anti-fellowship feeling for those who are not one's own kith. It is a feeling of 'consciousness of kind', which on the one hand binds together those who have it so strongly that it overrides all differences arising out of economic conflicts or social gradations, and, on the other, severs them from those who are not of their kind. It is a longing to belong to one's own group, and a longing not to belong to any other group. This is the essence of what is called a nationality and a national feeling."¹ As someone has said, a nation is united "against all the world."

To the birth of this feeling of nationality or 'consciousness of kind', as we have seen above, a common tradition, common ideals and beliefs, the possession of a common heritage of literature, culture, ways of thought, a common religion, the memory of common heroes and joys and sorrows are essential, and the resultant consciousness often stamps a group with a peculiar character which we

¹ *Thoughts on Pakistan*, p. 25.

call its national character and which is different from the character of every other group. Now, is there any of these factors, which contribute to the formation of nations, common between the Hindus and the Musalims ? Their traditions are different ; their group characteristics are different ; their religious conceptions are diametrically opposed; the moments of joy in the history of one group are moments of sorrow in that of the other and *vice versa* ; their sources of inspiration and cultural life are different ; the heroes of one are the enemies of the other. The Musalman reveres the memory of Aurangzeb ; the Hindu hates his memory and loves that of his opponent Shivaji. There is absolutely no group-consciousness or 'consciousness of kind' between the Hindus and the Muslims. They cannot sit together at the same dining table ; they cannot intermarry. The food of one is abomination to the other. The Hindu gets even polluted by the Musalman's touch. There are no social contacts between them to make possible the birth of a common group-consciousness. It is, indeed, psychologically impossible for the two groups to combine to form a single united whole.

The Hindus complain that the Musalmans used not to call themselves a separate nation, that they have begun to do so only recently, and that their claim of separate nationhood is but an act of perversity on the part of Mr. Jinnah. A study of the historical growth of the two nations we shall enter upon at a later stage. It will suffice here to note a

peculiar characteristic of the psychology of nations. Political philosophers make a distinction between nationality and nationalism. The distinction is fine, but the difference it makes in the lives of nations is momentous. It is possible that a national group may never develop the feeling of nationalism or the full consciousness of nationhood. It is also possible, on the other hand, that a people that were once a nation may lose the consciousness of nationhood and sink back into the consciousness of a mere racial community. The Hindus have been in India for three thousand years or more, but their nationalism is of yesterday's growth. The Netherlanders used not to be a nation ; today they are. The Welsh and the Scots were independent sovereign nations. possessing all the attributes of nationhood. They have lost their national consciousness altogether and are now content with being parts of the great British Nation. Similarly, a people which for centuries gave no sign of nationhood, may, for a variety of reasons, suddenly develop a national consciousness, and when it has once developed such consciousness, it will seek forthwith to assert its separate sovereign self. The birth of national consciousness and the desire to live an independent sovereign life are really concomitant. In truth, they may be said to be two different expressions of the same fact. For a nation is a body 'corporate', which means that it has a soul, a will, of its own, and this collective soul reacts almost in the same manner as the individual soul : it refuses to

coalesce with any other. The suckling infant clings to its mother. It has come out of her body. No relation could be closer than that of the mother and the baby. In fact, the baby has no consciousness of its separate existence. But the baby grows, stands on its own legs and toddles around and discovers one day that it has a soul, a separate self of its own. In the words of Iqbal :

چشم گیر ایش فند بر خویشن دستکے بر سینہ می گوید کہ من

" His all-grasping eye falls on his own self, and with his little fist on his breast he cries : I am." From that moment he parts from his mother and asserts his separate self more and more. The same is the case with nations. When the corporate soul of a nation awakens to its self, it refuses to coalesce with another. You cannot put two wills into one body without causing an explosion. As Sa'di said long ago, two derwishes may sleep peacefully in one blanket, but two Sultans cannot be contained in the same imperium. That is what has happened to the Muslims in India. They have developed a separate national consciousness of their own for reasons which we shall study later on.

But while a nation never willingly surrenders its sovereign self or agrees to coalesce with another to form a single whole, it is possible to destroy its will, its national consciousness, by systematic suppression as the Aryans did with the original inhabitants of India, or by generous treatment after conquest, as

has been the case with the Welsh, the Scots and the French Canadians. A German writer says : "A State in the historical sense is always the result of a war between different groups of people, by means of which the victorious group subjects the vanquished group to its own authority and constitutes in relation to it the ruling class. A coalition of families of equal birth never leads to the growth of a State ; at best it makes only a herd." Again : "The beginnings of a State are a relationship not of law but of power and lordship ; it rises not from pacts, but from one group overthrowing and subjugating its rivals."¹ It means that two or more groups or communities cannot unite by a pact or treaty to form one united nation. There is no instance in history of a nation formed in such a fashion and coming out intact from a crisis. The case of Czechoslovakia is far too recent to be ignored. The truth is that States are based on power and not on pacts. Power wielded by one homogeneous and internally united people is the only true basis of the State. One community must overthrow the other and establish its dominion over it. The two cannot exist side by side as equal partners in the same imperium. This has been the case in every other country ; it cannot be otherwise in India. The existence of communities, each

¹ Dr. Johannes Schubert : *Machiavelli und die politischen Probleme unserer Zeit*, pp. 54, 55. Lord Bryce implies the same thing *mutatis mutandis* when he says : " Every political community, whatever its form, be it republican or monarchical, is in a State of Nature towards every other community." (*International Relations*, p. 3).

keeping its separate identity intact, is incompatible with the national idea. The things are mutually contradictory.

This peculiarity of the nature of the State or the psychological make-up of nationhood explains the motives which lie at the back of some of the policies which Hindu India has been following for many years. I repeat that nationhood is not something concrete. It is not something that could be stated in bare terms of race or geography. It is a mere psychological state, a mere matter of consciousness, and we have learnt that it is possible to destroy this consciousness. Once this consciousness is destroyed, a people may be kept under subjugation, oppressed and suppressed and trodden under foot without any fear of revolt, resentment or protest, as has been the case with the Untouchables in this country. They have been deprived of every human right and treated like unclean animals. They have never once protested against this treatment throughout the centuries for the simple reason that their Aryan conquerors had killed their national consciousness, and national consciousness is the *sole* guarantee of a people's sense of honour, self-respect and integrity. There is no other means by which a people might maintain itself. And the Hindu politics has been to kill the fast growing national consciousness of the Muslims, as we shall see later.

The psychological inability of nations to coalesce makes it obviously necessary that each nation should

be able to lead a separate independent existence. Accordingly, political philosophers as well as statesmen consider it desirable "that a State should be co-extensive with a single nation."¹ But the question may be asked whether a people which has at one time formed part of a larger whole is justified and under what conditions is it justified in seeking secession. Sidgwick² writes : "If in any continuous part of the territory of a State sufficiently large to form the territory of a new and independent State, or capable of being conveniently united to an existing State, there is a decided local majority in favour of separation, has this majority a legitimate claim to secede, carrying with them the portion of territory over which their secessionist majority extends? It seems clear that a claim of this breadth would not be generally admitted merely on the ground that the interests of the seceders would be promoted or their sentiments of nationality gratified by the change: that some serious oppression or misgovernment of the seceders by the rest of the community,—i.e., some unjust sacrifice or grossly incompetent management of their interests, or some persistent and harsh opposition to their legitimate desires,—would be usually held necessary to justify the claim. If no adequate justification of this kind appeared, the forcible suppression of any such attempt at disruption would be approved by the majority of thoughtful persons." That is, divorce may be permitted if

¹ Sidgwick : *Elements of Politics*, p. 224.

² *Ibid.*, p. 226.

infidelity is accompanied by cruelty. The quotation has reference to the American Civil War, of which mention has been made frequently in this country in connection with the Muslim League's demand of Pakistan, and it is contended that just as the Northern States were justified in preventing secession from the American Union of the Southern States by force of arms, Hindu India would be justified in preventing the secession of the lands of Pakistan. That the two cases do not stand on a par would be apparent to any one who is acquainted with the true nature of the Hindu-Muslim question and of the dispute between the Northern and Southern States of America. The people of the North and the South were and are of the same race and religion, speak the same language, have the same historical and cultural traditions. The dispute was not a clash of "nationalities", but on one single economic question, *viz.*, the emancipation of the Negro slaves, which could on no account form a sufficient ground for separation. The distinction will become clearer when we examine the question from another point of view.

Political philosophers make a distinction between a Community and a Nation. The distinction is of a fundamental nature as it makes a serious difference between the political rights permitted respectively to a Community and to a Nation. According to them, a Community has the right of insurrection only, whereas a Nation has the right of secession as well.¹

¹ Sidgwick writes: "...some of those who hold that a government,

This means, as Dr. Ambedkar remarks, that "a community has a right to safeguards, a nation has a right to demand separation." But why should there be such difference in their respective rights? Or rather, wherein consists the difference between a Community and a Nation? Dr. Ambedkar says: "To my mind the reasons for this difference pertain to questions of ultimate destiny. A State either consists of a series of communities or it consists of a series of nations. In a State which is composed of a series of communities one community may be arrayed against another community, and the two may be opposed to each other. But in the matter of their ultimate destiny they feel they are one. But in a State which is composed of a series of nations, when one nation rises against the other the conflict is one

to be legitimate, must rest on the consent of the governed, appear not to shrink from drawing this inference: they appear to qualify the right of the majority of members of a State to rule by allowing the claim of a minority that suffers from the exercise of this right to secede and form a new State, when it is in a majority in a continuous portion of its old State's territory . . . and I conceive that there are cases in which the true interests of the whole may be promoted by disruption. For instance, where two portions of a State's territory are separated by a long interval of sea, or other physical obstacles, from any very active intercommunication, and when, from differences of race or religion, past history, or present social conditions, their respective inhabitants have divergent needs and demands in respect of legislation and other governmental interference, it may easily be inexpedient that they should have a common Government for internal affairs; while if, at the same time, their external relations, apart from their union, would be very different, it is quite possible that each part may lose more through the risk of implication in the other's quarrels, than it is likely to gain from the aid of its military force. Under such conditions as these, it is not to be desired that any sentiment of historical patriotism, or any pride in the national ownership of an extensive territory, should permanently prevent a peaceful dissolution of the incoherent whole into its natural parts."—*Elements of Politics*, pp. 648-49.

as to differences of ultimate destiny. This is the distinction between communities and nations, and it is this distinction which explains the difference in their political rights . . . A community has a right of insurrection because it is satisfied with it. All that it wants is a change in the mode and form of government. Its quarrel is not over any difference of ultimate destiny. A nation has to be accorded the right of disruption because it will not be satisfied with mere change in the form of government. Its quarrel is over the question of ultimate destiny."¹ Again, "...a community, however different from and however opposed to other communities major or minor it may be, is one with the rest in the matter of the ultimate destiny of all. A nation, on the other hand, is not only different from other components of the State, but it believes in and cherishes a different destiny totally antagonistic to the destiny entertained by other component elements in the State. The difference appears to me so profound that speaking for myself I would not hesitate to adopt it as a test to distinguish a community from a nation. A people who, notwithstanding their differences, accept a common destiny for themselves as well as for their opponents are a community. A people who are not only different from the rest, but who refuse to accept for themselves the same destiny which others do, are a nation. It is this difference in the acceptance and non-acceptance of a common destiny

¹ *Thoughts on Pakistan*, p. 329f.

which alone can explain why the Untouchables, the Christians and the Parsis are in relation to the Hindus only communities and why the Muslims are a nation. Thus, from the point of view of harmony in the body politic, the difference is of the most vital character, as the difference is one of ultimate destiny. The dynamic character of this difference is undeniable. If it persists, it cannot but have the effect of rending the State in fragments. But so far as safeguards are concerned, there cannot be any radical difference between a minor nation and a minor community, where both are prepared to live under one single constitution.”¹

I agree, but it is to be understood that this “ultimate destiny” is not to be understood in any abstruse metaphysical sense. It is only another name for what I have called “national consciousness”, which draws its inspiration, nourishment and colour from a people’s religion, history and traditions, literature and culture. Communal consciousness and national consciousness differ in their texture, character and complexion as well as in their objectives, though the one may develop into the other. The inhabitants of the Southern States of the American Union had only a grievance and no separate national consciousness. They were thus only a “community” which could demand redress of its grievances, and had no right to demand separation, and the Northern

¹ *Thoughts on Pakistan*, p. 338. The same idea was discussed by me in *The Truth* for November 16, 1937, p. 4f.

States were perfectly justified in forcing them to remain within the Union. Had they, by any chance, developed the psychological make-up of nationality, their case for separation would have stood justified. The Parsis and Christians in India are far too few and live scattered all over the country; the latter are also divided into too many denominations. The Untouchables, although fairly numerous, also live scattered and have no cultural or historical tradition of their own. Therefore, these three groups must remain mere communities and can never become nations. The question of the Muslims is a little more complicated. In fact, it is unique. Large or small, wherever there is a Muslim group, it has the consciousness of being part of a world-brotherhood. It is not possible to deprive the Muslim of this consciousness. Illiteracy, absence of communications and continued isolation for a long enough period may put it to sleep, but removal of these conditions will bring it back to life forthwith. This sense of belonging to a world-community is too strong to let the Muslim's political consciousness sink permanently to the level of that of an ordinary minority community (and I may note in passing that the Wardha Scheme of Education was intended to kill this consciousness of the Indian Musalman.)

But this consciousness, however strong, does not give the right of secession to a minority group. A Muslim minority living under a non-Muslim government may in time, by natural growth or conversions,

become powerful enough to establish its own government by displacing its former rulers, and if its Islamic consciousness has sufficient vitality it will naturally try to expand itself and grow in strength. But until that day comes, it will have to accept the position of a minority and be content with such safeguards as it can obtain. As Mr. Jinnah has explained, the Muslims of the U. P., for instance, are a small community and live scattered over a vast territory. Therefore, they can have no right of secession. They have the right only of rebellion for securing their legitimate rights and of growth and expansion, and revolution if possible, but not of secession. Similarly, the Sikhs, who are a small community and live scattered over a vast area, have the right of rebellion and safeguards, but not of self-determination or secession. The right of secession belongs only to a people who have a territorial home of their own, in which they are in a definite and clear majority, and have developed the national consciousness, *i.e.*, the desire to secede. If such a people has legitimate fears of "serious oppression", or "persistent and harsh opposition to their legitimate desires" from the other party, or "from differences of race or religion, past history, or present social conditions, has divergent needs and demands in respect of legislation and other governmental interference", its right of secession becomes undeniable. The Muslim League's demand for the right of secession for the Muslims of north-western and certain

parts of eastern India is based on this principle. The principle has been recognised in Soviet Russia ever since the Soviet state came into existence. There are about sixty large national groups in Russia. A 'nation', according to the Soviet definition, "is a historically evolved, stable community of language, territory, economic life and psychological make-up manifested in community of culture", and according to the constitutional law of Soviet Russia, a group which possesses these characteristics is a nation and as such has the right of political secession. It will be noticed that the Soviet theory is much more liberal than the principle we have stated above. According to our principle, a people must have keen desire for secession from fear of oppression and persistent and harsh opposition to its legitimate desires and interests, whereas, in Soviet Russia, the mere possession of certain characteristics by a national group entitles it to self-determination and political secession. Of course, the right of secession would not be exercised until the desire for it became insistent.

CHAPTER II

THE GOOD NEIGHBOURS

LET us now study the question of Hindu-Muslim relations in the light of their historical and cultural traditions and the political theories discussed in the last chapter. Much has been written on the cultural differences of the two peoples. There are those who think that religious fanaticism on the part of the two peoples is responsible in the main for their discords and political antagonism. They counsel, therefore, that religion should be divorced from politics and that a united Indian nation should be built on purely political bases. This line of argument is still being pursued vigorously by the so-called nationalists who have the sympathy and support of foreigners who, however, do not at all understand the real nature of the Hindu-Muslim problem. They read the history of India in the light of the history of Europe, which is badly disfigured by fanatical outbursts of sectarian fury and intolerance, persecutions and inquisitions for differences of dogma and devastating wars of religion. The history of India is singularly free from such stains, as will become apparent from the following pages.

Dr. Abdul Latif's scheme, too, of exchange of

populations and segregation of Hindus and Muslims in separate cultural zones is based on the same supposition that their political antagonism springs from the clash of their cultures. If the two cultures were allotted separate homes, to develop each in its own sphere without interference from the other, the two communities would be able to live peacefully side by side. Dr. Ambedkar writes : "The real explanation of this failure of Hindu-Muslim Unity lies in the failure to realize that what stands between the Hindus and Muslims is not a mere matter of difference. It is an antagonism as distinguished from mere difference, and that this antagonism is not to be attributed to material causes. It is spiritual in its character. It is formed by causes which take their origin in historical, religious, cultural and social antipathy, of which political antipathy is only a reflection. These form one deep river of discontent."¹

Now, Muslims conquered Sind in 712 A.D. and continued to rule over the province till about the middle of the 19th century, when they were displaced by the British. The Punjab was conquered and annexed by the Ghaznavids in 1020 and remained under Muslim rule till the close of the 18th century. The whole of northern India, including Bengal, was brought under Muslim rule before the close of the 12th century. The Deccan was conquered later. At least up to the death of Aurangzeb in 1707 A.D., the Muslims held undisputed sway over the whole of

¹ *Thoughts on Pakistan*, p. 331.

India. These are very long periods, and if the Hindu and Muslim cultures and religions were mutually so very inimical and the thing that stood between the Hindu and the Muslim was not a mere difference but an active antagonism, spiritual in character, which formed "one deep river of discontent", then one of two results must have followed: either the Muslims must have exterminated the Hindus and Hinduism and converted the whole race to Islam, or the Hindus must have exterminated the Muslims. I repeat, that if the premisses of hatred and antagonism are correct, one of these results must have followed; for the length of time the two peoples have lived in close association is to be counted not in months or years but in centuries. And as the Muslims held the upper hand while the Hindus were in a state of helpless subjection, the result of antagonism could have been only one: not a Hindu would have remained alive to tell the tale. Actually we find, however, that in Sind, after more than eleven centuries of Muslim rule, Hindus form one-fourth of the population of the province; in the Punjab, after nearly nine centuries of Muslim rule, Hindus (including Sikhs and Untouchables) are about equal to the Muslims, while in India as a whole Muslim population is only one-fourth. Sixty years ago it was one-fifth. In Delhi and Agra, which were the centres of Muslim power for many centuries, the Muslims are in a decided minority.

What tale do these figures tell? Do they prove

enmity and hatred and deep rivers of discontent, or are they rather an evidence of mutual tolerance, fellowship and good neighbourliness between the two peoples in spite of cultural and religious differences? These figures are a harder fact than the propaganda writings of Westerners who love to see the Muslims and the Hindus divided. How are these figures to be explained? The plain undisputable fact is that communal riots between the two peoples are not a feature of Indian history. It is towards the close of the 19th century that we come to hear of Hindu-Muslim riots for the first time. Even then they remained few and far between. It was after 1923 that they began to become a regular feature of Indian life. It would be absurd to contend that Hindus have now become more Hindu and Muslims more Muslim. Quite the reverse is the case. Both Hindus and Muslims of by-gone generations were more religious in their daily lives and were stricter in the performance of their religious duties than those of to-day who fly at one another's throats at the least provocation. Even to-day, in places removed from the main streams of public life, Hindus and Muslims live quite amicably together, associate as friends and neighbours, and share one another's joys and sorrows.

What has upset the amicable relations of the two communities? What has changed the fellowship, tolerance, concord, mutual sympathy and regard and good neighbourliness of yesterday into bitter hatreds of to-day? Let us study the cultural back-

grounds of the two peoples a little closely.

Unfortunately, much confusion has been created in the public mind by the numerous propaganda writings which have been published in recent years. Prof. Radhakumud Mookerji cites numerous sacred texts to prove what he calls "The Fundamental Unity of India." If the unity meant is geographical, nobody denies it, and no sacred texts are needed to prove it. The texts prove at best that according to their authors the Hindu race was spread over the whole sub-continent. That too nobody denies, and the whole thesis, so far as the present political problems are concerned, is irrelevant. Dr. Beni Prasad says : "The ideal of a state extending from sea to sea appeared as early as the Vedic Age."¹ This is a misuse of language which, in a scientific writer like the author, is inexcusable. If there was any such ideal, it never entered the consciousness of the race at large, and ideas which remain the private possession of individual thinkers or poets, but fail to form part of a people's political consciousness, have no value whatever.

The ancient Hindus had, in fact, no political or national consciousness. In the words of Hegel,² "the Hindus were a people, not a State." Their religious conceptions and social structure both prevented the growth of nationhood or political consciousness. As a recent writer has remarked :

¹ *The Hindu-Muslim Questions*, p. 83.

² *Philosophy of History*, p. 168.

"The Hindu has no fatherland ; his fatherland is the caste to which he belongs."¹ The Hindu's neighbour is not the man who lives next door and to whom he might owe neighbourly regard and neighbourly duties. His neighbour is the man of his caste, though the latter might be living a thousand miles away. It does not call for any great acumen to realize that a society fragmented into numerous castes and sub-castes, touchable and untouchable, is not very helpful to the growth of a civic or political sense.

But Hindu philosophy, of which our Hindu compatriots are so proud, made the case much worse. Ancient Hindus, indeed, produced some great thinkers whose thought was at times free and bold. But it was an evil day for the race when they turned their doctrines of philosophy into religious dogmas. It was bad for philosophy, because thought grows in freedom only and dies when it becomes a dogma. It was bad for religion, because Hindu philosophy is mostly pessimistic and otherworldly. It concerns itself more with pre-natal and post-mortem than with mundane affairs. Man is eternal, uncreate and immortal, and the present life is less than a speck in the whole career of the individual soul. It was not, therefore, worth worrying about. The doctrines of Karma, transmigrations of souls and cycles of births and rebirths of the eternal, uncreate and immortal soul, which are common to almost all systems of

¹ M. Winternitz : *Die Frau in den indischen Religionen*, p. 110.

faith born on the soil of India, are too otherworldly to permit the birth or encourage the growth of any social virtues or political ideals.

Except in two very short periods under the Mauryas and the Guptas, India was never under one government, which could help the growth of a sense of unity in the Hindu race. Whatever sense of unity there was, it had reference only to religious cults and ceremonies and caste rules, but none whatever to political life. India was far too big and communications were far too primitive and tedious to permit the growth of the sense of a common nationality. The country was divided into a number of independent sovereign kingdoms, normally at war with one another, in the making of which the people, as such, had no share. The questions of peace and war were decided, in the interests of ruling dynasties, by the rulers themselves who were despotic monarchs, and despotism is anything but helpful to the political growth of a people. The basis of the State in ancient India was power and not the willing consent of the people. The only share the "people" had in the State consisted in the payment of taxes, and political philosophers advised that the people should be "sucked dry" in the manner of "leeches, calves and bees."¹ I do not mean that every Hindu ruler was a ruthless tyrant. What is suggested is that the ideas of free citizenship and nationhood

¹ Benoy Kumar Sarkar: *The Political Institutions and Theories of the Hindus*, p. 184.

were unknown to ancient India, and that the Hindus had no tradition or memory of freedom or nationalism. This was one of the reasons why a handful of Muslim invaders were able to conquer this vast land in such a short time and hold it so long without any resistance or revolt on the part of the natives. Had the Hindus been a nation or possessed anything of what is called national consciousness, the Muslims could have never conquered this country, and it is a remarkable fact that through the whole length of Muslim rule in India, there was not a single serious popular revolt in the country. The Hindus had no sense of national unity and no sense of a common danger. They could not fight under one command even in the face of a foreign invader like Mahmud the Ghaznavid. As late as the 16th century, the Rajput Raja of Bundi, when he accepted Akbar's suzerainty, made the latter agree to the stipulation that he and his Rajput soldiers would never be put under the command of a Hindu officer.

As everybody knows, ancient Hindus had no sense of history and wrote none. Now, history is the record of a nation's achievements and failures, its hopes and aspirations and the institutions it builds to give them expression. It is the expression of a nation's genius, its character, its collective political life. History is indeed a necessary attribute of a nation's life, and a people that possesses no history is not a nation and cannot be called one. In absence of written history, there is nothing to

connect a people's past with its present or future. The continuity of life and its traditions is broken, for popular memory, in the absence of written records, does not go beyond a generation or two. Here was then a people without a past and without any ideals for the future, living its life from generation to generation, broken into a thousand fragments by caste rules. Such a people cannot be said to possess any national consciousness. The ancient Hindus were not a nation. They were only a people, a mere herd.

The Muslims of India were none better. Islam, indeed, became a state in the lifetime of its Founder himself. It has a well-defined political philosophy; I should say, Islam *is* a political philosophy; for the ethics of Islam receive their value to an appreciable extent from its political philosophy, and remain incapable of fulfilment except in a healthy, free and sovereign Islamic State. I do not at all mean that the Islamic State is a theocracy, a term which is frequently applied to it by those who do not understand the true nature and implications of the political philosophy of Islam. The Islamic State is a democracy, for whose maintenance every individual Muslim is responsible. It is this sense of personal responsibility, which is an essential part of the Muslim's faith, that gives him the privileges and lays upon him the obligations of the citizen of a State. ﴿لَا إِلَهَ إِلَّا اللَّهُۚ وَلَا شَرِيكَ لَهُۚ﴾—“There is no Islam without an organised society,” says Omar the Great.

Unfortunately, the Islamic State did not endure long enough. The Omayyads and the Abbasids destroyed it and turned it into ملک or autocratic, despotic, hereditary monarchy, and I have already pointed out that despotism is inimical to the growth of political virtues and national consciousness. It was under these two autocracies that two more elements entered into the Muslim society to vitiate and corrupt its political life, namely, theology and Sufism, both developed under the influence of Greek philosophy. These two things combined to pervert the Muslim's conscience and changed Islam from an ethico-political philosophy into a sort of "religion," a something which political slogan-mongers call a private relation between the individual and his God. Iqbal has summed up the whole historical moment in one line :

صلیمان کیا ہے۔ کشتہ، سلطانی و ملکی و پیری

Thus was effected in the body of Islam that divorce between religion and politics, against which the faith had entered such a powerful protest, which has been the death of the political life of the Muslims, and which amounts almost to a negation of the one basic principle of Islam, namely, the oneness of God. Queerly enough, the *ulama* in this country, who insist on the divorce of religion and politics, are just those who have put on the "nationalist" label!

At the time the Muslims conquered India, the divorce of religion and politics had become the accepted creed of the Muslims throughout the world

The men who conquered India were not the national army of a Muslim State, but paid mercenaries of an imperial despot. The State they established in India was not a national Muslim State, but held, maintained and exploited in the interests of an autocrat and his satellites. The Muslim Empire in India was Muslim only in the sense that the man who wore the crown professed to be a Muslim. Through the whole length of their rule in India Muslims never developed the sense of nationhood. Imperial policy from beginning to end was inimical to the growth of that sense. Had the State been a national Muslim State and had the Muslims had the sense of being a nation, they would have tried to extend the inner frontiers of that nation by converting the whole Hindu people to Islam, of course by means of persuasion and propaganda which alone are permitted by the faith, whatever bigoted enemies of Islam might say to the contrary. And they ruled for so many centuries that even a minimum of conscious effort would have sufficed to convert the whole race. No such effort was ever made, either by the State or by the people at large. The propagation that did take place was the result of un-organised and spasmodic effort of private individuals.

So we had two peoples, Hindus and Muslims, living side by side in equal servitude to an imperial despotism, and both devoid of any national feeling or national ambitions. The absence of nationalism on both sides was indeed the guarantee of their peaceful

association and good-neighbourliness.

Much has been written on the irreconcilability of the religious conceptions, beliefs and practices of the Hindus and the Muslims. The Hindu is a pantheist ; the Muslim is a monotheist. The Hindu worships idols ; the Muslim has nothing but contempt for idol-worship. The Hindu worships the cow, while the Muslim is a beef-eater. The Hindu believes in caste and untouchability ; the Muslim believes in equality of all men. The Hindu insists on racial and social exclusiveness ; the Muslim has no feeling of race as his whole consciousness is based on a creed. The Hindu does not believe in proselytism, whereas the Muslim desires to share his faith with the whole world, so that if each lives his faith, one must be always on the defence and the other always on the offensive, the conversion of one Hindu to Islam being a loss to one and gain to the other. There are heaps of other differences. Yet, in spite of them all, there is something in their respective faiths, which enabled the two peoples to live amicably together for many centuries, and which, if what they have learnt and suffered under British rule could be washed out of their minds and the same old religious mentality could be recreated in them which inspired their forefathers of a century ago, would enable them again to live amicably together as good neighbours and citizens of the same State. That something is the spirit of tolerance inculcated in both religions.

Hinduism is in fact a racial cult and not a religion in the true sense of the word. It is not a creed. There is no definite thing on which you could lay your finger and say this is Hinduism. Theists and atheists, monotheists, polytheists and pantheists, worshippers of sticks and stones and learned Mahatmas, all are equally Hindus. As there is no creed, the question of preaching or propagating religion among non-believers does not arise. In fact, in view of the peculiar structure of Hinduism there can be no such thing as non-believers, a term which presupposes the existence of a definite creed and a society interested in the maintenance of that creed. The Hindus are a racial group characterised by certain social customs and usages, chief among them being the caste system, which have attained the form and force of religion.

We have noted above that the race produced some great thinkers in antiquity. The speculations of Hindu philosophers were unhindered, as all philosophic thought must be. Neither the State nor the people interfered with them or penalised them when their thought went contrary to established opinions. The philosophers too, on their side, never tried to impose their doctrines on the people and exhorted them instead to keep to their rites, ceremonies and established customs. So we see in ancient India folly and philosophy, wisdom and superstition, living side by side in perfect peace, neither interfering with the other. Tolerance of religious opinions is indeed the great characteristic of

the Hindu race. In truth, the Hindu mind is wholly indifferent to purely doctrinal differences in religion. If the basic conceptions and principles of Islam had not been so utterly different from those of Hinduism, Brahmins, who had adopted Krishna, the prophet of monotheism, into their own system by identifying him with Vishnu and even with Brahma, would have easily found room in their pantheon for Allah and His Apostle. In any case, to show their appreciation of Islam, they did produce an Allah-Upanishad in Sanskrit!

The Muslim mind is not so indifferent. It cannot afford to be, as Islam is a religion and not a racial discipline. But the Holy Quran lays down certain injunctions which no Muslim can ignore without running counter to its intentions. Firstly, the Holy Quran says (II, 256) that there must be no compulsion in religion, conversion being dependent only on the individual's realisation of truth. Secondly, that religious discussions should be in a spirit of courtesy, kindness and forbearance : " Call to the way of thy Lord with wisdom and goodly exhortation, and have disputation with them in the best manner " (XVI, 125). Thirdly, that Muslims must not revile the false deities the polytheistic unbelievers worship because that would be subversive of social peace (VI, 109). Fourthly, that Allah has sent His apostles to every race (XXXV, 24), some of whom have been mentioned in the Holy Book, while others have not been so mentioned (IV, 164), but that a Muslim must make no difference between divine messengers

and teachers and should honour them equally (II, 285). The name of no Hindu prophet is mentioned in the Holy Quran, but if any Muslim finds from his own study and research that a particular teacher, Krishna or Buddha for example, was a true prophet¹ of God, he is bound to accept and honour him as such under the above mentioned injunctions of the Holy Book, though his personal research has no force of dogma for others. It is a fact, however, that all educated Muslims, who know the teachings of their religion, honour these and other Hindu teachers. A rational faith like Islam has no occasion to be bigoted. So, the Hindus and the Muslims, in spite of fundamental differences in the teachings of their respective faiths, could, by virtue of their traditions and those very teachings, live together as good neighbours and associate with one another with sympathy, courtesy and mutual regard. Europeans, whose own national histories are full of persecutions and religious wars, cannot understand this fact and speak frequently of "passionate intolerance" of India of the Middle Ages. But this is either sheer ignorance and false analogy or the Machiavellian tradition of divide and rule. The patent fact is that religious controversies, with intent to injure the religious susceptibilities of the other party, are not in the Indian tradition. Such offensive controversies were introduced in this country for the first time by Christian missionaries.¹

¹ Christianity is based on a dogma which is not amenable to reason

The impact of Islam on the Hindu mind and the close and sympathetic association of the two peoples gave birth to that remarkable spiritual phenomenon, the *Bhakti Movement*, represented by Chaitanya, Dadu, Kabir, Nanak and others. It is strange that in spite of the much-advertised "liberalism" of Akbar, the Mughal period of Indian history produced no such men. Akbar's religious policy had no rational foundation. It was of the Machiavellian variety, which his Western admirers have perfected into a fine art. The foreign soldiery he had with him was small, and he did not want to repeat the sad experience of his father who was driven out of India by a petty landlord and remained a fugitive for fifteen years. So, to create a balance of power in the country, he set the Hindu against the Musalman and ruled comfortably over both. Abdul Qādir Badāyūnī, one of the most capable men at Akbar's court whom, in spite of his open opposition to his policies, the Emperor could not dispense with, has left a detailed description of his religious policy and the steps he took to suppress Islam. "Wine was declared lawful and bacon was made an ingredient of wine; Jizya or and cannot therefore help becoming intolerant of other opinions, and Europe was able to establish social peace only by driving religion from public life and segregating it to churches. Besides, Christianity has a most extraordinary dogma that all religious teachers other than Christ, including those of the Old Testament, were "thieves and robbers" and mere "hirelings" (Jn. X, 8, 12.). Christian preachers had perforce to 'prove' that they were thieves and robbers! What is more, the dogma of Christ's superiority is based not on his teachings and deeds but on miracles and the alleged manner of his birth, both of which lie beyond the pale of reason, and therefore naturally lead to fanatical disregard of freedom of opinion.

the military tax was abolished and beef was declared unlawful. Pigs and dogs were specially reared and regarded as manifestations of God. The Salāt or the prescribed prayers, the Šaum or the prescribed fasts and the Hajj or pilgrimage to Mecca were abolished. The Islamic calendar was replaced by the new fangled Ilāhi months and years. Indeed Islam after a thousand years was considered to have played itself out ; the study of Arabic was looked upon as if it were something unlawful ; the Law of Islam or Fiqh, Tafsir or the exegesis of the Quran and Hadīth or the traditions of the Prophet were ridiculed ; and those who prosecuted these studies were looked down upon as deserving of contempt. The Adhān or call to prayers, and the Namāz-i-Jamā'at or congregational prayers which used to be, as prescribed by Islam, offered five times a day in the state hall were stopped. Such names as Ahmad, Muhammad and Mustafa, the various names of the Prophet of God, had become offensive to the Emperor, and to utter them was a crime. Mosques and prayer-rooms were changed into store-rooms and into Hindu guard-rooms. Islam was in great distress. Unbelievers could openly ridicule and condemn Islam and the Musalmans. The rites of Hinduism were celebrated in every street and corner, while Musalmans were not permitted to carry out the injunctions of Islam. The Hindus when they observed fast could compel the Musalmans not to eat and drink in public, while they themselves could eat and drink

publicly during Ramadān. At several places Musalmans had to pay with their lives for sacrificing the cow on Id-al-Adhā. A number of mosques were destroyed by Hindus and temples erected in their places."¹

This is the true picture of Akbar's so-called "tolerance" and liberality. It was a great set-back to Hindu-Muslim relations. The frankness and cordiality of the former days gave place to a sense of rivalry which continued throughout the Mughal period. Fortunately, Akbar's anti-Islamic policy was not followed by his successors, and the sense of rivalry did not go far beyond court circles. Among ordinary folk not connected with the court, the same old relations of courtesy, regard and good neighbourliness continued and did so to our own times. Maulvi 'Abaidullah, a Hindu convert to Islam whose *Tuhfat-ul-Hind* was first published in 1851, gives incidentally a pleasing picture of the mutual relations of the Hindus and the Muslims. He gives a long list of his Hindu relations and friends who were studying Islam and had either embraced it or were on the eve of doing so. These things could not be except by close and sympathetic association and in an atmosphere of social harmony and peace. Hindus and Muslims participated in one another's festivals, marriages and other domestic events and shared their joys and sorrows. It was a fine age when

¹ Dr. Burhan Ahmad Faruqi : *The Mujaddid's Conception of Tawhid*, pp. 20-22.

men were really religious and peace and harmony prevailed, an age which we of to-day who live in towns and read newspapers can hardly imagine. The late Lala Lajpat Rai, who spent his life in bitter opposition to the Muslims, has told us in what close relationship his father and he himself in his earlier days lived with the Muslims. The same story could be found repeated in thousands and hundreds of thousands of other families. If these relations between the two communities had continued uninterrupted, in due time a nation, united in mind and soul, would have been born on the soil of India. Can those days ever possibly come back ?

CHAPTER III

CAUSES OF ESTRANGEMENT

WE have seen that neither the Hindus nor the Muslims of the pre-British period possessed a national consciousness and were therefore able to live side by side as good neighbours. Had the Muslims been able to develop the sense of being a nation, they would have assimilated the Hindu race and extinguished Hinduism. Had the Hindus been a nation, they would have exterminated the Muslims. Instead, the Hindus fought under the Muslims and the Muslims under the Hindus, quite indiscriminately. They fought for dynasties, not for causes or nations. Again, had they been a nation, the British could have never conquered India. As a matter of fact, Hindus as well as Muslims fought against Hindus and Muslims under the British flag without any idea of a nationality, not in the least suspecting what chains of servitude they were forging for themselves, the like of which the history of India had not known before. It has been truly said that India was conquered by Indians with Indian money, for England. Such a thing would have been impossible, had there been any national idea or sentiment in the peoples of India at all.

But while the two peoples lived side by side as good neighbours, they maintained their separate identities throughout the long centuries of their association. By his centuries long discipline of racial exclusiveness, untouchability and caste rules, the Hindu has raised around himself walls which none can overstep. The Aryans came to this country four thousand years ago, but have failed to assimilate the original inhabitants up to this day. No doubt, Scythians, Parthians and Huns were absorbed into the body of Hinduism. But these peoples had come as conquerors, and it was with a view to re-establishing their ascendancy that the Brahmans made room for them in their body. It was like Rome re-asserting herself through the spiritual arm over her barbarian conquerors. Had they been a conquered people, their lot would not have been different from that of the Sudras. Sivaji could get Brahmans from Benares to vouch for his being a Rajput. But no ordinary Mahratta could aspire to that honour.

The Scythians, Parthians and Huns were semi-barbarous peoples and had to surrender to the superior culture of the Hindus. But the Muslims brought a higher culture, a higher mind and the consciousness of being the bearers of a higher and purer faith. Therefore, they could not be absorbed or assimilated into Hinduism. The Hindu's race consciousness is very strong. He observes untouchability and caste rules. The Muslim's race consciousness is very weak. Islam weakens it and seeks to

kill it. The Indian Muslims have none, as they spring from many races. But their religious¹ consciousness is very strong. The sources from which the two peoples derive their inspiration, their moral concepts and spiritual nourishment are different. So, in spite of their centuries of close association and sympathetic intercourse, the Hindus and the Muslims remained separate. The two streams could not mix. They were two nationalities, wholly different in their traditions, social structure, moral conceptions and psychological make-up, so utterly different indeed, that if at any time the sentiment, which the political philosopher calls national consciousness, were to awaken in them and become dynamic, they could not but react differently ; they could not but grow into two separate nations. For nationalism or nationhood is nothing but the consciousness of separate nationality become dynamic. This is what has happened to the Hindus and the Muslims. The

¹ Propaganda, Indian and European, has been so strong and persistent against religion that the mere fact that a certain people's religious consciousness is strong is considered sufficient condemnation of that people. Apart from the fact that, as pointed out by Renan and other political philosophers, race has never formed the basis of nationhood, one might well ask whether morally it is justifiable to make race the sole basis of nationhood or any other form of group life. What peculiar virtue lies in being the scion of a particular family or a particular caste or race that one should be taken into a group or kept out of it for mere birth ? Why should any privilege or lack of privilege belong to birth and blood alone ? And is not there something barbarous and primitive in basing political associations merely on race or blood ? A moral idea constitutes a far better and far more humane basis of association. The thing is so obvious, it hardly calls for argument to prove its soundness and superiority. Islam has, therefore, abolished the barbarous tradition of blood-association and replaced it by that of faith and ethical principles in national life.

two peoples have become self-conscious nations, and not until they readjust their relations in the light of this new consciousness will there be any peace between them.

Let us now inquire how this consummation has taken place. In a word, it was one of the direct results of the British policy of discrimination and favouring one community at the expense of the other.¹

The nationalism of the Hindus and the Musalmans has been of slow growth, and no definite date can be assigned as to when it ripened definitely. It showed itself at first in the form of economic rivalry, especially with respect to Government employment, which later turned into political rivalry and finally into national animosity. It will be remembered that Muslim rule was radically different from British rule in its economic aspects. Muslim rule was as national as the rule of the Mauryas or the Guptas in the sense of being indigenous. The Muslim conquerors made India their home. The Muslim rulers were as Indian as Mr. Gandhi or Maulana Azad, and the revenues they raised in the country were spent in the country ; they did not send them out to any foreign land,

¹ It is obvious from the early history of British rule in India that the new rulers acted, consciously and almost as a matter of principle, as champions of Hinduism against the Muslims. The latter, being the erstwhile rulers of the country, had to be suppressed. For instance, Lord Ellenborough, Governor-General of India, wrote in a despatch to the Duke of Wellington dated 18-6-1843 : " I cannot close my eyes to the belief that that race (*i.e.*, the Muslims) is fundamentally hostile to us and our true policy is to reconcile the Hindus."

whereas British rule has been one long steady drain right up to to-day, which has made England one of the wealthiest and India the most poverty-stricken country in the world. The British were then a company of merchants, and as soon as they had obtained a foothold in the country, they began to ruin the industry and commerce of Bengal. Mir Qasim, the last Muslim ruler of Bengal, tried to stop the injustice and made an amazing sacrifice of his revenues, but lost his throne, and Bengal passed out of Muslim hands for ever.

The next blow, which again fell heavily on the Musalmans specially, was the Permanent Settlement of Bengal (which included Assam, Bihar and Orissa at the time). Under that Settlement, the real owners of lands were turned by a stroke of the pen into tenants, the lower Hindu revenue collectors were made landlords, and the higher Muslim revenue officers were thrown on the rubbish heap: they were replaced by European officers. Dr. W. W. Hunter writes: "The whole tendency of the (Permanent) Settlement was to acknowledge as the landholders the subordinate Hindu officers who dealt directly with the husbandmen . . . It elevated the Hindu collectors, who up to that time had held but unimportant posts, to the position of landholders, gave them a proprietary right in the soil and allowed them to accumulate wealth which would have gone to the Musalmans under their own rule."¹ Three avenues

¹ *The Indian Musalmans*, p. 159f.

of employment were open to the Muslims of noble houses under the Muslim rule, revenue and administration, the judiciary and the army. In the first, they were replaced by European officers or newly created Hindu landlords. The army was closed to them and no commissions were given to Indians until recently, and the Muslim law-officers were also displaced later. So the Muslims began to sink rapidly. Hunter, writing in 1871, says : "During the last seventy-five years (*i.e.*, since the Permanent Settlement) the Musalman Houses of Bengal have either disappeared from the earth, or are at this moment being submerged beneath the new strata of society which our rule has developed."¹ Speaking of these great Muslim Houses he says elsewhere : "In every district the descendant of some line of princes sullenly and proudly eats his heart out among roofless palaces and weed-choked tanks. Of such families I have personally known several. Their houses swarm with grown-up sons and daughters, with grand-children and nephews and nieces, and not one of the hungry crowd has a chance of doing anything for himself in life. They drag on a listless existence in patched-up verandahs or leaky outhouses, sinking deeper and deeper into a hopeless abyss of debt, till the neighbouring Hindu money-lender fixes a quarrel on them, and then in a moment a host of mortgages foreclose, and the ancient Musalman family is suddenly swallowed up and disappears for ever."²

¹ *The Indian Musalmans*, p. 162.

² *Ibid.*, p. 152.

The numerous Hindu Rajas and Maharajas one finds in Bengal, Bihar, Orissa and Chhota Nagpur to-day are the descendants of the same petty revenue collectors and money-lenders.

The Muslim system of education depended upon rent-free grants of land made by Muslim rulers and their officers. These grants were resumed. Hunter writes :¹ "Special courts were created (in 1828), and during the next eighteen years the whole province was overrun with informers, false witnesses, and calm, stern Resumption Officers . . . Hundreds of ancient families were ruined, and the educational system of the Musalmans, which was almost entirely maintained by rent-free grants, received its death-blow. The scholastic classes of the Muhammadans emerged from the eighteen years of harrying absolutely ruined." He adds : "There can be no doubt whatever that from those resumptions the decay of the Muhammadan system of education dates."²

Most scandalous perhaps is the story of the Hugli Trust, and the scandal continues to this day. The Trust was created by one Haji Muhammad Mohsin who died in 1806, leaving behind a vast estate for religious purposes, including an educational institution. The two trustees quarrelled. The Government dismissed both of them in 1816, appointed itself in place of one trustee and nominated another one. "Next year it let out the estate in perpetuity, taking a suitable payment from each of the permanent lease-

¹ *The Indian Musalmans*, p. 182f.

² *Ibid.*, p. 184.

holders. These payments, with the arrears which had accumulated during the litigation, now amount to £105,700, besides over £12,000 which has since been saved from the annual proceeds of the estate." This amount and the annual proceeds from the estate were spent by the Government on founding a college, from which the Musalmans were practically excluded. "To cloak so gross a breach of trust," Dr. Hunter says, the Government attached a small school for Musalmans to the college. The writer continues : "Besides the misappropriation of the accumulated funds in building the College, it annually diverted £5,000 to its maintenance. That is to say, out of an income of £5,260, it devoted only £350 to the little Muhammadan school which alone remained to bear witness to the original character of the Trust. It is painful to dwell on this charge of misappropriation, because it is impossible to rebut it."¹

A still greater disaster occurred with the change of language in educational institutions and Government offices. The educational languages of the Musalmans of Bengal were Arabic, Persian and Urdu. The official language was Persian, while gentlemen spoke Urdu at home. English schools were established in 1835, and Urdu was replaced by Bengali in vernacular schools. Bengali was the language of the Hindus alone, and naturally Hindu teachers were appointed to teach in the schools.² It appeared as if

¹ *The Indian Musalmans*, pp. 184-6.

² Dr. Hunter (*ibid.*, p. 180f.) says: "The Muhammadans have just ground for complaining that the funds which we levy impartially from all

the Government were determined to exclude the Muslims from the official life. The Muslims refused to accept these changes and send their children to these schools. The results began to make themselves felt after 1850. With their educational foundations gone and their language abolished, the Muslims could not but lose their place in Government services. Dr. Hunter gives figures of Muslim employees department by department in his own day and concludes : " In fact, there is now scarcely a Government office in Calcutta in which a Muhammadan can hope for any post above the rank of porter, messenger, filler of inkpots and mender of pens." ¹ *Dūrbīn*, a Calcutta Persian paper, wrote in its issue of July 14, 1869 : " All sorts of employment, great and small, were being gradually snatched away from the Muhammadans and bestowed on men of other races, particularly the Hindus. The Government is bound to look upon all classes of its subjects with an equal eye. Yet the time has now come when it publicly singles out the Muhammadans in its Gazettes for exclusion from official posts. Recently, when several vacancies occurred in the office of the Sundarbans Commissioner, that official, in advertising them in the Government Gazette, stated that the appointments would be given to none but Hindus. In short, the Muhammadans have now sunk so low, that, even when qualified for Government employ, they are classes for State Education, are expended on a system exclusively adopted to the Hindus."

¹ *The Indian Musalmans*, p. 167.

studiously kept out of it by Government notifications. Nobody takes any notice of their helpless condition, and the higher authorities do not deign even to acknowledge their existence." Hunter adds in a footnote that the statement about the Sundarbans Commissioner's advertisement attracted official notice at the time, but was not contradicted.¹

A few more quotations may be noticed. Dr. Hunter writes (p. 148) : "Indeed, from the highest official to the lowest . . . there is now a firm conviction that we have failed in our duty to the Muhammadan subjects of the Queen. A great section of the Indian population, some thirty millions in number, finds itself decaying under British rule." On p. 150 the same author writes : "It is not that they have ceased to retain the entire State Patronage, but that they are gradually being excluded from it altogether. It is not that they must now take an equal chance with the Hindus in the race of life, but that, at least in Bengal, they have ceased to have a chance at all. In short, it is a people with great traditions and without a career." The conclusion he derives (p. 155) is : "A hundred and seventy years ago it was almost impossible for a well-born Musalman in Bengal to become poor ; at present it is almost impossible for him to continue rich." Were the Muslims in any way inferior to the Hindus ? Dr. Hunter answers (p. 167f.) : "When the country passed under our rule, the Musalmans were the superior race and

¹ *The Indian Musalmans*, p. 172.

superior not only in stoutness of heart and strength of arm, but in power of political organisation and in the science of practical government." Only it was the British rule that had descended upon them as a blight and reduced them to a condition of utter helplessness.

It is obvious from these citations that Hindu monopoly of official preferment was completely established by 1870, and the Hindus were determined to maintain their monopoly and keep the Muslims out of Government service by all possible means. It appears that some Government Officers realised that the Muslims had been unjustly treated, and made a move for making some room for Muslims also in the Government service. The *Hindu Patriot* of Calcutta, in its issue of August 2, 1870, strongly opposed the proposal and wrote that the Muslims were rebels and must not be encouraged in any wise whatever. The Muslims had to struggle for many years to break the Hindu monopoly of services, which the Hindus sought to maintain by every variety of low trickery and petty office intrigues. The low trickery and the petty intrigues continue to this day. It will be remembered that communal inequalities in the services have always formed a large part of India's politics and have contributed in no small degree to the embitterment of communal relations. Despite all efforts to the contrary, the communal inequalities continue, and the bitterness they engender has deepened into permanent animosity between the

Hindus and the Muslims.

Before we take leave of Bengal, it will not be irrelevant to take notice of the *Bande-Mataram* song which has contributed in no small degree to the embitterment of communal relations. The song occurs in a book which appeared in 1882 and shows how far apart the two peoples had already travelled and how the Hindus were already thinking of establishing Hindu Raj by allying themselves with the British and exterminating the Muslims, which the book teaches to be the true meaning of the worship of Vishnu.

"The song occurs in, and is of the very essence of the spirit of, Bankim Chandra Chatterjee's novel *Ananda Math*. Bhavananda, the hero of the story, is planning an armed revolt against Moslem power in Bengal,—the date is about 168 years ago. He is collecting recruits, and on a highway adventure meets one Mahendra whose wife and daughter he has earlier rescued from robbers. Bhavananda hums the song *Bande Mataram*. Mahendra at first does not understand, and then, perceiving the trend of it, asks Bhavananda to sing again. The latter repeats the song, explaining in between how and why rebellion is necessary to liberate the country, which he throughout calls the 'Mother'. Mahendra is too timid and asks Bhavananda to abandon the 'impossible' project. In reply, Bhavananda bursts into spirited eloquence and concludes: 'Our religion is gone, our caste is gone, our honour is gone; now even life is insecure. Can the Hindus preserve their

Hinduism unless these drunken *nereys* (term of contempt for Moslems) are driven away ?' Mahendra asks, ' Will you drive them away single-handed ? ' Bhavananda's reply is some lines of the song *Bande Mataram* which, literally translated, mean : ' When seventy million throats will roar, and twice seventy million hands will hold the sharp-edged swords, call you the Mother weak ? ' Further argument follows. Mahendra points out the prowess of the Moslems ; but Bhavananda maintains that Moslems are ' cowards '. His words are : ' The Englishman does not run away (from battle) even when his life is in danger, but the Moslem runs away even as soon as he begins to perspire... If one cannon-ball falls anywhere near them the whole tribe of Moslems run for very life... ' But still Mahendra is not convinced and says, ' I will not take that vow. '

" Next morning Bhavananda takes Mahendra to the temple ' Ananda Math.' The Brahmachari in charge conducts Mahendra inside the temple where is semi-darkness. Mahendra gradually sees the following : A huge image of four-armed Vishnu, complete with conch, circle, club and lotus, two decapitated and bloody heads rolling in front of Vishnu ; on the left of the image is Lakshmi, on the right Saraswati ; and on the lap of Vishnu is another ' lovely ' image. The Brahmachari asks, ' Do you see the image on the lap of Vishnu ? ' Mahendra says, ' Yes, who is she ? ' ' The Mother,' answers the Brahmachari, ' we are her children ; say, *Bande*

Mataram.' Here a comment may be permitted : The Mother is an *image* which represents the motherland in the shape of an *idol*, and is surrounded by other Hindu idols. That *idolised* Motherland is hailed with the words 'Bande Mataram' Then Mahendra is led to another part of the temple. Here the presiding deity is "Jagatdhatri", an image surrounded by splendour. The Brahmachari explains : 'The Mother(land) was at first like this.' Mahendra reverently salutes 'the motherland symbolising Jagatdhatri,' and is led into a dark tunnel. In a subterranean chamber is the image of Kali, black, bare and unclad. The Brahmachari explains : 'This is what the Mother(land) has *now* become.' 'Why does she hold those weapons in her hands ?' asks Mahendra. 'We, her children, have armed her with them,' answers the Brahmachari, and commands ; 'say, *Bande Mataram !*'

"Thence Mahendra is led to another chamber, where the ten-armed Durga presides. The Brahmachari says : 'This is what the Mother(land) will be like, when the enemy will be crushed under her feet.' Here also Lakshmi and Saraswati are present, and working himself to an excess of fervour, the Brahmachari chants words which are identical with those words of the song which, literally translated, mean : 'Thou art Durga with ten arms ; and thou art Lakshmi lotus ranging : and thou art Vani (Saraswati) that giveth knowledge ; I salute thee !' Mahendra is now converted and says, 'I

will take the vow.' Here another comment may be permitted. The Mother(land) is clearly conceived as having no separate identity but being *identical* with all the three goddesses, and accordingly saluted.

"In Part II, Chapter 5 of the book the process of initiation of the recruits to the rebel 'army' is described. Each one vows to renounce, 'as long as the Mother is not liberated,' all family and worldly ties and to 'hold arms with my own hands and fight for the *Sanatan Dharma*', and then each is commanded to sing *Bande Mataram* to seal the vow.

"When many have been thus recruited and initiated, they are sent in batches to different villages to terrorize the Moslems. In the author's own words (Part III, Chapter 1), 'The emissaries go to a village and wherever they see Hindus they say 'Brother, will you perform the worship of Vishnu?' and so saying, they collect 20 or 25 Hindus and sally forth on Moslem villages, and set fire to Moslem houses. The Moslems run helter-skelter to save their lives, and the sons (of the Mother) loot all the possessions of the Moslems and distribute them among the votaries of Vishnu. Getting a share of the loot the (Hindu) villagers are pleased and they are taken to Vishnu temples and made to touch the feet of the images and then initiated as (new) sons.' One more comment: It may be noted that the worship of Vishnu and the service of the Mother(land) takes the form of falling upon Moslem villages, burning their houses and looting their property.

“The arson, looting and killing proceed. In Chapter 8 of the same Part a further description is given. To translate literally, ‘... then there was much shouting. Some shouted, ‘Kill, kill, kill the *nereys*,’ some shouted, *Bande Mataram*, some shouted, ‘Brother, will the day come when we shall break mosques and build temples of Radha-madhav on the sites ?’ ... and oft and anon there were great shouts of *Bande Mataram* ...”

“Let us now pass on to Part III, Chapter 6. The English are taking a hand against the rebels. The writer describes: ‘The woods and the valleys resounded with the song *Bande Mataram* ... Loudly the soldiers of Vishnu sang: Thou art knowledge, thou art worship; Thou art strength in both my arms; Thou in this body of mine art Life’... (three lines of the song.)

“In the last chapter of the book a note of disappointment is struck. A ‘Physician’ and Satyananda, the leader of the rebellion, converse. Satyananda says, ‘The Moslem power has been crushed, but Hindu power has not yet been established: the English still rule at Calcutta.’ The Physician answers, ‘Hindu power will not yet be established.’ Satyananda cries out, ‘O Lord! who then will rule? Shall Muslims rule again?’ And so the argument goes on till the Physician, now revealed as some ‘superman’, consoles the rebel leader: ‘There is no more any enemy: the English are our friends...’

“In conclusion, and in explanation of this last

sentiment, let us quote the comment of a contemporary journal on the purpose and theme of the novel. The *Liberal*, dated April 8, 1882, wrote : The Physician said, Satyananda, be not crest-fallen. It is so written that the English should first rule over the country before there could be a revival of the Aryan Faith . . ." ¹

The same spirit of antagonism among the Hindus against the Muslims and distrust and political rivalry was growing up in northern India. We may begin our survey with the Mutiny of 1857, which was confined mostly to what are now the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh and to Delhi and districts administratively dependent upon it. Hindus and Muslims participated in it equally. It was started by the Hindus and the Muslims threw in their lot with them. The mutiny was quelled in a few months, and that put an end to Hindu-Muslim unity. The Hindus turned traitors to their erstwhile comrades in arms and became informers, and the whole wrath of the Government fell upon the Muslims. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, who was an eye-witness of what befell in the Mutiny and what followed in its wake, writing in 1887 to Mr. (later Justice) Badr-ud-din Tyabji, a barrister of Bombay who presided over the Madras Session of the Indian National Congress in that year, said : "What happened during the Mutiny ? Hindus began it. The Muslims were more daring and plunged into it. (At the end) the Hindus

¹"Ain-ul-Mulk" in the *Statesman*, September 5, 1937.

washed off their sins in the holy waters of the Ganges and became as good as before, but thousands of Muslim families went to rack and ruin."¹ It is difficult to describe the horrors that fell upon the Muslims in consequence of the Mutiny. "Show me a Muslim and I will show you a rebel", went the saying among European Officers. "To them were attributed all the horrors and calamities of that terrible time."² In a pamphlet published in 1860 on "The Loyal Mohammedans of India", Syed Ahmad Khan wrote: "There was no atrocity committed then of which the blame was not imputed to the Mohammedans, although the parties really guilty may have been Ramdin and Matadin." Again: "I am an attentive reader of the newspapers, and I have also read the various works that have been written upon the Mutiny and rebellion, and in all do I find the most bitter denunciations against the Mohammedans, who are freely represented as being everything that is vile, treacherous and contemptible. There was no prickly thorn in those awful times respecting which it was not said that it was planted by a Mohammedan! There was no fiery whirlwind that was not raised by a Mohammedan!"³ The language is picturesque and powerful, but states the bare truth. Thousands perished in the massacres that followed the suppression of the mutiny, their properties were confiscated and their orphaned

¹ Quoted in Hālī's *Hayāt-i-Jāvīd*, Vol. I, p. 281 (First Edition).

² Gen. G. F. I. Graham: *The Life and Work of Syed Ahmad Khan*, p. 58 (First Edition). ³ *Ibid.*, pp. 59, 60.

children handed over to the Christian missionaries.

Confiscations continued for long afterwards. Fires of the Mutiny had hardly died out when there began a long series of what are called "Wahābī prosecutions" throughout Northern India, from Eastern Bengal to the Punjab, which continued right into the eighties. Maulvi Muhammad Ja'far, one of the sufferers who had to spend many years in the Andamans, has left us a graphic account¹ of those prosecutions in a homely straightforward language; for he was not a man of letters or learning. It appears from his narrative that these trials were far from perfect and not always fair. For instance, a gentleman of Karnal was arrested on suspicion, tried and convicted, and his whole estate worth five lakhs was confiscated. The gentleman was later found innocent and released, but his property was not returned to him! It appears from the accounts of that period that the Government was determined to impoverish the Muslims and suppress them to such an extent that they should never be able to lift their heads again. The eagle, said a Governor of Madras in those days, does not mind the chirping of sparrows, but if a hawk or a falcon dares to lift its head in the face of his majesty, he breaks its neck forthwith.² The sparrows were the Hindus who were free to chatter on the public platform and in the press, while the Government's heavy hand was reserved for the Muslims alone. These events, which

¹ *Kalā Pāni*.

² Quoted by Hāli in *Hayāt-i-Jārid*, p. 271.

Sir Syed Ahmad Khan had seen with his own eyes and lived through, made a profound impression upon him and determined his politics to the end of his life. He was anxious to save his community from extinction and enable it to live once again a life of honour in the country. That became the sole motive of his politics. With this end in view he sought to keep the Muslims from all political agitation and tried by all means in his power to bring about reconciliation between the Muslims and their British conquerors. It has become a fashion these days to decry Sir Syed's policy, but they forget that in the conditions prevailing in his day no other policy was possible without dire consequences for the Muslim community in India which was then threatened with extinction. Principal Gurmukh Nihal Singh says, "The activities of Sir Syed Ahmad and Mr. Beck led to the estrangement of the Hindus and the Muslims," and that Sir Syed "championed all just causes of Indians as a nation and advocated Hindu-Muslim unity, until he fell under the powerful and subtle influence of Principal Beck."¹ This is ignorance if not deliberate perversion of history, for the fact is that the estrangement had taken place years before Beck came to India, or the M. A.-O. College, of which he came as Principal, was ever founded. All accounts agree that the estrangement took place as an immediate consequence of the speedy suppression of the Mutiny,

¹ Presidential Address to the All-India Political Science Conference, January 2, 1943, for which see *The Indian Journal of Political Science*, April-June, 1943.

when, as I have noted above, the Hindus became traitors and informers, and the gulf became wider and wider as the years went by. It is also a fact that if the Hindus had not become informers and gushing loyalists, the Muslims' sufferings would not have been as great as they were. An old gentleman one day led me through Dariba Kalān (Delhi) and the Kanārī Bazaar that leads off from it. We counted four mosques situated close to one another. The presence of four ancient mosques so close to one another reminded one of the fact that the whole locality was once inhabited by Muslims. No Muslim family lives there now. All families but one were exterminated on the gallows at *Khūnī Darwāza* where the Dariba joins the Chāndni Chowk. That was the work of the Hindu informers. The memory of that treachery is reflected even in the poetical literature of the period. The Muslims bewailed that the Hindus' political friendship was undependable, while the Hindus declared from house-tops that Muslims were rebels and a turbulent race, in the same way as they have been shouting for decades now that the Musalmans are toadies and allies of the foreign imperialist bureaucracy! Hindu writers, who shed crocodile tears over what they call the "Musalmān's communalism", pass over these events in complete silence.

Large-hearted as he was, Syed Ahmad Khan, though fully aware of the Hindus' perfidy, kept his mental balance and continued to look upon

Hindus and Muslims as one people and to work for their collective well-being without any distinction of race or creed, until the Hindus forced him by their own conduct to turn his face to his own community. It is obvious that for any two peoples, living so mixed up together as Hindus and Muslims do in this country, to form one nation it is indispensable that they should have a common language. Owing to their close association of centuries, such a common language, namely, Urdu, had grown up, which was spoken by the Hindu and the Muslim alike. The Hindus now suddenly discovered that they did not want Urdu.

Some leading Hindus of Benares started an agitation in 1867 that Urdu should be replaced by Brijbhasha and the Arabic character by Devnagari character in all Government offices and courts, and committees and Sabhas were established throughout Northern India with a head-office at Allahabad to carry on the agitation. According to Sir Syed's biographer:¹ "Sir Syed used to say that it was the first time when he was convinced that it was thenceforth impossible for the Hindus and the Muslims to live as one nation or to make any joint effort for the

¹ Hālī: *Hayāt-i-Jāvid*, Vol. I, p. 140. A year earlier the Syed had suggested to the Government that a university should be established somewhere in Northern India, at which higher education should be imparted through the medium of Urdu. The Hindus objected that at the proposed university the language for Hindu students should be Hindi. When it was pointed out to them that Hindi was not sufficiently developed to become the medium of university education, they said the Government should spend money to bring it to the level of Urdu. The project fell through, though the Government was at first in favour of it.

progress of the country. He says: At the time when this agitation started at Benares I one day spoke to Mr. Shakespeare, who was then Commissioner of Benares, about the education of the Musalmans, while he listened to me in amazement. At the end of my speech he remarked, 'This is the first time I have heard you speak of the interests of the Musalmans, whereas heretofore you have always spoken of the well-being of Indians as such.' I replied, I am now convinced that the two peoples will never sincerely join hands in any common enterprise. It is not gone far yet, but hatred and enmity are increasing on account of those who call themselves educated. He who lives will see its consequences.' Mr. Shakespeare said, 'It will be a sad day if your prophecy comes true.' I replied, 'I too am extremely sorry, but I am fully convinced of the soundness of my prophecy.'" Subsequent history has proved how sound the prophecy was. For three quarters of a century the Hindus have been trying to unlearn Urdu and replace it by Hindi, until Mr. Gandhi, who bespeaks the Hindu mind in such matters more faithfully than any other, says unashamedly that all those words must be expunged from Hindustani, which remind the Hindus of the Muslims' having once ruled over the country—and naturally also of their presence in it!

Reference in the above quotation to "those who call themselves educated" requires some elucidation, as it brings into relief another factor which was

widening the gulf between the two communities. I have pointed out in a previous chapter that possession of historical literature is necessary to the formation of a nation, and that a people which possesses no historical literature cannot become a nation. The Hindus possessed no historical literature and had no historical sense, and for this reason, though they were ever conscious of being a separate people, they had not developed national consciousness and were not a nation. This deficiency was made good in the new system of education introduced by the Government in 1835. The text-books of history prescribed for study in the new schools, written by British civilians or Christian missionaries, were purposely so designed as to instil poison and create hatred and enmity in the hearts of the Hindus against the Muslims. According to Hālī, the results of this policy had begun to show themselves in the early sixties. Indeed, Hālī speaks again and again of anti-Muslim hatred of the "educated Hindus", who had received their education at these schools. Much water has flowed under the bridges since then. Generation after generation fed upon the same venomous stuff for more than a century has borne its natural fruit. The race has also developed a taste for history. They have been busy unearthing the past with a view to constructing a rational history of their race and have learnt to take pride in it. Thus, one very important element whose absence had prevented the race from becoming a

nation has taken its birth. And it is but an evidence of their newly awakened sense of nationalism that they have beaten their masters in the art of perversion of history to the extent even of fabricating downright falsehoods.¹ The mendacious and most

¹ The poisonous propaganda by Hindus against Muslims at educational institutions is going on today as strongly as ever in spite of their glib professions of nationalism. A note submitted to the Kamal Yar Jung Education Committee about conditions in the Punjab University says *inter alia* : "Those who have examined necessary papers in history will know how Muslim rulers and administrators are depicted as blood-sucking vampires and fiends of cruelty. The general impression which they give is that the Muslim rulers came to India simply to destroy the Hindus and their culture and to convert the people to Islam at the point of the sword. Most of these views are often shared by the Muslim candidates themselves. Partly it is due to the desire of getting sympathy from non-Muslim examiners. An incident is given in which a Hindu student in M. A. Class taking up Aurangzeb as his thesis fared badly at the hands of an examiner as he gave a favourable view of Aurangzeb's administration." —Report, p. 200 f. Sir Aziz-ul-Huq, in a separate note in the same Report (p. 295) speaks of a subtle method of anti-Muslim propaganda carried on through school text-books and quotes the following sentence from a text-book prescribed by a Provincial Text-Book Committee for use in the VII Class: "Though Hossain Shah was a Mohammedan, he was very tolerant," meaning to impress the students thereby that a Muslim as such must indeed be intolerant. Sir Aziz-ul-Huq says: "This is not the only instance ; there are hundreds of such text-books in use in schools all over India. Some of the text-books in schools and colleges are saturated with anti-Muslim hatred; some language readers give atrocious stories and sometimes a staggering creation."

Indra Prakash, a Mahasabha apologist, maligns Islam and the Muslims thus (in *Where We Differ*, p. 81): "The Muslim religion exalts and hero-worships an assassin. This religion encourages its followers to kill men of other religions. According to the tenets of Islam the killing of a *Kafir* or a man belonging to the fold of any other religion raises the murderer or assassin in the estimation of his fellow-men or community; nay, it makes him a *shahid* and facilitates his transport to heaven." Again (on p. 87): "Thousands of Hindu boys and girls are being kidnapped every year by the Muslims." Is it possible to exceed this mendacity and malevolence ?

Another recent instance of a whole tissue of perversions is the Presidential Address of Gurmukh Nihal Singh, referred to in a previous foot-note, in which he says that Sir Syed founded the All-India Muslim

venomous propaganda that is being carried on in schools, colleges and the public press day after day against the Muslims is common knowledge, and there is no need to expatiate on it. All that we have to note is that a people that is engaged almost to a man, day in and day out, in such persistent and tireless inimical and mendacious propaganda against the Muslims, must of necessity consider itself separate from the latter and to be at deadly enmity with them. If the Hindus considered themselves a part of the same nation with the Muslims, such propaganda would not be possible, because in that case it would be directed against their own body politic. Only a fool or a knave will argue to the contrary.

These were the various factors which determined the policies of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan and led him to counsel his co-religionists to keep aloof from the Congress. Hālī says again and again that the attitude of the Hindu press of Bengal, which painted the Muslims as rebels and urged that on this account they should be kept out of Government services, went far to determine Sir Syed's policies.

The Congress was founded in 1885. It was admittedly a culmination of Hindu revivalism.¹ Dr. Pattabhi Sitaramayya,² writing as late as 1938, says : Educational Conference just to prevent the Muslims from joining the Congress ! And this in an address to a scientific society ! These people must be morally blind if they expect that the Muslims would swallow all this inimical mendacious propaganda against them and throw in their lot with the Hindus in a common nationality.

¹ Gurmukh Nihal Singh in the Address quoted above.

² *History of the Congress*, p. 22.

"All these movements (*viz.*, Brahmo Samaj, Prarthana Samaj, Arya Samaj, Mrs. Besant's Theosophical Movement with its centre at Benares, 'the holy city of India', and the Ramakrishna Mission) were really so many threads in the strand (*sic*) of Indian Nationalism, and the Nation's duty was to evolve a synthesis so as to be able to dispel prejudice and superstition, to renovate and purify the old faith, the Vedantic idealism, and reconcile it with the Nationalism of the new age. The Indian National Congress was destined to fulfil this great mission." Clearly, then, it was a Hindu organisation with ideals of purely Hindu Nationalism, for the realisation of which it would have been wholly irrelevant and absurd for the Muslims to join it. Sitaramayya is full of praise for the Arya Samaj. He says, "The Arya Samaj developed a virile manhood in the Nation," and speaks of Shardhanand the "Martyr" and Lajpat Rai the 'Hero'. Naturally, Muslims could not be part of the virile nation which was created by the Arya Samaj ; for this body has distinguished itself in the main by the fierce hatred of the Muslims it has created among its adherents. Its founder Dayanand, a Sadhu of obscure origin, poisoned the social life of Northern India, especially the Punjab, as no man had done before or has done since. He travelled from town to town, held debates and left ill-will, hatred and sectarian strife everywhere behind him. He visited Lahore in 1877. Before long his disputation raised such a storm that a Hindu newspaper *Koh-i-*

Noor, in its issue of May 19, 1877, prayed thus for peace: "May God end the excitement of the enraged populace and restore peace and quiet." The *Satyarth Prakash*, the last edition of which, prepared by the author himself, appeared a year before his death, is a standing witness of what fierce hatreds, violence of speech and venomous sentiment he was capable. He lays it down as one of the duties of a future Arya Samaj government to drive out of the country all those who do not profess its faith, especially the Muslims. He condemns Sikhism, speaks of Guru Nanak with contempt, but extols Guru Gobind Singh because, according to the popular report, of his enmity towards the Muslims. He objects to Brahmo Samaj and the Prarthana Samaj for their spirit of toleration, whereas Dayanand would have nothing but hatred and enmity towards the Muslims. If one looks back upon the history of the Arya Samaj, one finds that by far the greater part of its energy has been spent upon the propagation of hatred and enmity against the Muslims among the Hindu masses. The hatred the Arya Samaj preached against the Muslims was indeed so fierce and persistent that even Mr. Gandhi was shocked and protested against the Samaj's creed and methods in no uncertain terms in 1923. An association with such an ancestry of anti-Muslim hatred could not reasonably expect the Muslims to enter it, and the Muslims naturally kept aloof from the Congress.

Nor did the Congress ever try to rise above

narrow communalism or qualify its Hindu character, ideology or political sympathies. For example, it promptly espoused the cause of Hindu Bengal against Partition. The British justified the Partition on administrative grounds, for the province of Bengal included at the time Bihar, Orissa and Assam, and was far too big for one man to administer efficiently. We have already seen that the Hindu Bengal monopolised the whole machinery of Government in all its departments, and no Musalman could find a higher job in it than that of a menial. The Hindus were not willing to give up their monopoly. Whenever the Government tried to do something for the Muslims, the Hindu press raised a storm of protest against it. The Partition had thus a very obvious communal aspect.¹ The Congress jumped in and took sides with the Hindus in spite of its pretensions of nationalism.

One more factor presently entered the political life of the country, which has played no small part in embittering Hindu-Muslim relations and has always, directly or indirectly, enjoyed the blessings and patronage of Congress leadership.² This was the

¹ Indra Prakash speaking of the Partition of Bengal in *Where We Differ*, p. 18, says: "The Muslims were in favour as they were in a majority in the newly created province of East Bengal and Assam". But Dr. Sitaramayya says (p. 113 of his *History*) that the Partition had taken place against the wishes of "the people", which means that the Muslims in the eye of this eminent Congress leader, are no part of the "people".

² Presiding over a Cow Protection Conference at Belgaum in 1924, Mr. Gandhi said: "Swaraj would be impossible of attainment; even so the term 'Swaraj' would be devoid of all meaning so long as we have not found a way of saving the cow; for this is the touch-stone by which Hinduism

anti-cow-killing movement started by that Mahratta fanatic, Bal Gangadhar Tilak, founder of a new Shivaji cult. The anti-cow-killing movement and the Shivaji cult were both directed against the Muslims. While the latter was local and was confined to Maharashtra, the former spread readily throughout the country and has been responsible for more bloodshed than any other single cause of communal estrangement. And Tilak was a Congress leader of the front rank!

must be tested and proved before there can be any real Swaraj in India." That the happiness of four hundred million human beings should be a lesser object than the preservation of an animal is a sad reflection on the Mahatma's sense of proportions.

CHAPTER IV

SEPARATE ELECTORATES

THE communal estrangement that we have traced in the last chapter owed itself to the fast growing racial consciousness of the Hindus rather than to any political ambitions on either side. The Indian Muslims had no political ambitions of any kind in the nineteenth century or even much later. The main plank of Sir Syed's policy, as we have already noticed, was to save the Muslims from British wrath and oppression, to reconcile them to British rule, to prove that they were really loyal to their British masters and were not so disaffected or disloyal towards them as the Hindus tried to paint them to be, and as the British themselves were inclined readily to believe, and, to make the objective easier of attainment, to preach loyalty among them. Indeed, the preaching and profession of loyalty remained the chief occupation of Muslim leaders long after Sir Syed's death. In the meantime, racial consciousness grew apace among the Hindus, which was bound in time to become the problem that it has now become.

We have already noticed one source of rivalry between the communities that came into being

shortly after the Mutiny, namely, the monopoly of the Government services, which the Hindus had managed to secure and were not willing to surrender. The principle of election and popular representation introduced in the governance of the country with the Minto-Morley Reforms in 1909 became another fruitful cause of mutual rivalry. The mischief the introduction of the elective principle in the legislative bodies would do to communal relations had been foreseen long years before by Sir Syed Ahmad Khan who, speaking in the Viceroy's Legislative Council in 1883 on the C. P. Local Self-Government Bill, said : "India, a continent in itself, is inhabited by vast populations of different races and different creeds ; the rigour of religious institutions has kept even neighbours apart ; the system of caste is still dominant and powerful. In one and the same district the population may consist of various creeds and various nationalities ; and while one section of the population commands wealth and commerce, the other may possess learning and influence. One section may be numerically larger than the other, and the standard of enlightenment which one section of the community has reached may be far higher than that attained by the rest of the population. One community may be fully alive to the importance of securing representation on the local boards and district councils, whilst the other may be wholly indifferent to such matters. Under these circumstances, it is hardly possible to deny that the

introduction of representative institutions in India will be attended with considerable difficulty and socio-political risks . . . The system of representation by election means the representation of the views and interests of the majority of the population, and, in countries where the population is composed of one race and one creed, it is no doubt the best system that can be adopted. But, my lord, in a country like India, where caste distinctions still flourish, where there is no fusion of the various races, where religious distinctions are still violent, where education in its modern sense has not made an equal or proportionate progress among all the sections of the population, I am convinced that the introduction of the principle of election, pure and simple, for representation of various interests on the local board and district councils, would be attended with evils of greater significance than purely economic considerations. So long as differences of race and creed, and the distinctions of caste form an important element in the socio-political life of India, and influence her inhabitants in matters connected with the administration and welfare of the country at large, the system of election, pure and simple, cannot be safely adopted. The larger community would totally override the interests of the smaller community, and the ignorant public would hold Government responsible for introducing measures which might make the differences of race and creed more violent than ever."

This was said sixty years ago. The history of these sixty years bears out every word of what Sir Syed then said. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan warned the Government as well as the public in many public speeches that representative institutions were suited only to those countries which had homogeneous populations, but that in India, whose population was extremely heterogeneous, parliamentary institutions could not be introduced without grave socio-political risks.

Nawab Mohsin-ul-Mulk, Sir Syed's successor at Aligarh, came to know early in 1906 that the Government intended to establish popular Councils at the Centre and in the provinces. At his instigation, a Muslim deputation waited upon the Viceroy on October 1, 1906. They demanded and secured the right of separate representation for the Muslim community. To say in the face of Sir Syed's policies and frequent declarations that the deputation was "a command performance," as has been said so often recently,¹ does not carry conviction. But let us suppose for the sake of argument that it was a command performance. What would have been the consequences if the command performance had not been staged? We have seen that from 1857 onward the Hindus and the Muslims never felt as one people, that the two communities had parted from each other, that the Hindus

¹ Dr. Sitaramayya says (p. 75 of his *History*) : "The Minto-Morley scheme of communal representation was forced on the country. People were not consulted on the matter." As if the Muslims who had demanded separate representation were not a part of that country or people!

had become keenly race-conscious and were becoming ever more aggressive towards the Muslims, that cow-worship was rapidly displacing good-neighbourliness, and that the nationalist movement among the Hindus was but a culmination of Hindu revivalism, as is admitted by Hindu nationalists themselves. Under these circumstances, if the Muslims had not demanded separate representation for themselves, their case would have simply gone by default. Absence of separate electorates would certainly not have created a united homogeneous nation. It would have simply resulted in the dominance of the Hindus over the Muslims.

Dr. Beni Prasad argues scientifically and at considerable length against the mischief separate electorates have done, and he bewails the fact that in the case of both communities political awakening was preceded by religious revivalism. Bewailing is useless at this late date. What is essential is to recognise the fact that religious revivalism preceded political awakening. And in making this recognition certain differences must also be noted. Firstly, Muslim religious revivalism does not necessarily lead to political separatism. There is no inherent connection between the two phenomena. Muslims can be profoundly religious without being politically antagonistic to any non-Muslim people. There is nothing in the religion itself that can tend to create any such antagonism. On the contrary, Islam expressly denounces racialism, and Islamic history, if it is not

read in a spirit of anti-Islamic propaganda, fully supports my contention. Secondly, whatever of religious revivalism did take place among the Muslims was of defensive character. Muslims had to defend their faith against the inimical onslaughts, first of Christian missionaries and later of the Arya Samaj and of other Hindus who had begun to follow the Christian practice of attacking Islam, as they still do through the public press and through books, some of which they manage to smuggle into the educational curricula of schools and colleges.

Thirdly, Hindu revivalism preceded that among the Muslims by about three quarters of a century. What is worse, Hindu revivalism was as racial as religious. There is nothing to distinguish one from the other; for Hinduism is but a racial cult. It is argued that Muslims should not and cannot form a separate nation merely on account of difference in religion. The contention, coming as it does from Hindu writers and Hindu leaders, is surprising if not positively dishonest, for the disease of separatism is inherent in the social structure of the Hindus and their religious and cultural tradition which goes back to more than three thousand years. They look upon the rest of humanity as unclean and untouchable, and can have no social relations with the latter. However high his caste or social position, a Hindu, as soon as he leaves Hinduism and enters, say, the fold of Islam, at once becomes untouchable, and the doors of the Hindu race are closed upon him for

ever. So, although the majority of the Indian Muslims are descended from Hindu ancestors, no Hindu recognises any kinship with them. They are untouchable to the Hindus and as foreign to the Hindu race as any European. Socially and culturally the Hindus had always been separate from the Muslims. Awakening of race-consciousness among them, which was an inescapable consequence of Hindu revivalism, intensified the differences and awakened in them the desire of political domination over the Muslims. We have already learnt how the Hindus became aggressive towards the Muslims as early as the sixties of the last century and how persistently they tried to keep the Muslims out of all Government offices. The Muslims were put on the defence, and it was but natural that they should defend themselves and ask for separate representation for safeguarding their rights when the elective principle was introduced in the councils of the country. If they had not demanded separate representation, they would have been simply swamped by the race-conscious majority. If separate electorates have harmed the "country", whatever the term means, the blame lies not at the door of the Muslim leaders who asked for separate representation, but at the door of the excessive racialism of the Hindu, which made that demand inevitable.

However, nobody grudged the Muslims the privilege they had obtained, or painted it as a national calamity, as present-day Hindus are in the

habit of doing. The Gandhian ideology of supra-communal nationalism had not yet entered the people's consciousness. No offensive slogans had yet been put in the mouths of the ignorant masses. Everybody was frankly a Hindu or a Muslim, and "communalism" had not yet become the term of abuse it later became as a result of Congress propaganda. As a matter of fact, political consciousness among the masses was in an embryonic stage at the time, and political discussions were confined to men of high culture and academic achievements, who approached politics more in an academic spirit than in that of fiery patriotism and intolerant nationalism of later days. They could, therefore, afford to deal with their rivals with courtesy, tolerance and sympathetic understanding. For instance, when the Punjab Hindu Sabha was founded in 1907, the statement of its aims and objects ran : "The Sabha is not a sectarian nor a denominational but an all-embracing movement, and *while meaning no offence to any other movement, whether Hindu or non-Hindu*, it aims to be ardent and watchful in safeguarding the interests of the entire Hindu community in all aspects." The provincial Sabha became an All-India organisation a few years later. Maharaja Sir Mohendra Nandi of Cossimbazar, presiding over the first session of the All-India Hindu Mahasabha, held at Hardwar in April 1915, said : "If, therefore, we make efforts to set our house in order or hold closer together the scattered units of our faith, it cannot imply a menace

to any other community or faith." When the Muslim League was formed in December, 1906, development of friendly relations with other communities was laid down as one of its objects in its constitution and remained part of that constitution until recently. Indeed, the spirit of courtesy and tolerance that informed political leaders of that age made co-operation among the various political organisations quite feasible, when occasion demanded it.

The occasion came before long. We have seen that the Muslim policy under Sir Syed Ahmad Khan's leadership, dictated by sheer fear of British oppressions, had been one of loyalty and abject flattery. This policy was inherited by what is called the "Aligarh School" as a matter of tradition, though the conditions that inspired it had ceased to exist. The first jolt to Muslim loyalty came from Italy's invasion of Tripoli in the autumn of 1911 and the British Government's share in it. It was followed by another powerful shock administered by the Repeal of the Partition of Bengal shortly after (in December 1911). It should be noted that the first powerful protest against the Repeal came from that home of Muslim political orthodoxy, namely, Aligarh, and Nawab Viqar-ul-Mulk, the successor of Nawab Mohsin-ul-Mulk, wrote a series of letters protesting against the Repeal.

These two blows to the Muslim's loyalty were followed by a third one when the Balkan States attacked Turkey in the autumn of 1912 with the full

moral support of Britain. The Indian Musalmans were shocked profoundly, and Muslim publicists who dared criticise Britain were made to pay dearly for their temerity. The Musalmans had hardly recovered from this shock when, in 1913, Sir James Meston, the then Lt.-Governor of the U. P., staged a massacre of the Muslims at Cawnpore for their opposition to a road-building scheme. These events following one after the other in quick succession, killed the Muslims' loyalist policy for good, and when the Muslim League met in its next session a few months later, it effected a fundamental change in its constitution and declared the attainment of responsible self-government as its political goal.

The change of creed brought the League into line with the Congress, and the two organisations began thenceforth to hold their annual sessions at the same place, until in 1916 they concluded the famous Lucknow Pact. The terms of the Pact were incorporated in the Government of India Act, 1919. They did less than justice to the Muslim community, but as they have passed into history, we need not enter into the details. The Pact was, however, of far-reaching importance in its implications. By that Pact, the Congress acknowledged the fact that the Hindus and the Muslims were two separate nations, and that while the Congress itself was the representative of the Hindus, the Muslim League represented the Muslim community. The Congress has now resiled from this position and claims to represent

the whole of India, whereas the Muslim League stands true to its position of 1916 and insists that the Congress is a Hindu organisation and has no right to represent the Muslims whom, as a matter of fact, it does not represent. Hindu writers of Congress persuasion now call the Lucknow Pact "the greatest blunder the Congress has ever committed." It may have been a blunder in the eyes of those who are cherishing dreams of Hindu imperialism. But it represented the true facts of the situation, and if the Hindus and the Muslims are ever to come to an amicable settlement, it will be on the basis that they constitute two different and separate nations.

CHAPTER V

HINDU NATIONALISM

“PARADOXICAL as it may seem, the communal question is itself the offspring of the growth of nationalism and not something that was pre-existing and has become a hindrance to the growth of nationalism. In former times, the two communities were like two streams flowing side by side in their own separate channels. Being in equal subjection to an autocracy in which they had no share, there was nothing to divide and no cause for jealousy or rivalry. Only a few years ago, in small, out of the way towns and country places, Hindus and Muslims lived amicably together. They did so because both of them were in a static condition. There was nothing to fight for. The dawn of political consciousness and the introduction of democratic institutions with their votes and representatives and rights and the other accompaniments of democracy have, however, brought new hopes and new objects of endeavour. Had the Muslims and the Hindus been one people, with the dawn of political consciousness they would have risen as one body together. But the caste-system and the doctrine of untouchability had kept humanity into separate compart-

ments. Communities existed in form; the new hopes of political rights put the flame of active life in them and hurled them one against the other. If political hopes could be killed to-day and political consciousness smothered in all Indian breasts, the communal question too will disappear. And it grows in intensity with the growth of political consciousness. Those who have been telling us that the present communal tension is bound to disappear with increasing political consciousness, and have been preaching to us piously to trust in human nature, have wholly failed to understand the situation. Human nature can be just as devilish as angelic. Self-interest, which is only another name for self-preservation, is a fundamental instinct of life and it is this instinct which is keeping the two communities at loggerheads. Communalism and nationalism are antagonistic forces; but they are also necessary accompaniments of each other because of the peculiar constitution of the two communities concerned."¹

Thus I wrote in February 1929. The Simon Commission expressed the same opinion a year later and said: "So long as authority was firmly established in British hands and self-government was not thought of, Hindu-Muslim rivalry was confined within a narrower field. This was not because the presence of a neutral bureaucracy discouraged strife. A further reason was that there was little for members of one community to fear from the pre-

¹ *The Future of Islam in India*, p. 19 f.

dominance of the other. The comparative absence of communal strife in the Indian States to-day may be similarly explained. Many who are well acquainted with conditions in British India a generation ago would testify that at that epoch so much good feeling had been 'engendered' between the two sides that communal tension as a threat to civil peace was at a minimum. But the coming of the Reforms and the anticipation of what may follow them have given new point to Hindu-Muslim competition. The one community naturally lays claim to the rights of a majority and relies upon its qualifications of better education and greater wealth; the other is all the more determined on those accounts to secure effective protection for its members, and does not forget that it represents the previous conquerors of the country. It wishes to be assured of adequate representation and of a full share of official posts."

The word 'engendered' in the above, though excusable for obvious reasons in an official apologist of British rule, is historically false and should be replaced by 'survived'. Otherwise, as an exposition of the major cause of Hindu-Muslim antagonism, the view is perfectly true. The point needs to be emphasised, and so long as it continues to be ignored, as propagandists are in the habit of doing, the way to a true solution of the Hindu-Muslim problem will not be found.

The point is that the problem is the direct consequence of the growth of political consciousness in

the country. This consciousness grew up first among our Hindu compatriots. They were the first to be exposed to the blasts of Western thought with its highly developed ideology of nationalism. Pre-disposed as they were by their discipline of racial exclusiveness, caste and untouchability, they swallowed it bait, hook and line. In fact, some of the most hateful aspects of nationalism which Hindu India has developed and are not to be found elsewhere can only be explained in the background of this racial discipline of the Hindus, which extends over at least three thousand years. It was the Hindus who started political agitation at a time when the Muslims were yet engaged in allaying British wrath over the Mutiny. It was a Hindu that composed the song of *Bande Mataram* and wrote a romance to inculcate hatred of the Muslims. It was the Hindus who, by virtue of their growing national consciousness, urged the banishment of Urdu from public offices in favour of Hindi. It was the Hindus who organised their national Congress. It has been said with perfect truth that the birth of the Congress marks the birth of Hindu nationalism. It was a Hindu leader, Bal Gangadhar Tilak, who organised a Sivaji cult. It was the Hindus who rose practically in revolt against an administrative measure, namely, the Partition of Bengal, which threatened their monopoly of official preferment. It was the Hindus who organised political dacoities and murders at a time when the Muslims were yet sleeping the

sleep of ages. And, finally, it was the Hindus who proclaimed the "Two-Nation" theory, for which Mr. Jinnah, President of the All-India Muslim League, has been abused so vociferously and so shamelessly by Hindu leaders and the Hindu Press of recent years.

We have already, though very briefly, sketched the growth of Hindu-Muslim estrangement. It might have gone on growing, or the two communities might have found a way of mutual accommodation, as they did at Lucknow in 1916. But the World War No. One gave birth to forces which profoundly affected India and produced reactions which led the two communities ever more apart. The war was the outcome of an exaggerated sense of nationalism, but such is the perversity of human reason, it only made the sentiment fiercer and innoculated with it peoples who had been hitherto free from the virus. The war created a passionate desire among the peoples of India to be free from the foreign yoke, and it was this fierce passion for freedom that made Hindu-Muslim unity possible in 1919-22. It was a psychological moment when Mr. Gandhi put himself at the head of the Congress organisation. Under his inspiration the constitution of the body was changed and its membership was thrown open to every one who could pay four annas. In the universal mental upheaval brought about by the Great War and the bloody events that followed the Rowlatt Bill, this had become inevitable. Gone were the

days when politics was the pastime of the successful Barrister and the leisured scholar. Mr. Gandhi and the pressure of events combined to make it the close concern of the common people. In a country possessing a homogeneous population, the development would have been very healthy. But Mr. Gandhi and his co-workers let themselves be carried away by the charming spectacle of territorial nationalism which they saw working so well in Western countries, and forgot that India was not like them, that here were two distinct nationalities which had wholly different historical traditions and cultural backgrounds, and had been drifting apart for more than half a century. They saw that there were "communities"—a fateful word—and did not realize that the communities were nationalities according to every definition known to the student of political science. The Congress view was that India was geographically one country and therefore Indians were and must make one nation. As for religious differences, the Congress Pandits declared that religion must not be allowed to intrude into politics. The idea is fundamentally wrong. It is a psychological absurdity. "It is on religion that the inmost and deepest life of a nation rests," says Bryce. It is from religion that a nation derives its whole moral and spiritual strength and inspiration. Religion forms the inner life of a nation; it is the core of a nation's life. If you ignore this core, the life of a nation becomes hollow and unstable, while a nation-

ality based on this hard inner core has a promise of stability and endurance. According to the same authority, "The permanence of an institution depends not merely on the material interests that support it, but on its conformity to the deep-rooted sentiment of the men for whom it has been made. When it draws to itself and provides a fitting expression for that sentiment, the sentiment becomes thereby not only more vocal but actually stronger, and in its turn imparts a fuller vitality to the institution." Renan says : "Community of interests is assuredly a powerful bond between men. But can interests suffice to make a nation ? I do not believe it. Community of interests makes commercial treaties. There is a sentimental side to nationality ; it is at once body and soul ; a Zollverein is not a fatherland."

The question is whether the foundations of a nation are truly laid in the hearts of men or in a territorial habitat. The Congress affected the latter and sought to build a united Indian nation on the bases of geography, politics and economics. In fact, it presumed that the nation was already in existence. The presumption was palpably false ; the bases were wrong, and the edifice of nationalism which the Congress had sought to build crashed in less than three years. Several Hindu leaders had joined hands with the Khilafatists with mental reservations. The Mahatma went to jail and the show of Hindu-Muslim unity broke up. Swami Shardhanand and

Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya came out of jails and launched an open and unashamed propaganda against the Muslims. The All-India Mahasabha was reorganised in 1923 at Benares under the presidentship of Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya. The policy enunciated in 1907 and 1915 of looking after Hindu interests without prejudice to the interests of other communities was thenceforward abandoned, and a new ideology was evolved, namely, that India was the Holy Land of the Hindus, that the Hindus were a nation in their own right in which Muslims, Christians and Parsis had no place, and that the political goal of the Hindus was Hindu Raj. Clearly, the Hindu race had begun to dream a new dream; a new life had begun to surge in their views. The mighty psychological forces of awakened nationalism had gripped them. Hindu Raj has been the professed political goal of the Hindu Mahasabha ever since and remains so to this day.

Here I want to make a digression and I apologize for it. But the question is important, and propagandists have created so much confusion in the public mind in the last twenty years or so that a brief discussion of it would not be out of place. One might ask how came it that political awakening led the Hindus and the Muslims to insist on their separate identities and whether the two communities could not have grown up as one nation. My answer is that they could not and what has happened was inevitable. It is senseless to seek scapegoats and

blame the whole thing on them. Congress propagandists lay the blame on Sir Syed Ahmad Khan for preventing the Muslims from joining the Congress, on Nawab Mohsin-ul-Mulk for organising the famous deputation to the Viceroy in 1906, which obtained the right of separate electorates for the Muslims, and lastly on Mr. Jinnah who has organised them into one body and brought them under one flag. The Muslims, too, in their turn, can point the finger of accusation at Swami Dayanand and the Arya Samaj founded by him for the purpose, amongst others, of driving Islam out of India, whose preachers have been propagating anti-Muslim hatred for sixty years, at Tilák, the creator of the Sivaji cult and the anti-cow-killing movement, at Lala Lajpat Rai, Bhai Parmanand, Pt. Madan Mohan Malaviya, Dr. Moonje, Mr. Savarkar and a host of others too numerous to mention. But I say it is wrong to seek scapegoats. The Muslims have been mostly on the defence during the British period and I shall speak of them in a subsequent chapter. The Hindu leaders were themselves the product of the movement of Hindu nationalism and not its fathers. They were themselves the creatures of the period in which they were born and worked and not its creators. The worst that can be said about them is that they were not big enough to give a healthier direction to the surging force of racial nationalism among the Hindus and let themselves be carried away by the current.

I have pointed out before that the Hindus and

the Muslims were already distinct nationalities and had always been so. The things that separated them were so profound and so far-reaching in their political implications that their likeness is not to be found in the history of any other people, with the sole exception of the Jews. The latter believed themselves to be the "chosen people" and for this reason, in spite of close association of two thousand years, have refused to fuse with any other race and have maintained their separate identity. The Hindus, like the Jews, also believe themselves to be a "chosen people" and have always looked upon the rest of humanity as *untouchables* with the result that though Muslims and Hindus have lived side by side, more often than not as good neighbours, for more than seven hundred years, they maintain more pronounced marks of being separate nationalities than any two nations of Europe. They dress differently. The very houses in which they live in differ in the inner arrangement and size of rooms : a house built for a Hindu family is uncomfortable for a Muslim family to live in, while one built for a Muslim family with its large airy rooms must look like extravagance to the Hindu. They eat different foods. The very utensils in which they cook and eat are of different shapes and different metals. What is more, the difference in utensils corresponds to the difference in their cultural outlooks. The Hindus use brass for cheapness and durability, while the Muslims use tinned copper for its effect on food.

Huqqa is comparatively a recent invention ; tobacco came to India in the reign of Akbar. But here too the differences in their national characters have asserted themselves. They have developed different shapes for their Huqqas which are made of different metals. The reed-pipes of the Huqqa are also covered with clouts of different colours ; the Muslims affect deep-blue, the Hindus red. The details might sound frivolous, but are significant of the fact that though the two streams have flowed in the same channel for centuries, they have refused to mix. Sir Abdur Rahim, the present President of the Central Assembly, once pointed out the difference forcibly as follows :

"Any of us Indian Muslims travelling, for instance, in Afghanistan, Persia, Central Asia, among Chinese Muslims, Arabs and Turks, would at once be made at home and would not find anything to which we are not accustomed. On the contrary, in India, we find ourselves in all social matters total aliens when we cross the street and enter that part of the town where our Hindu fellow-townspeople live."

Indeed, when a Muslim happens to enter a Hindu home, in view of the numerous taboos to which Hindu society is subject, he does so with extreme mental discomfort and often makes mistakes. Even Europeans who have tried to study Indian society have noticed the difference. Sir Theodore Morrison, once Principal of M.A.-O. College, Aligarh, once

wrote : " The Hindus and the Muslims who inhabit one village, one town or one district, belong to two separate nations more distant and spiritually farther asunder than two European nations."

Now, when two peoples, which stand socially and spiritually so far asunder, attain to political consciousness, they grow up naturally into two distinct and separate nations. Any other development would just not be possible. When the individual becomes politically conscious, he straightaway seeks association with his own people. When a Sikh, for instance, attains to political consciousness, that will be no occasion for him to fall in love with a Musalman. He will, instead, look to the Sikhs for his association. His political awakening will coincide with his love for Sikhism. A different development is a psychological impossibility, and those who profess impatience at what they call dragging religion into the sphere of politics expose their own ignorance of the psychology of nationalism. It was this psychology of nationalism which, under the stress of Western political thought working upon the racial consciousness of the Hindus, made them realize that they were a nation. As early as 1909 Lala Lajpat Rai, Rai Bahadur Lal Chand and others entered a strong protest against the Congress theory of a united nation composed of Hindus, Muslims and others, and contended that the Hindus were a nation in their own right, separate and distinct from the Muslims and

others.¹ They went further and taught that the Hindus *ought* to develop as a separate nation and must not consider the Muslims as a part of the same body politic.

But it was the upheaval brought about in men's minds by the Great War that made the Hindu-Muslim issue finally and irretrievably clear. The reorganisation of the Hindu Mahasabha in 1923 under the Presidentship of Pandit Malaviya with its new ideology has been mentioned above. In 1925, a piece of Hindi writing called *Mere Vichar* by the late Lala Hardyal, which he called his political testament, reached India and was publicised throughout the country by the Hindu Press. Indra Prakash cites the following two passages :

"If there is any possibility of the Hindus and the Muslims working together, it is only possible as we see in Hindu States or as was the usage at the time of Maharaja Ranjit Singh. It is that the State should belong to the Hindus and the Muhammadans may live there. But the State cannot be a Muslim

¹ See Indra Prakash's *Where We Differ*. Note the following passage from R. B. Lal Chand's *Self-abnegation in Politics* quoted by the author on p. 159 : "Patriotism ought to be communal and not merely geographical. Although patriotism has come to be understood as meaning love for one's country, the origin of the word implies as much communal love as geographical. In fact, it appears to me the original idea was that of common descent as basis for the ideal, and as a community settled in different tracts (*sic*), the tract absorbed their love and gave rise to the secondary sense. But at any rate the word is not necessarily confined to mean love for the country apart from the interests of the community to which the individual belongs. The ideal, the predominant factor, ought to be communal rather than geographical." The writer's tone is hesitating, but his meaning is clear and quite in accord with the psychology of nationalism.

State, nor can it be a jointly Hindu-Muslim administered State. The reason is that every State is ultimately dependent on its customs, its national language and its national history.

"There can be two classifications of the present States—the Muslim States and the Hindu. The Hindus reside in the Muslim States and the Muslims also live in the Hindu ones. A joint Hindu-Muslim State is sheer nonsense, which under no circumstance can exist. We, therefore, desire to establish States after the fashion of Baroda or Kashmir. To create States like those of Bahawalpur and Hyderabad we are not prepared to offer sacrifices. My point is now clear." (p. 99f.) Indeed, it is clear. Again:

"To attain Swaraj, we do not need the Muslim assistance, nor is it our desire to establish a Joint Rule. Don't look towards the non-Hindu quarters. If you attain Swaraj with the Muslim help, eternal will be your dependence on the Muslims. Leave them, therefore, all alone." (p. 173.)

Dr. Ambedkar¹ quotes another passage from the same testament, which runs as follows :

"I declare that the future of the Hindu race, of Hindustan and of the Punjab rests on these four pillars : (1) Hindu Sanghathan, (2) Hindu Raj, (3) Shuddhi of Muslims, and (4) the Conquest and Shuddhi of Afghanistan and the frontiers. So long as the Hindu nation does not accomplish these four things, the safety of our children and great-grand-

¹ *Thoughts on Pakistan*, p. 123.

children will be ever in danger, and the safety of the Hindu race will be impossible. The Hindu race has but one history, and its institutions are homogeneous. But the Musalmans and Christians are far removed from the confines of Hinduism, for their religions are alien and they love Persian, Arab and European institutions. Thus, just as one removes foreign matter from the eye, Shuddhi must be made of these two religions. Afghanistan and the hilly regions of the frontier were formerly part of India, but are at present under the domination of Islam . . . Just as there is Hindu religion in Nepal, so there must be Hindu institutions in Afghanistan and the frontier territory ; otherwise it is useless to win Swaraj. For mountain tribes are always warlike and hungry. If they become our enemies, the age of Nadirshah and Zamanshah will begin anew. At present English officers are protecting the frontiers ; but it cannot always be . . . If Hindus want to protect themselves, they must conquer Afghanistan and the frontiers and convert all the mountain tribes.”¹

¹ The following excerpt from a scheme, drafted by Lala Hardyal in 1906 when he was in England, for organising a society of workers for the liberation of India and sent by him to Pandit Shyama Krishna Varma for consideration, is of interest in this connection. Hardyal wrote :

“Should the Society consist only of Hindus ? In my opinion, yes, for—(a) A harmonious sentiment, based on common memories, literature and polity can be produced in its full intensity among Hindus.

“(b) The peasants will take the Society as their own, if it consists only of Hindus. We should look to the Jats, Rajputs, Sikhs and other Hindu populations and must not be carried away by our advanced notions. Politics is the art of manipulating the passions of large masses of men so as to achieve a desired object.

“(c) As no serious man can predict the indissoluble character of the

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This is the ideology that has governed the policy of the Hindu Mahasabha from 1923 to this day. The Mahasabha leaders have been declaring year after year since that date that Hindus alone have the right to rule over India and will establish Hindu Raj in the country. Shankaracharya Dr. Kurtkoti's utterance still rings in our ears: "India belongs to the Hindus; the Muslims are only guests and should learn to behave like guests." Excerpts from the writings and speeches of Hindu leaders on the subject will make a good sized volume by themselves. I will, therefore, confine myself to Mr. Savarkar, than whom a greater authority on the union of Hindus and Mohammedans, it is advisable to lead the Mohammedans by means of Hindus. If you create the idea of political organisation and sacrifice among Mohammedans, these are weapons which might be turned against the Hindus in the possible case of an English intrigue. The Mohammedan masses are so susceptible to religious mania that it is probable that if the idea of organisation and communal service is accentuated in their midst, it will find its embodiment in a union of Muslims, which would be anti-Hindu in character. It is better to organise the Mohammedans by means of Hindus, for as soon as a Mohammedan worker will appeal to his co-religionists for national unity, his words will rouse only religious passion and the spell of Hindu-Mohammedan unity will be broken. Let us bring the Mohammedans into our camp by means of Hindu workers.

"(d) In using the word *Swarajya* and appealing to the people we arouse Hindu associations. We would ask the Mohammedans to join us, but we must keep their masses under Hindu leadership. If you give them Mohammedan leaders, you tread on dangerous ground.

"(e) Many enthusiastic young men, zealous for the freedom of the Fatherland, think that the introduction of Mohammedans will bring in a jarring note. I know more than six or seven young men of the Punjab who will give up all worldly prospects for a Hindu Society, but not for a mixed one. I think Mr. Tilak and Mr. Lajpat Rai will agree in this opinion." The *Eastern Times*, August 6, 1943. This should enable the reader to understand the trend of Congress policies since Mr. Gandhi captured that body.

ideology of the Hindu Mahasabha cannot be cited, as he has been the President of the body for six consecutive years, in fact, ever since he came out of jail. Speaking at the Ahmedabad session of the Hindu Mahasabha in 1937, Mr. Savarkar thus enunciated the "Two-Nation" theory :—

"Several infantile politicians commit the serious mistake in supposing that India is already welded into a harmonious nation, or that it could be welded thus for the mere wish to do so. These our well-meaning but unthinking friends take their dreams for realities. That is why they are impatient of communal tangles and attribute them to communal organisations. But the solid fact is that the so-called communal questions are but a legacy handed down to us by centuries of a cultural, religious and national antagonism between the Hindus and the Muslims. When time is ripe, you can solve them; but you cannot suppress them by merely refusing recognition of them. It is safer to diagnose and treat deep-seated disease than to ignore it. Let us bravely face unpleasant facts as they are. India cannot be assumed today to be an unitarian and homogeneous nation; but on the contrary, there are two nations in the main, the Hindus and the Muslims in India."

In the Calcutta session of the Mahasabha held in December 1939, Mr. Savarkar further elaborated his thesis of the Hindus being a separate and distinct nation and said, "The whole Congress ideology was

vitiated *ab initio* by its unwitted assumption that the territorial unity, a common habitat, was the only factor that constituted and ought to and must constitute a Nation. This conception of a Territorial Nationality has since then received a rude shock in Europe itself from which it was imported wholesale to India, and the present war has justified my assertion by exploding the myth altogether. All Nations carved out to order on the Territorial design without any other common bond to mould each of them into a national being have gone to rack and ruin, tumbled down like a house of cards. Poland and Czechoslovakia will ever serve as a stern warning against any such efforts to frame heterogeneous peoples into such hotch-potch Nations, based only on the shifting sands of the conception of Territorial Nationality not cemented by any Culture, Racial or Historical affinities and consequently having no common will to incorporate themselves into a Nation. These treaty-Nations broke up at the first opportunity they got! The German part of them went over to Germany, the Russian to Russia, Czechs to Czechs, and Poles to Poles. The cultural, linguistic, historical and such other organic affinities proved stronger than the territorial one. Only those Nations have persisted in maintaining their National unity and identity during the last three to four centuries in Europe, which had developed Racial, Linguistic, Cultural and such other organic affinities in addition to their Territorial unity or even at times in spite

of it and consequently willed to be homogeneous units—such as England, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, etc. Judged by any and all of these tests which go severally and collectively to form such an homogeneous and organic Nation, in India we Hindus are marked out as an abiding Nation by ourselves . . . The Hindus are no treaty-Nation—but an organic National Being.

“One more pertinent point must be met as it often misleads our Congressite Hindu brethren in particular. The homogeneity that welds a people into a National Being does not imply the total absence of all internal differences Religious, Racial or Linguistic, of sects and sections amongst themselves. It only means that they differ more from other people as a National unit than they differ amongst themselves. Even the most unitarian Nations of today —say, the British or the French—cannot be free from any religious, linguistic, cultural, racial or other differences, sects or sections or even some antipathies existing amongst themselves. National homogeneity connotes oneness of a people in relation to the contrast they present to any other people as a whole.

“We Hindus, in spite of thousand and one differences within our fold, are bound by such religious, cultural, historical, racial, linguistic and other affinities in common as to stand out as a definitely homogeneous people as soon as we are placed in contrast with any other non-Hindu people —say, the English or Japanese or even the Indian

Moslems. That is the reason why today we the Hindus from Kashmere to Madras and Sindh to Assam will be a Nation by ourselves." Accordingly Mr. Savarkar includes in the term "Hindu" the followers of all those sects which have sprung from the soil of India, Jainism, Buddhism, Sikhism, etc., and excludes from it Muslims, Christians, Parsis and Jews.

Mr. Savarkar's thesis is wholly in accord with facts of history and with political theory, and it is not possible to quarrel with it. The quarrel arises when he becomes inconsistent with his own thesis. The political scientist will say that when two communities have developed the consciousness of being separate nations, as the Hindus and the Muslims have in this country, it is time that, in order to avoid inner tensions, civil wars and the like, they parted company and established separate national governments of their own. That is also the contention of the All-India Muslim League. Mr. Savarkar, however, having once repudiated the territorial basis of nationhood with considerable acumen, falls back on the geographical motif and claims the whole of India as a heritage of the Hindu nation by calling it the "Holy Land" of the Hindus. He, therefore, visualizes a single government for the whole of India, dominated by the Hindus, in which the Muslims will have a subordinate and subservient position. In other words the Hindus will be the ruling race; the Muslims a subject people. The

President of the Mahasabha explains in the same address : "In no case can the Hindu majority resign its right which as a majority it is entitled to exercise under any Democratic and legitimate (*sic*) constitution. The Muslim minority in particular has not obliged the Hindus by remaining in minority, and therefore they must remain satisfied with the status they occupy and with the legitimate share of civic and political rights that is their proportionate due. It would be simply preposterous to endow the Muslim minority with the right of exercising a practical veto on the legitimate rights and privileges of the majority and call it a 'Swarajya'. The Hindus do not want a change of masters, are not going to struggle and fight and die only to replace an Edward by an Aurangzeb simply because the latter happens to be born within Indian borders, but they want henceforth to be Masters themselves in their own house, in their own Land."

In the government visualized by the President of the Hindu Mahasabha the principle of representation will be "one man one vote and the public services to go by merit alone." 'One man one vote' secures the absolute right of majority to the Hindus. Mr. Savarkar insists very strongly upon Hindus' right of majority and goes into details which show—in fact he says so in plain terms—that the Hindus shall be the absolute rulers of the land, and the minorities shall live at their mercy. As to merit, those acquainted with public services know that

'merit' covers every kind of low intrigue, injustice and trickery, nepotism and communalism of the most hateful type. They know what subterfuges are resorted to in order to deprive Muslims of their rights in services and to get posts and promotions for the Hindus. One not acquainted with the petty politics of Government offices can have no idea of the devilish subterfuges employed by these people. Nepotism is an inseparable attribute of the Hindu joint family and caste systems, and in the eyes of a Hindu no man who is not a Hindu has any merit whatever. And, in the new government of Mr. Savarkar's imagining, the judges of merit will be Hindus !

Once you admit the existence of two nations in the same geographical habitat, then two alternatives present themselves. Either the two nations should part company, divide up the country between them and set up separate independent sovereign States, or one nation should dominate the other and keep it under subjection, exterminate it or absorb it altogether and thus put an end to its existence. A third course is not known to history. Mr. Savarkar, while he admits the Muslims to be a nation, does not accept their right to a separate national existence. He claims the whole of India as the undivided holy land of the Hindus, in which they shall rule supreme. Modern Hinduism is incapable of absorbing non-Hindu communities, and nobody has spoken of extermination, though Mr. Savarkar called upon the

Burmese Buddhists to exterminate the Muslims from their land in the summer of 1938 when the anti-Indian riots were at their height in Burma. The Mahasabha alternative is to keep the Muslims under subjection, whatever the subjection might ultimately lead to. In view of the long history, tradition and social organisation of the Hindus, there can be only one end for the Muslims under a government of the Hindu Mahasabha's choice, namely, that they would be reduced to the status of Sudras and untouchables. At any rate, that is the goal the Hindus have set before themselves.

CHAPTER VI

CONGRESS NATIONALISM

THERE are those among us, though their number is now dwindling to the point of extinction, who look upon the political doctrines and claims of the Hindu Mahasabha with smiles of contempt or tolerance, and pin their faith to the Indian National Congress which, they claim, is non-communal and national. It has been pointed out in a foregoing chapter, on the authority of Dr Pattabhi Sitaramayya, Dr. Beni Prasad and Principal Gurmukh Nihal Singh, and other names may be added to the list, that the birth of the Congress was a culmination of Hindu revivalist movement. In fact, it marked the birth of the Hindu nation. It is true a few Muslims were also associated with the Congress in the earlier days of its history. But it never lost the character, except for a very brief period, of being a Hindu organisation, and bears its birth-mark on its face, if anything more markedly, to this day. By the Lucknow Pact of 1916, the Congress admitted frankly that it was a Hindu organisation and that the Muslims were a separate body politic and were represented by the All-India Muslim League. This consciousness of the separate identities of the two peoples formed the

foundation and back-ground of the Hindu-Muslim alliance of 1919-21.

During the non-co-operation movement under the leadership of Mr. Gandhi and the Ali Brothers, Hindu-Muslim unity seemed for the time being complete. The movement itself proved a colossal failure. Jails were filled to overflowing, but the business of the Government did not stop for one day. For one resignation from a Government post there were a hundred willing to fill it up. The Musalmans who are easily carried away by enthusiasm lost heavily in the process.

There were also fissures visible under the facade of Hindu-Muslim unity. The Hindus had no real sympathy for the Muslims' extra-territorial patriotism that the Khilafat agitation implied. Only the powerful spell which the personality of Mr. Gandhi, already enveloped in a mystic pall of holiness and superstition, exercised over the Hindu masses, kept the two communities together. There are Muslims who, looking back over the many circumvolutions Mr. Gandhi has gone through since the non-co-operation days, contend that the Mahatma was not sincere in his professions for the cause of Hindu-Muslim unity in those days. This is not a biography of Mr. Gandhi and no place for going into the question of personal sincerities. But I think the occasions cited to prove his lack of sincerity can be explained otherwise. Mr. Gandhi has a deep insight into the workings of the Hindu mind. After his

return to India in 1915, he toured the country back and forth for several years and learnt to know the Hindu mind very intimately. He also has a mighty passion for exercising dictatorial sway over the masses. That, he learnt very early, he could do only by humouring the prejudices of the people. He has never had the courage to flout Hindu public opinion, even when he knew that the latter was wrong. He is too clear-headed to have any respect for the common Hindu superstitions, such as cow-worship. But to humour the Hindu public he has had to declare more than once that Swaraj was not worth having if it did not protect the cow from slaughter. Mr. Gandhi's readiness to surrender to Hindu prejudices has indeed been fatal to the cause of inter-communal peace and to the development of a common Indian nationality.

In March 1922 Mr. Gandhi went to jail. Before he came out two years later, the political atmosphere in India had completely changed, and communal harmony had vanished outright. As stated above, in 1923, when Mr. Gandhi and other influential Congress leaders were safely behind the bars, the Hindu Mahasabha was reorganised under the Presidentship of Pandit Madan Mohan Malaviya, with whom were associated Swami Shardhanand, Lala Lajpat Rai and other Arya Samaj leaders. Under the inspiration of Pandit Malaviya, the Mahasabha denounced the ideology of a united nationality and loudly proclaimed as its goal the establishment of

Hindu Raj in India, in which Muslims would be but a subject people. A three-fold programme was launched for the realization of this aim. The whole programme took the form of a brief slogan: Shuddhi, Sanghathan and militarisation of the Hindus. They argued that the majority of the Indian Muslims were of the Hindu race and should be reconverted to Hinduism. It was sheer lunacy, for it is absurd to think that any one who has once had some experience of the light of Islam should willingly revert to that hotch-potch of primitive superstitions called Hinduism. Naturally the scheme failed and no attempt has since been made to resume it, but the methods employed by the Arya Samajists, who were to carry it out under the guidance of Swami Shardhanand, for the accomplishment of their purpose left behind them a legacy of profound bitterness between the communities.

Sanghathan meant consolidation of the ranks of the Hindu community as against the Muslims. It implied complete repudiation of the Congress creed of a united nation. Owing to the estrangement which had been growing between the Muslims and the Hindus for more than sixty years, which we have briefly traced in the foregoing chapters, it was but natural that this new ideology of the Mahasabha with its clear and unmistakable appeal to the racial consciousness of the Hindus should find ready acceptance among them. The Congress creed was a novel idea, of which history furnishes no example.

It was foreign to the consciousness of the peoples concerned. The Hindus and the Muslims had always, ever since they had come into contact with one another, considered themselves Hindus and Muslims and never as Indians ; the very idea of India being a political unit did not exist. They had always looked upon themselves as two separate peoples and never as components of the same common nationhood. And what they had refused to learn from close association of centuries they could not swallow at the dictation of any Mahatma. The Mahasabha's ideal, on the other hand, was clear, bold and precise and in complete conformity with the racial consciousness of the Hindus : India is the holy land of the Hindus; the Hindus are a nation by themselves and shall alone rule over India, for which they must close up their ranks against all, particularly the Muslims. No wonder, the Mahasabha ideology gripped the Hindu masses as nothing had ever done before.

Though the Muslims are in minority, they have always enjoyed a prestige for their military prowess, and Hindus, in spite of their huge numbers, have been but sheep before them, and Hindus of all parties have fought for many years in the Central Assembly for a proportionate share in the Indian army. The Mahasabha, when it adopted its new ideology in 1923, struck upon a novel plan for creating the spirit of aggressiveness among the Hindus and killing the fear that the name of the Musalman inspired in the Hindu's breast. It started

a series of well-planned riots through the length and breadth of the country, staging small battle-fields in the streets of cities where the Hindu could learn how to face the Muslim in the game of bloodshed. I remember asking a friend in those days—we were both at Berlin at the time—what were the causes of the very frequent communal riots in India, and he replied that there was only one cause, namely, that the Hindu had lost the fear of the Musalman. So long as the Hindu retained a wholesome fear of the Musalman, there could be no riots. The riots were the course of training by which the Hindus were to be militarised.

A comparison of the itineraries of Pandit Malaviya's journeyings through the length and breadth of India in those days with the dates of the riots yields an interesting conclusion. This is not an afterthought. I remember it distinctly as I watched the bloody drama unroll itself week after week and month after month. If you look up the newspapers of those years, you will find Pandit Malaviya's visit to a town being followed a few weeks later by a bloody riot in that town. The Chief Presidency Magistrate of Calcutta also found that Pandit Malaviya's visit to any place boded ill for the peace of that place and forbade his entry into Calcutta in the summer of 1927. The Pandit defied the ban and was arrested. Simla intervened and the incendiary was promptly released. The brief spell of Hindu-Muslim unity during the

Khilafat agitation was bitterly avenged, and when one looks back to those days of riots and communal discord, one cannot but agree with Mr. Gandhi that there was something Satanic in the make-up of the Government of India. But there is no need to dwell upon this aspect of the affair, for the people of India have always understood the part played by the Government in connection with the riots. The Government's own annual publication, now ceased, was usually a cooked document, intended for propaganda abroad, and was most misleading and incorrect.

The Hindus, cold blooded as they are, have a remarkable aptitude for secret associations, plots and intrigues, and the riots were well-planned. Heaps of brick-bats, bottles of acid and other lethal weapons were collected on house-tops. Necessary evidences for law courts later were also arranged usually beforehand. And then at a given signal they fell upon the Muslims unawares. No wonder that the riots everywhere followed a fixed pattern.

When Mr. Gandhi came out of jail in February 1924, he found the country in the grip of Pandit Malaviya's gangster politics, but had not the courage to face the situation. Once, or perhaps twice, he raised a feeble voice, but reactions among the Hindus were unpleasant, and the Mahatma realised that if he cared to maintain his popularity among the Hindus he must accept the Mahasabha ideology of Hindu nationalism and Hindu Raj and make his surrender to Pandit Malaviya, who had become the symbol

and champion of Hindu orthodoxy and represented in his person the hopes and aspirations of the Hindu race. In any case, while the country was aflame with communal strife and bitterness, the Mahatma did nothing to quench the fires and left the evil genius of Malaviya to direct the political life of Hindu India for five long years (1923-27). Towards the close of 1927 was announced the appointment of the Simon Commission. Hindu India, to serve its own ends, decided to boycott the Commission. Hindu India also desired that the boycott should look a united Hindu-Muslim affair. They wanted to impress the Commission that the two communities were united and that there were no disputes between them. Accordingly, as is their wont, Hindu leaders met in secret and decided to call off the anti-Muslim campaign of terrorisation, and the riots came to an abrupt end. Early in 1929, when the Simon Commission was touring the country, I prophesied in a Lahore journal that there would be no riots until the new constitution had started to function. There were to be none because it was not to the interests of the Hindus to have riots while the constitution was in the making, and it is a fact that between the appointment of the Simon Commission towards the close of 1927 and the introduction of the new constitution in April 1937, riots were few and far between, though some of them, especially those at Bombay and Cawnpore, were unusually gory. On the whole, the years specified above were

a period of comparative peace.

But I am not writing a history of the communal riots. All I want to stress is the fact that Mr. Gandhi kept mum and did not raise his little finger to check the gory drama that was being played all over India by Pandit Malaviya, Lala Lajpat Rai and other Mahasabhaties, and when he did emerge from retirement towards the close of 1928, he did so, not as an All-India leader of both the Hindus and the Muslims as he had been before his incarceration and retirement, but as a leader of the Hindu community alone. With the Mahatma's conversion to the Malaviyan ideology of Hindu nationalism and Hindu Raj, Pandit Malaviya himself left the stage and gradually sank back into private life. Since then, Mr. Gandhi has been a leader of the Hindu community only, which he has confessed on several occasions, and the Congress has been, in its policies and almost completely in its membership, a purely Hindu national organisation. The general election of 1926 was the last one held while Mr. Gandhi was in retirement, and in that election the Mahasabha swept the polls and the Congress lost heavily. Mr. Gandhi's conversion to the Mahasabha ideology tilted the balance again in favour of the Congress. The latter had come into line with the Hindu sentiment. Since then, membership of the two bodies has been fluid. Members of the Mahasabha are frequently members of the Congress as well, and men who hold office in the Mahasabha one day

are quite often found holding a corresponding office in the Congress the following day; and *vice versa*. There is little difference in the ideologies of the two bodies. Clear proofs of the identity of views and aims between the Congress and the Mahasabha were provided last summer during by-elections in the N.-W. F. P., when the Mahasabha candidates withdrew in favour of the Congress candidates, and Rai Bahadur Mehr Chand Khanna, leader of the Hindu Sabha in the Frontier Province, became a Congress leader without seeking formal membership of that body and without resigning from the Mahasabha. A resolution was moved at an A.-I. C. C. meeting at Bombay in 1938, which, had it met with approval, would have prevented members of the Congress becoming members of the Mahasabha, and *vice versa*. But the motion was defeated, though the ban against the Muslim League remained strictly in force.

The aims and objects and the whole political ideology of the Congress and the Mahasabha being the same, one might ask what is the difference between the two bodies,¹ and why they do not merge together. The speeches made from the

¹ According to Ambedkar (*Thoughts on Pakistan*, p. 41) : "It is no use saying that the Congress is not a Hindu body. A body which is Hindu in its composition is bound to reflect the Hindu mind and to support Hindu aspirations. The only difference between the Congress and the Hindu Mahasabha is that the latter is crude in its utterances and brutal in its actions, while the Congress is politic and polite. But for this difference of fact (? tact) there is no other difference between the Congress and the Hindu Mahasabha."

Congress platform are usually so liberal from the communal viewpoint as to make one feel that the Congress and the Muslim League should be natural allies and should not find it difficult to come to an understanding. On the other hand, the speeches made from the Mahasabha platform are characterised by such ferocity of sentiment and language as to make one feel that there was no possibility of an understanding between it and the League. Yet, the Mahasabha with all its uncompromising fanaticism and bigotry has shown itself ready and willing to enter into coalition with the Muslim League to form provincial Ministries, which the Congress, despite its professions of non-communalism and nationalistic liberality, has steadily refused to do. To have a place in the sun the Mahasabha is willing to accept crumbs, while the Congress feels too mighty and proud to share power with any other body, the Sabha included.¹ The difference between the two bodies is that almost the whole political talent of the Hindu community is centred in the Congress; while the Mahasabha is the organ of its fanaticism; but there is no difference of aim or ideology.

But to return to Mr. Gandhi. From 1924 to 1928

¹The point is important and the Muslim League would do well not to let itself be deceived by the Mahasabha's readiness to enter into coalitions with it. The Mahasabha's willingness is conditioned by the simple fact that otherwise it will have absolutely no chance of enjoying power in any province. The day it became powerful enough to form a Government in a province, it would refuse just as obstinately as the Congress to share power with the League.

was his period of incubation, at the end of which he emerged as a leader of the Hindu community pure and simple. Almost a complete break between the Hindus and the Muslims had taken place by then, and when, in 1930, Mr. Gandhi launched his movement of civil disobedience, he had to depend upon his Hindu followers alone. The Muslims as a community held completely aloof.¹ The Congress had by then become an expression of Mr. Gandhi's mind, and Mr. Gandhi was rapidly developing an imperialistic attitude towards the Muslims. The Round Table Conference had held its first session in the winter of 1930-31, and a Hindu-Muslim settlement was becoming imperative. Mr. Gandhi dangled a blank cheque in the face of the Muslims at the Karachi session of the Congress, but put it back into his pocket without putting his name to it. Before he left for London for the second Round Table Conference, an effort was made to bring the two communities to some agreement. But Mr. Gandhi torpedoed the effort by a plea for unanimity. "Let the Muslims come with a unanimous demand," he said, and pointed to the handful of so-called "Nationalist Muslims" whom he carried in his pocket and who, he knew, would not agree with the other Muslims.

¹ It was during this campaign of civil disobedience that the Congress coined most offensive slogans to revile the Muslims. The campaign had followed five years of gangsterism, during which the Hindus under the leadership of Pandit Malaviya had sought to terrorise the Muslims. There was enough bitterness between the communities already. The offensive slogans which the riff-raff of the Congress following hurled at Muslims indiscriminately only added to the bitterness.

This demand for unanimity was repeated time after time until the Congress went out of office in 1939.

The plea of unanimous demand is a tried imperialistic weapon to divide and rule, for it is always possible to buy up a number of people and use them as an argument against the concession of any demands. Whenever India has put forth any demand for freedom before the British Government, the latter has always met it with the counter demand for an agreed formula, knowing full well that such unanimity did not exist, and that if the Indians at any time threatened to come to an agreement, means could be found to thwart it. When the India Secretary Mr. Amery declared, for instance in 1940 that if the Indians came with an agreed constitution the British Government would accept it, Hindu India represented by the Congress rejected the declaration and characterised it as an imperialistic device of divide and rule policy, though Mr. Amery's pronouncement was and remains perfectly justified because, as a matter of fact, the Hindus and the Muslims are not agreed and are completely at variance in their demands and ambitions. Mr. Gandhi's demand of unanimity, on the other hand, had no such justification because he could see that the Muslims were practically unanimous except for the handful of "Nationalist Muslims" whom he was carrying in his own pocket. The plea was in fact a device for creating division among the Muslims and was so used later by the Congress Governments.

The Constitution Act was passed in 1935 and the Muslims retained their right of separate electorate. The provincial part of the reformed constitution came into force in 1937 and elections were held early in the year. In April of the previous year the Muslim League had resolved to co-operate with the Congress in working the new constitution, and Mr. Jinnah, the President, who had been a nationalist in the Congress sense of the term all his life and believed in Hindu-Muslim co-operation, expected, in view of the sameness of the professed creeds of the League and the Congress, that the latter would not oppose the League in the elections. But the Congress threw the gauntlet and set up candidates in opposition to those of the Muslim League. It was an eye-opener to Mr. Jinnah who protested and said that as the Congress and the League cherished the same ideals and their programmes were identical, the Congress should not oppose the League. But Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, the then Congress President, replied that there were only two parties in the country, the Congress and the British Government. The Congress, as I have already pointed out, was then as it is to this day, with the exception of a microscopic minority, a Hindu organisation, and the Pandit himself admitted only a few weeks later, when he started the Muslim Mass Contact Movement, that the Muslims as a community were not in or with the Congress. That being the case, the Pandit's contention implied that Hindus alone would

be the inheritors of power from the British and the Muslims would be nowhere. Mr. Jinnah was not prepared to accept this quiet abolition of the Muslim community and promptly retorted that there were not two but three parties in the land, the third being the Muslims.¹ A hot controversy followed and continued for many months. The Congress has since resiled from its original position considerably, but has not yet accepted the full implications of Mr. Jinnah's contention. Until it does that, the Hindu-Muslim problem will remain unsolved.

The Congress success in the 1937 elections was overwhelming,² and their heads got swollen beyond all proportions. The Congress leaders began to feel that they were now so mighty that they had no need of any co-operation of the leaders of the "third party". Defining the future policy of the Congress with regard to the communal problem at a convention which met at Delhi on March 19-21, 1937, Pandit Jawaharlal said : "We have too long thought in terms of pacts and compromises between communal leaders and neglected the people behind them. That is a discredited policy and I trust that we shall not revert to it. And yet some people still talk of

¹ The *Tribune*, writing on the controversy, said : "Can any one deny that the two parties themselves have in the past treated the Muslim community as a 'third party'? Did not the Congress treat it as a separate and independent party when it made a pact with the Muslim League at Lucknow, and has it not treated it in the same way in all its subsequent negotiations with Muslim leaders?" (Quoted in *The Truth* of March, 16, 1937).

² But it was confined mainly to Hindu constituencies. Out of the 482 Muslim seats the Congress ventured to contest only 58, of which it lost 32.

the Muslims as a group dealing with the Hindus or others as a group, a medieval conception which has no place in the modern world."

Under this policy, the Congress would not recognise any organised political party among the Muslims and began to demand that the Muslim League should be wound up, or at least should cease to function as a political organisation, and that the Muslims should enter the Congress singly and should make it their sole political mouthpiece.

In view of the communal upheavals that had characterised the political atmosphere in India from 1923 to 1927 and the subsequent metamorphosis of the Congress the demand was senseless. To the Muslims who had been hearing the cry of Hindu Raj raised from the Mahasabha platform for fifteen years, the demand sounded like a call of imperialism, and subsequent events have proved that their fears were justified.

It would have been better for Hindu-Muslim relations if the Congress had not launched the Muslim Mass Contact Movement. The argument, which the Congress propagandists employed and continue to employ to this day, that the League leaders were mostly landlords who had little contact with the Muslim masses, was irrelevant. The Muslims themselves pull their leaders to pieces whenever they feel inclined to do so; but that would not move them to enter the Congress. In a certain idealistic sense Pandit Jawaharlal's contention may have been

right in March 1937 or earlier that Hindus as well as Muslims should enter the Congress as individuals, leaving their communal labels completely behind. But the demand that those who entered the Congress should make it their sole political mouthpiece was addressed to the Muslims alone. It was not addressed to the Hindus who could be members at once of the Congress and the Hindu Mahasabha. The difference implied a distinction in the positions the Hindus and the Muslims were to occupy in the new order: the Hindus as such were to be the nation and the Muslims their hangers-on. Their cultural institutions and social traditions, their very strong race-consciousness, and their systems of caste and untouchability would keep the Hindus a distinct political group, whatever form of nationalism was evolved in India. These are walls which prevent the Hindu from merging in any other people. The Muslims of India, on the other hand, have no race-consciousness, and if they had entered the Congress singly and individually without having a political organisation of their own, as Pandit Jawaharlal wanted them to do, they would have rendered themselves utterly powerless and easy victims of exploitation and enslavement. Individuals live by virtue of being members of an organised political group. When the group organisation is no more and the individuals become sundered, they become a herd which anybody may drive at pleasure. That was what the Mass Contact Movement aimed at accomplishing with regard to

the Muslims. It was a strategical plan for Hindu Raj and Muslim subjugation.

The Congress had clear majorities in six provinces, the U. P., the C. P., Bihar, Orissa, Bombay and Madras, but refused to form Governments in those provinces except on the condition that a guarantee were given them that the Governors would not exercise the special powers vested in them under the constitution for the protection of minorities and other special interests. War clouds had been gathering over Europe since 1935. In the autumn of that year Italy invaded Abyssinia and conquered the whole country in six months. In the summer of 1936 a Fascist rebellion broke out in Spain with the open military assistance of Italy and Germany, and Mussolini threatened to sink the British fleet in the Mediterranean if Britain interfered. Hitler occupied Rhineland and tore up the Treaty of Versailles. England did not want troubles in India when war threatened to break out any moment in Europe, and the policy of appeasement was extended to India. To purchase peace the Government surrendered and gave the guarantee the Congress demanded. The Muslims were once again betrayed by their British friends. At this point I must quote Dr. Ambedkar:¹ "At the Round Table Conference it was agreed that the cabinets shall include representatives of the minority communities. The minorities insisted that a provision to that effect should be made a part of

¹ *Thoughts on Pakistan*, p. 38 f.

the statute. The Hindus, on the other hand, desired that the matter should be left to be regulated by convention. A *via media* was found. It was agreed that the provision should find a place in the Instrument of Instructions to the Governors of the Provinces and an obligation should be imposed upon them to see that effect was given to the convention in the formation of the cabinets. The Musalmans did not insist upon making this provision a part of the statute because they depended upon the good faith of the Hindus." The faith was betrayed.

The Instrument of Instructions contained the following clause: "In making appointments to his council of Ministers our Governor shall use his best endeavours to select his Ministers in the following manner, that is to say, to appoint in consultation with the person who in his judgment is most likely to command a stable majority in the legislature those persons (including so far as practicable members of important minority communities) who will best be in a position collectively to command the confidence of the legislature." Read in the context of the Round Table Conference discussions, the clause means that inclusion of Muslims in the cabinets was mandatory and that men so chosen for inclusion in the cabinets should be those who had the confidence of their community. But as the language of the clause itself is not mandatory, the Congress on entering office declared, firstly, that it was under no obligation to take Muslims into the cabinets. Accordingly, the

Orissa cabinet had no Muslim member, and occasion was soon found to rid the C. P. cabinet of its Muslim Minister. Secondly, the Congress declared that it would take Muslims into its cabinets provided they resigned from their parties and signed the Congress pledge. That is how imperialism purchases men and sows divisions among subject peoples. And men were found who were willing to sell themselves. The men so purchased could not be called representatives of their community, because their followings in the legislatures were either non-existent or infinitesimal. They simply became instruments of Congress imperialism, the same as an Indian appointed by the Imperial power becomes an agent of British imperialism and does not represent the people of India. Dr. Ambedkar, commenting on the clause quoted above and the Congress declaration, says : "The position taken by the Congress is in direct contradiction with the meaning of this clause and is indeed a covert attempt to break all other parties in the country and to make the Congress the only political party in the country. The demand for signing the Congress pledge can have no other intention. This attempt to establish a totalitarian state may be welcome to the Hindus. But it meant the political death of the Muslims as a free people."

The Congress refusal to co-operate with the Muslim League and indeed with any Muslim political party, its purchase of unattached individuals here and there for its own purposes, and its taking into

the cabinets only those Muslims who signed its pledge and accepted its empire turned the Muslims all of a sudden into a subject people and made the Hindus the ruling race. Whether the Congress rule was good, bad or indifferent is irrelevant ; for good government is no substitute for self-government. If good government were the right criterion, then no Indian political party would be justified in clamouring for self-government or Swaraj. National freedom or sovereignty is a good in itself. It has an absolute value, for which good government by an alien people is no substitute; and Hindu Raj, by the Congress or the Mahasabha, is alien rule to the Muslims.

But the fact stands that the Congress rule was extremely unjust and oppressive to the Muslims. It has been admitted in many quarters, Hindu as well as British, that as soon as the Congress entered into power, the Hindus of the provinces in which they are in majority, felt and began to behave as if Hindu Raj had come. What is more, the Congress Ministries encouraged this feeling. District officers in the Congress-governed provinces were instructed to consult the local Congress authorities, Hindu in all cases, and associate them in the administration.

The Congress Ministries issued orders that the Congress flag should be flown on all public buildings and schools. Many Ministers toured their provinces to hoist flags in mofussil towns with pomp and circumstance. They ordered or permitted the sing-

ing of *Bande Matram*, the symbol of the restoration of Hindu sovereignty and hatred of the Muslims, on all public occasions. Even some Assemblies in the Congress-governed provinces began their proceedings with the *Bande Matram* song. "The effect of such a policy on the Hindu masses," in the words of Mr. Fazl-ul-Huq, ex-Premier of Bengal, "was disastrous, and to the officials it gave a very dangerous lead. The former felt that their 'Raj' had come at last and their will must now prevail. The latter knew that only by falling into line with their new masters in the Ministry and by pandering to the whims of their local agents in the shape of office-bearers of Congress committees could they smooth their path to preferment or avoid the displeasure of the powers-that-be. Thus was the stage set for the blatant arrogance of the militant Hindu to burst the bounds of restraint which non-partisan Governments had hitherto imposed. In towns and cities, in villages, tehsils and talukas the Congressmen and the Mahasabmites sensed in the very air the spirit of the *Bande Matram* as its author conceived and wrote it."¹

I have said in the first chapter of this book that it is possible, by systematic oppression, to kill the consciousness which makes a people a nation, and once this consciousness is killed, the people may be kept in subjection, oppressed, suppressed and ground into the dust without any fear of revolt,

¹ *Muslim Sufferings Under Congress Rule.*

resentment or protest on their part. This is what the Hindus under the Congress Governments tried to do to the Muslims. The prophecy made early in 1929 fulfilled itself with a vengeance, and the campaign of mass terrorisation of Muslims and planned riots which Pandit Malaviya had carried on so vigorously in 1923-27 was revived. It appeared as if all restraints had vanished and Hindu Raj had come in right earnest. "Never before in India's history," says Mr. Fazl-ul-Huq, "have riots taken a heavier toll of life and property within such a short space of time than during the two and a half years of Congress administration in some of the provinces of India." Mr. Fazl-ul-Huq gave a list, which was incomplete, of one hundred and fifty cases of loot, arson, assault, murder and mass terrorisation. The space at my disposal does not permit even a brief resume of those cases. Those who care to know the details may look them up in the two volumes of Sharif Report, the reprint of Mr. Huq's statement published by the All-India Muslim League, and K. S. Abdur Rahman Khan's Report. All I can do is to point out the technique the Congress Governments adopted to protect the Hindu offenders from the consequences of their violence and to deny justice to the Muslim sufferers and deprive them of their civil rights. The technique consisted, in the words of Mr. Huq, in "(1) permitting their local officers, specially the police, to effect a 'compromise' after the Muslims of a locality had been oppressed, the terms of the

'compromise' usually being that the Muslims either 'voluntarily' undertook not to eat beef or perform cow-sacrifice, or apologised to their tormentors for some unknown offence, and (2) allowing the police to delay arrests and searches, so that in most cases, although outrages against Muslims could not be denied, sufficient evidence could not generally be found to prosecute the culprits, or to secure conviction if they or some of them were prosecuted." As one reads the stories of the riots, one finds frequent mention of such compromises, of Muslim sufferers being arrested by the police and harassed while their Hindu tormentors were not touched at all, of punitive police being stationed in Muslim quarters while their Hindu oppressors went scot-free. Magistrates lived in fear of transfers or dismissals if they did not toe the line, so much so that a British writer in the *Statesman* (in 1939—I forget the exact date) suggested, with pointed reference to this practice of the Congress Governments, that the power of transfer and dismissal of Magistrates should be taken away from the provincial Governments and vested in the High Courts, as a guarantee of the magistracy's independence and good faith.

Space must, however, be found for one case, namely, the Chandur Biswa Murder Case which illustrates the mind of the Congress Governments and is typical of the methods followed by them in their treatment of the Muslims. Chandur Biswa

is a small village in Berar, where there was a Hindu-Muslim riot, in which both Hindus and Muslims received injuries and one Hindu lost his life. Before any investigation was made, a debate was held on the riot in the provincial Assembly, in the course of which the Congress Premier declared that it was not a case of riot but a carefully planned murder ruthlessly carried out. He went so far as to indict the whole Muslim population of the village. Accordingly, all Muslim males, including minors, sick and aged, were arrested, locked up and subjected to much suffering. "Grave outrages," says Mr. Fazl-ul-Huq, "were committed by the police in course of their raid on the village and arrest of Muslims." Ultimately, 43 persons were prosecuted, of whom 13 were acquitted, six sentenced to death and 24 to transportation for life, all for one Hindu who had lost his life in a riot! On appeal, the High Court found that the whole evidence produced by the prosecution was false and acquitted them all. The Chief Justice in the course of the judgment remarked : "This is a distressing case. The epithet is justified when we see in this case, where forty-three men are standing on their trial on a capital charge, witness after witness whose evidence is false, improved and tutored, going into the box. So far as seven of those witnesses are concerned, they are children or young people who have been coached to give false evidence. False evidence in such a case means that the witness or the coach is doing his best to get

another human being hanged careless of whether he is innocent or not. Human conduct can hardly stoop to anything lower than endeavouring to kill one's enemies through the lips of perjured children." The High Court summed up its judgment as follows : "The concoction is transparent and so is the reason. Ikramuddin (one of the accused) was the leader of the Muslims, and therefore, the five most important witnesses in the case come forward and concoct a deliberately false story in order to swear away the leader's life . . . All these fantastic stories would be comic if it were not for the tragedy of it. The conspiracy has resulted in six men being sentenced to death and twenty-four to transportation for life . . . The case has been treated as some gruesome festival in which witness has vied with witness to see how many Muslims he could be instrumental in sending to the gallows. Truth, honour, respect for human life, regard for one's own sworn word have all been thrown to the winds . . . When attempts are made to tamper with evidence and to deflect the normal course of justice by such one-sided and in some respects outrageous investigation as we had in this case, such results are perhaps inevitable . . . We find a deep laid concert on the part of those witnesses to bring in every Muhammadan they possibly can, just because he is a Muhammadan."

The High Court's findings would have shocked the country. They did not because the means of publicity were all in the hands of the Hindus. Had

the Premier of the C. P. had some sense of shame, he would have committed suicide or at least retired from public life for good. Mr. Yusuf Sharif was dismissed for releasing a prisoner who had served almost the whole of his sentence. But the Congress did not call Pandit Shukla to account for this abominable conspiracy against the lives of citizens. Indeed, neither the Hindu Press nor any Hindu leader ever said a word of disapproval against the miscreant. Mr. Gandhi, the Congress dictator and Pandit Shukla's patron, is eternally chattering about truth and non-violence and his inner voice. I am sure God Almighty never speaks to such hypocrites and Mr. Gandhi's inner voice must be somebody else's. In any case, with such instances of justice and good government before them, the Muslims of India can never agree to being put in a position of subjection to the Hindus.

The object of these riots, with the Governments' connivance or active assistance, was to demoralise the Muslims and inspire them with that fear of the Hindus which British imperialism had sought to inspire in the Indians of all classes. The Muslims were forbidden at places to call the "Azan" or kill cows for their food. Their mosques and graveyards were desecrated without hope of redress. But the most subtle and thoroughgoing plan to de-Muslimise the Muslims, to destroy their cultural and social unity, to wipe out national tradition and thereby to kill their consciousness of being one people was the

Wardha Scheme of education which was to be imposed compulsorily upon all alike under the future Congress Government of India, and a foretaste of which was administered in the C. P. in the shape of the Vidya Mandir Scheme. Under the Wardha Scheme all religions were to be driven from schools except the one invented by Mr. Gandhi. The Prophet of Islam, to whom every Muslim, wherever he lives, owes direct personal allegiance, was to be locked up within the confines of Arabia. He was to be presented as an Arab hero of the 7th century, not as the centre of the love, devotion and loyalty of all Muslims, and not as a world teacher as he was and as the Muslims believe him to be. All mention of Islam was excluded from the earlier stages of school curriculum. The obvious purpose of the scheme was to fortify Hindu nationalism and to place all non-Hindu nationalities that could not merge in Hinduism in its outer fringes as so many Sudras who could have no place in the national life of the country.

From the above details it is obvious that a Mahasabha Government could not have improved upon the Congress pattern. Both stood for Hindu nationalism and Hindu Raj. The Congress had actually ushered Hindu Raj and won the loyalty of the whole of Hindu India. It took the wind out of the sails of the Hindu Mahasabha so completely that the latter body almost disappeared as a factor in Indian politics as long as the Congress was in power.

The Sabha had nothing left to do because the Congress was doing all there was to do for the building up of Hindu nationalism and a Hindu Empire. It emerged from obscurity only when the Congress went into the wilderness and its leaders were put behind the bars.

In view of the policy of appeasement which the Government of India had followed for many years towards the Congress, some of us feared that the outbreak of war would find the Congress installed at New Delhi and the coping stone put on the arch of Hindu Raj. But by now the Congress stood completely discredited in Muslim eyes, and if the Government had surrendered to that level when the war broke out, Muslim India would have risen in revolt. Instead, the Government invited the co-operation of all communities on a level with the Congress and put off the introduction of the central part of the constitution until after the war. The Congress Governments resigned, to the great relief of the Muslims, in the hope that Britain would sooner or later seek their co-operation at their own price. To help the Government towards such a solution of the deadlock Mr. Gandhi started a movement of individual civil disobedience in the name of "freedom of speech" while the world was aflame, and hundreds went to jail. Early in 1942 the Government emptied the jails; but Mr. Gandhi was implacable and warned the Government that it should be prepared for disillusionment. Sir Stafford

Cripps, friend of the Congress and their hope, brought a pledge of complete freedom and sovereignty soon after the war. The terms he offered were generous, and many felt that independence had come. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, the Congress President, was so sure that he is reported to have said at Lahore (when he came to the town in connection with a meeting of the Jamiat-ul-Ulema) : "Swaraj is coming : let any who have the courage try to prevent it."

But there was one fly in the ointment. The Cripps proposals provided for the possibility of the secession of Muslim India and the establishment of an independent Muslim State. The Congress could not swallow that. Also Mr. Gandhi had plans of his own for the establishment of a complete Hindu Raj, the nature of which was revealed by subsequent events. So the Congress, by making impossible demands for immediate enforcement, brought about the rejection of the proposals, and the Cripps chapter was closed. In his last commentary on the Delhi negotiations and in his farewell message Sir Stafford Cripps disclosed that if the Congress demands had been conceded, it would have placed the Government of India completely in the hands of the Hindu majority and the Congress in a position of vantage and power from which it could not have been removed. If the Congress demand were accepted, Mr. Jinnah told the Press on April 13, the Muslims would be "at the mercy of the Congress rule." Mr.

Rajagopalachari tried for a rapprochement between the League and the Congress on the issue of Pakistan at the A.-I. C. C meeting held at Allahabad a fortnight after Sir Stafford Cripps' departure from India. He met with a rebuff, and the A.-I. C. C. instead adopted a resolution, moved by one who a little while before had held office in the Mahasabha, that Pakistan would never be made a subject of discussion in the A.-I. C. C. The door was banged in the face of the Muslims.

The "open rebellion" resolution of the A.-I. C. C. of August 8, 1942, has been interpreted in some quarters as treason to India. No doubt, Hindu India has looked to Japan, since her defeat of Russia, as their source of hope and inspiration, and there were general rejoicings among the Hindus over Japanese victories in the Far East, Singapore, Malaya and Burma. It is possible Mr. Gandhi shared the feeling. Certain it is, as is evident from the papers seized from the Congress office at Allahabad in May, that there were people in the Congress, including Mr. Gandhi, who expected the Axis to win, and who feared to displease Japan and hoped to come to an understanding with her. The general anarchy, which Mr. Gandhi expected would follow if Britain rejected his "Quit India" ultimatum, was an open invitation to Japan, whose armies were waiting on the other side of the border, to cross over and occupy the country. Viewed thus, the August resolution was an act of blackest treachery to India, but

especially to the Muslims who have no such affinity with Japan as Hindus claim to have.

A more charitable view is that the war situation being unfavourable to the Allies in the summer of 1942, as it appeared to superficial observers out here, Mr. Gandhi wished to exploit the occasion in favour of India and force Britain to recognise her freedom forthwith. If that was his intention, it was his duty to take other elements in the country also into his confidence, form plans in consultation with them and chalk out an agreed programme of work, as neither he nor his Congress is the whole of India, and those other elements were in acute disagreement with him. Mr. Gandhi did nothing of the sort, and if independence of India was his objective, he went quite the wrong way about it, committed a most egregious blunder and lost a golden opportunity.

But the soundest interpretation of the August resolution was the one put on it by Mr. Jinnah, President of the All-India Muslim League. For any one who is not wholly ignorant of British character and British political history—and it is not possible to attribute such crass ignorance to Mr. Gandhi—it would have been sheer lunacy to expect that Britain would yield readily to Mr. Gandhi's threats. A sane and calculating head as he is and looking back over the many surrenders the Government of India had made to him and the Congress, he believed that the Government would come to terms with him, enter into another "Gentlemen's agreement" with him

like the one of 1937, and hand over power exclusively to the Congress, which meant to the Hindu majority. Hindu hegemony over India would have been established for all time. The August resolution was in truth directed against the Muslims rather than against the British. Accordingly, Mr. Gandhi was authorised by the A.-I. C. C. to open negotiations with the Viceroy. But the language used by him and his lieutenants for weeks before had been so indiscreet and so violent that it appeared that he had overshot his mark. For once in his long Viceroyalty Lord Linlithgow's Government acted promptly and effectively, and Mr. Gandhi's melodrama was blanketed in the first act. Muslim India was once again saved from the mercies of Hindu Raj.

This in brief is the record of the Congress's much vaunted supra-communal nationalism which differs in no wise, except for its duplicity, from the outspoken Hindu nationalism of the Hindu Mahasabha.

CHAPTER VII

THE MEANING OF PAKISTAN

WE have learnt the story of the growth of Hindu nationalism and now turn to the study of Muslim reactions.

I have already pointed out that the Muslims of India never were a nation, though they constituted a nationality separate and distinct from that of the Hindus, with the natural consequence that the fall of the Empire found them a scattered herd without hope and without any political ambition. After the Mutiny we see Indian Islam on the defence first against British wrath and then against the ever more aggressive nationalism of the Hindus. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan's attitude was simply negative. He did not want representative government for India; it was unsuitable for the heterogeneous mass of the peoples of India, and subsequent events have fully justified his fears. His endeavour was to bring about a reconciliation between the Indians and the British, and he visualised a state of society formed after the best traditions of the Mughal rule. The founders of the All-India Muslim League had no higher ambition than separate electorates for the Muslims. They insisted that the Muslims were a separate nationality,

but had no vision of a Sovereign National State of their own. In fact, they accepted the rule of a benevolent British autocracy as a permanent fixture in the political life of the country. The events of 1911-13 stirred Muslim India to its depths and forced the Muslim League to change its policy of complete subservience to the British to one aiming at responsible self-government for India. Change of creed and the growing spirit of revolt among the Muslim masses enabled the Congress and the League to enter into a pact, namely, the Lucknow Pact of 1916, by virtue of which the Congress acknowledged itself to be the representative organisation of the Hindus and the Muslim League of the Muslims. The Pact was a treaty as between two nations. But the Muslims had yet no consciousness of being a separate nation. The League and the Congress held their annual sessions at the same places and almost on the same dates, their respective programmes so arranged that the delegates of the Congress and the League could attend the sessions of both. In 1919, in the course of his evidence before the Joint Select Committee appointed by Parliament on the Government of India Reform Bill, Mr. Jinnah expressed the hope of the early disappearance of separate communal representation in the legislatures and of the distinction of Hindu and Muslim in the political life of the country. Even as late as 1931 Mr. Jinnah hoped that separate electorates would disappear "sooner than most of us think," provided the Hindus agreed

to certain minimum demands of the Muslims.¹

But we are anticipating events. The hectic days of Khilafat agitation and non-co-operation of 1920-22 were followed by five years of political gangsterism under the leadership of Pandit Malaviya, in which all hope of Hindu-Muslim unity or even co-operation perished. Many conferences were held to bring about peace between the communities, but all to no purpose. Those were days of blank despair for the Muslims. Leaders like Abul Kalam Azad, the Ali Brothers and others who had worked with Mr. Gandhi still took their orders from him, stood aloof and refused to help their co-religionists who were being slaughtered by the Mahasabha hooligans. A Tanzim movement came into being, but vanished into thin air after a few bursts of rhetoric and a few crowded demonstrations. Mr. Gandhi's sermons on non-violence had, it appears, sunk so deep into the hearts of the Muslims that for the time being they forgot the teachings of Islam. They became almost ashamed of them and apologised for them. Their enemies, while they made life a nightmare for them, taunted them in the press and from the pulpit that Islam was a religion of violence and was responsible for the disorders and violence that India was going through at the time, that Muslim fanaticism was alone responsible for the riots. It was a well directed campaign that the Mahasabha had

¹ Address to the U. P. Muslim Conference held at Allahabad, August 8, 1931.

launched against them. The attack was directed both against the bodies and the minds of the Muslims. And the Muslim preachers and writers became apologetic. In answer to the Hindu campaign of violence and vilification they apologized that Islam was a peaceful religion. Their writings and speeches spread cowardice and demoralisation through the rank and file of the Muslims. From the newspapers and pamphlets published in that period it looks as if our writers and preachers had lost their heads, as if the community had suddenly become brainless. Islam does seek to establish peace on earth, but it never was a pacifist religion. Far from turning the other cheek, Islam teaches that cowardice, weak surrender and passive suffering of cruelty and injustice are crimes in the sight of the Creator, that to let the tyrant go unchecked is a crime against humanity. The crime was committed ; the Muslims went through terrible sufferings and were in blank despair. But there was yet no desire for separation. A friend reminds me that thirty years ago, when we were boys at college, we used to debate about the desirability of division of the country and exchange of populations. But those were idealistic dreams of isolated individuals and not practical politics. I mention it only to show that the consciousness that grows in time into the feeling of nationhood was already dawning upon the minds of individual Muslims.

In his Presidential Address to the All-Parties

Muslim Conference held at Delhi on January 1, 1929, H. H. the Agha Khan used the word 'nation' for Indian Muslims and said they were no mere community but a nation. But he was referring only to numbers and the pronouncement had no political significance. The Conference had met only to consider the policy the Muslims were to urge before the Simon Commission and decided to retain separate electorates. There was no question of a separate nationhood.

In February following I published my thesis¹ of the Hindus and the Muslims being not merely two communities but two nations, that they being two nations, a pact could not bring forth a single united nation out of them, and that the natural and rational solution of the Hindu-Muslim problem was that one community should either absorb or extinguish the other community or otherwise render it harmless. My reasons for thinking so have been stated in the first chapter of this book. Being a member of the Muslim nation, naturally I contended that Muslims should strive to reconquer India for Islam and make that their political goal. I am still of the same mind, for I believe the ultimate political salvation of India lies in Islam only. But that is a long range ideal, whereas we are here concerned with the present and the immediate future.

I have said the time was one of deep despair for the Muslims who, since the collapse of the Khilafat

¹ *The Future of Islam in India*, 1929.

Movement, were virtually without any political organisation, the Muslim League of the day being but a drawing-room affair. The thesis met with the approval of isolated individuals, but otherwise it went unnoticed. I am no good at propaganda.

In his Presidential Address at the annual session of the All-India Muslim League held at Allahabad in December, 1930, the late Dr. Sir Muhammad Iqbal of blessed memory propounded his scheme for the establishment of what he named the North-West India Muslim State, to consist of the Punjab, the N.-W. F. P., Sind and Baluchistan, after the pattern of what was then called the Irish Free State. The scheme was looked upon as no more than a political curiosity at the time, the idealistic dream of a thinker and poet who had little contact, they said, with the world of realities, a dream which, to all appearances, had little bearing on what the common herd of politicians calls practical politics, and Iqbal was neither a propagandist nor the head of any party. But it was Iqbal's scheme which a few years later gave birth to Pakistan ideology, though the name itself is of Hindu coinage. Iqbal is truly the father of Pakistan and in a fuller sense, as we shall see presently. Iqbal's Address of 1930 may well be called a turning point in the history of Muslim India and, like everything else that came from his pen, is such a profound piece of writing that we have decided to reproduce it as an appendix to the present volume.

In the meantime, things went on as they did. The Round Table Conference came and shocked Mr. Jinnah as he had never been shocked before. He had worked all his life for Hindu-Muslim unity. But at the Round Table Conference he realized that it was a hopeless job. "I received the shock of my life," he says, "at the meetings of the Round Table Conference. In the face of danger, the Hindu sentiment, the Hindu mind, the Hindu attitude led me to the conclusion that there was no hope of unity."¹ Speaking at the U. P. Muslim Conference held at Allahabad on August 8, 1931, before leaving for the second session of the Round Table Conference, Mr. Jinnah said: "The first thing that I wish to tell you is that it is now absolutely essential and vital that Muslims should stand united."²

The worst fears of Mr. Jinnah came true when the provincial portion of the reformed constitution was introduced in April 1937 and the Congress entered office in the six provinces of Hindu majority. The story of the sufferings of the Musalmans in the twenty-seven months of Congress rule has already been told. The refusal of the Congress to share

¹ *Recent Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah*, p. 37.

² The following passage in this speech is worth noting as it illustrates the mentality of the leaders of the two Indian political parties, Mr. Gandhi and Mr. Jinnah. The former as usual is lachrymose and indulges in heroics, while the latter's sobriety and moderation of language is the mirror of his inner sincerity. Said Mr. Jinnah: "I was reading the speech of Mr. Gandhi only this morning and Mr. Gandhi said that he loved Hindus and Muslims alike. I again say standing here on this platform that although I may not put forward that claim, I do put forward this, honestly and sincerely, that I want fairplay between the two communities."

power with the Muslim community through its national organisation, the All-India Muslim League, and its willingness to admit some Muslims to its Ministries only on terms on which the Rajas of Jaipur took office under Akbar amounted to a claim that the Hindus were the ruling race and the Muslims were subjects of the Hindus. The Muslim Mass Contact Movement, which aimed at complete disruption of the Muslim community and its reduction to the status of mere dependents and camp-followers, had been initiated even before office acceptance. Mr. Jinnah once more appealed to Mr. Gandhi for a settlement, but the latter replied that he saw no light; his mind was enveloped in "impenetrable darkness." Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, the Congress President, talked fire and brimstone and declared a Congress volunteer was better than a thousand Jinnahs. In fact, the Pandit's extravagance of language and his readiness to employ offensive epithets for those who differ from him, especially leaders of the Muslim community, have gone no small way to embitter communal relations. In the whole history of Indian political leadership there never was a man so conceited and so arrogant as this pampered only son of a wealthy father. He seems to have swallowed, without caring to chew, a lot of stuff from the text-books of Socialist theory, which he pours forth every now and then and desires to impose dictatorially on India. He does not understand India, has no sympathy with its traditions or the

cultural outlooks of the various communities living therein, but is ever ready to surrender every principle to the will of the Mahatma.

The story of the campaign of mass terrorisation which the Hindus launched and carried on with unrelenting vigour and venom under Congress rule has been narrated already. All this was done under official patronage and with the active assistance of Congress Governments. Muslim representation in local bodies in the Congress-governed provinces was either reduced or extinguished. Muslim schools were deprived of Government and municipal grants-in-aid. Muslim girls at school were forbidden to use the Islamic form of greetings and ordered to say *Namaste*. Muslim boys at schools were ordered to worship the portrait of Mr. Gandhi and sing idolatrous hymns to Saraswati. Muslim protests went unheeded.

The idea has been propagated assiduously in this country that democracy means the rule of the majority. This may be true in countries which have homogeneous populations, where majorities and minorities are alterable, where, as in Britain, if the Conservatives are in power to-day, the Liberals may take their place to-morrow, and Labour the day after. This is not the case in India, where majorities and minorities are permanently fixed. Majority rule in this case means anything but democracy. It means communal dictatorship, unadulterated, unmitigated, naked imperialism.

That democracy means majority rule is also a falsehood. In whichever country democracy has been considered merely majority rule, the constitution has sooner or later broken down and been replaced by some sort of dictatorship. Democracy means compromise, mutual understanding and mutual accommodation. But Hindu India has pinned its faith to what some British statesmen have termed "arithmetical democracy," and it was this kind of "democracy" which the Congress Governments adopted. They were uncompromising, as irresponsible as any despotism, and used their majorities ruthlessly. "They do not listen to reason; they don't care for what we say and defeat or carry proposals with the sheer weight of numbers," complained a Muslim M. L. A. of Bihar, as he came out of the Assembly Hall disgusted.

Mr. K. M. Munshi, ex-member of the Congress Cabinet in the Bombay Government, and Bhai Parmanand, trying to ridicule the idea of Pakistan, have said on various occasions that the Muslims would establish Pakistan in every village, every town and every street. Now, this street by street Pakistan was established many years ago, by Hindus and not by Muslims, and is in force to-day and daily growing in severity. No Musalman can find lodgings in a Hindu Mahalla. No Hindu would let his house to a Musalman. Hindu social, charitable and commercial institutions do not admit Musalmans. Social segregation implied in untouchability has

become economic boycott under the stress of the Hindu's race-hatred and newly awakened political ambitions. Hindus teach their children almost from infancy to hate Muslims and keep away from them. They teach so in their homes and in their schools. It is no longer for the Muslims to decide whether they would be one nation with the Hindus or a separate one in their own right. The question has already been decided by the Hindus by locking the Muslims out of the economic life of the country and by their racial exclusiveness, so that the Muslims must now assert themselves as a separate nation or go to the wall. There is no other alternative.

The Hindus are now foisting a new language upon the country, which even the average Hindu does not understand. They demand that we should purge our language of all words of Arabic, Persian and Turkish origin because, they say, they remind the Hindus of the Muslims having had rule over them. In all civilized countries they have created zones of silence around churches, schools and hospitals. This is a matter of decency, humanity and common courtesy. But the Hindus claim it as a right that they should be free to make hellish din before our mosques. They want us to give up our food and treat the cow as a sacred thing (though the Quran commands us to kill this ancient superstition). They ask us to give up Islam because, they say, it is of foreign origin whereas a good patriotic Indian should profess a religion of only Indian origin. They want

us to change our names because the present ones are of foreign origin. Where are we going to stop?

There is a "total" war, to which the proud Musalman could react only in one way—revolt. "We are lucky," said a Muslim of Bihar to the writer once, "that the Congress Governments have treated us so brutally. If they had treated us generously, we Muslims with our hot blood and generous nature would have perished. We would have merged our identity in the Congress." It was indeed the "total" war which the Hindus were—and are—waging against the Muslims that forced them to consolidate their ranks and conceive the idea of a separate homeland for themselves. It was yet only provincial autonomy. What would happen when the federal part was introduced and the Hindu majority installed at the Centre? Thus asked the Muslims. Obviously the Hindu majority at the Centre would use its weight of numbers as it was doing in the Congress-governed provinces, ruthlessly and without regard to justice and fairness, and emasculate the Muslim provincial Governments. Mr. Bhulabhai Desai, leader of the Congress Party in the Central Assembly, referring to the Muslim League block, actually declared from the floor of the House on October 23, 1938: "There is soon coming a time when that Bench will disappear."

Though Islam is but an ethico-political philosophy, the Indian Muslims have been as a whole poor political thinkers. But the world in which they

were placed would not leave them alone, and the "total" war which the Hindus had declared against them shook them profoundly. In 1937 we find them shaken and amazed. In 1938 we find signs of growing recognition among the Muslims that there was no place for them in a common Hindu-Muslim nationality, and towards the close of the year voices began to be audible all over India that there were two nations in India, that the Muslims were a nation in their own right. This recognition by the Indian Muslims was of profound significance in their history. A nation, I have said, is a collective ego, and it is not possible to put two egos in one body without causing an explosion. Both the Hindus and the Muslims have developed their separate national egos. Each of the two egos seeks self-expression without any interference, rub or obstruction by the other. If they are forced to form one nationhood, an explosion is sure to result, which will shatter the country into a thousand bits. A civil war will follow of the bloodiest and most devastating kind, man against man, woman against woman, child against child, a "total" civil war, which the non-violent Mahatma envisaged when he asked in the summer of 1942 that the country should be left to "God or anarchy."

This is one meaning of Pakistan. A people has been threatened with extinction and has risen in self-defence. It cannot agree to live in the same home with the other nation without exposing itself

to the danger of extinction. A people, hitherto living an amorphous sort of life, has become politically conscious of its own identity. It has become a nation, has developed what is called "national consciousness," and the nation demands a place of its own in the Indian sun, a separate home of its own, in which its sovereign self might be able to find scope for free expression, unchecked and unhindered by others.

This is one meaning of Pakistan. But there is another and a higher one.

I have said that Islam in India put itself on the defence after the Mutiny. The whole literature of that period is defence and apology. In politics, in religion, in everything they were on the defence. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, Maulvi Charagh Ali, Syed Amir Ali were all apologists. They had nothing positive to offer. Their whole contention was that Islam was not incompatible with the progressive life of the modern age, that either as it was or with a little change it could quite fit in with modern life. But God Almighty of His grace raised in our midst a mighty genius, Dr. Sir Muhammad Iqbal, who, as though an unconscious instrument in the hand of destiny, turned his back upon the life of self and power and gave himself up entirely to the study of life and its problems. Drawing his inspiration direct from the depths of life and from the Holy Quran and the early history of Islam he declared, with a conviction that comes only from the sureness of

experience, that Islam was a whole *Weltanschauung*, a philosophy of life which was truer and fuller than any other philosophy, that it was the only true philosophy of life and everything that was not Islam was folly and falsehood. The standards by which those of the nineteenth century had measured the values of Islam were false and fleeting, while the values of Islam were the only true and lasting ones. The West with all its materialism would perish and Islam alone would endure. He taught that Islam had its own political philosophy and its own peculiar conception of nationhood. Whereas other nationalities were based on distinctions of race or territory and were for this reason a chief cause of wars and bloodshed, Islamic nationality, being founded upon an idea of universal nature, had room in its embrace for the whole mankind and was a mighty factor for the establishment of world peace. God and the logic of history had laid a heavy duty upon the shoulders of the peoples of Islam, and it was necessary that, for their own preservation and for the fulfilment of that duty, the Indian Muslims must maintain their separate identity and refuse to merge themselves in another body politic.

I have said a nation has a collective ego, a corporate soul. I have used these terms for want of a better word; but in reality there is no such thing as a corporate soul or a collective ego. The national self or the collective ego is born in the hearts of individuals. From individuals it grows and expands

until it grips a whole people; and then it becomes "national consciousness." Among us it took its birth in the soul of Iqbal. That is why I have called him the Father of Pakistan.

But the people, nurtured as they had been for centuries in the traditions of the Mulla and the Sufi, failed to understand him. For thirty years, right to the moment of his death, he continued hammering at them, and then events conspired to make them turn to him. The men, who in 1938 raised the banner of a sovereign Muslim nation in a separate homeland, were those who had come under the influence of Iqbal. When Mr. Jinnah declared in January 1940, in his article on the constitutional maladies of India written at the special request of the *Time and Tide*, that Hindus and Muslims were two separate nations, the pronouncement sent a thrill through the ranks of those of us who had been working for the recognition of Indian Muslims as a separate nation.

The so-called Pakistan Resolution adopted by the All-India Muslim League at its' Lahore session in March 1940 was not something that the League was trying to foist upon the Muslims of India. It was but an expression and adoption by the League of what had already become their political faith. And yet the Resolution will for ever stand as a landmark in the history of Muslim India. What had been a longing, a mere vision, now became definite and concrete. It was as if the atmosphere,

charged with fog obscuring men's vision, had suddenly cleared up showing clear-cut, away in the horizon, the goal towards which they were to strive. It has stirred the Muslim mind throughout India and not only of those who accept the mandate of the Muslim League. There is no body of Muslim opinion in India to-day, which has not accepted the ideal or has the courage to deny it. Even some of those who are otherwise bitterly opposed to the League swear by it.

The idea of Pakistan has put the Muslim imagination afire. They see strange, undreamed of, limitless possibilities in it. Inspired by Iqbal they have gone back to the Great Prophet, to Abu Bakr and Omar the Great, and invested the term with a new meaning. They imagine Pakistan to be a State in which men shall be free from oppression, injustice and exploitation, and free from selfish greeds, covetousness and fear of poverty. It will be a State in which men, instead of fattening on the labour of others, will take pride and find joy in working for the happiness and well-being of those others; in which wealth and birth will have no privileges and poverty, no handicap; in which the son of the humblest and poorest man will have all the opportunities of education and advancement his talents entitle him to; in which poverty, ignorance and filth shall stand abolished; in which no man shall go to bed hungry, though it may not have many millionaires, and in which, though or rather because

it will be an Islamic State, there will be no distinction of Muslim and non-Muslim among its citizens in the matter of civic rights and economic benefits. To this ideal State of their imagination they have given a new name. They call it *Hukumat-i-Ilahi* or the "Kingdom of God," which term some people, ignorant of English and of the history of political institutions and misled by an apparent similarity of meanings, have translated into "theocracy." But the Islamic State is not a theocracy. The State headed by the Holy Prophet and his immediate four successors was a democracy and not a theocracy. The doctrine of the theocratic character of the State was evolved and assiduously propagated by the later Abbasides as a prop to the sinking fortunes of their own dynasty. But being repugnant to the letter and spirit of the teachings of the Holy Quran and the practice of the Holy Prophet and the first Four Caliphs it never took root in Islam and had been entirely forgotten until it was revived a couple of years ago by Maulana Abul 'Alā Maudūdi. But then he is one of the bitterest opponents of the Muslim League. The Islamic State is a democracy, whose citizens feel and have the right to declare: "We are the State."

This then is the second and higher meaning of Pakistan.

CHAPTER VIII

PROS AND CONS

I HAVE said in the last chapter that voices began to be audible among the Muslims all over the country in 1938 that they were a separate nation. It would be a travesty of history to assert that this was due to any propaganda or was something extraneous that was being foisted upon the Muslim community by any scheming politician. Hindus and Muslims had always been separate nationalities, so much so that when a Hindu abjured Hinduism and entered the fold of Islam he did so with the full consciousness that he was renouncing one nationality and entering another. Political awakening brought about by our Western contacts gradually galvanised this quiet, torpid, inactive, passive sense of nationality into a dynamic consciousness of nationhood, to which the Muslims could not remain immune, with this difference that it gripped the Hindus first, as they were pre-disposed for it by their racial consciousness and hoary old tradition of social exclusiveness, and touched the Muslims later. By 1938 it had become sufficiently strong among the Muslims. It is but natural that the growth of national consciousness should forthwith give birth to a longing for an

independent, sovereign political life. Psychologically, it is not possible to separate one from the other. And in 1939 followed scheme after scheme for a sovereign Muslim State or, in the alternative, for a constitutional arrangement which should assure to the Muslims a sovereign national life and should be based on a categorical recognition that they were in fact a separate nation. The space at my disposal permits examination of only the main features of some of them.

The first to enter the field was Dr. Abdul Latif's scheme of a Confederacy or Federation of culturally autonomous zones. Under his scheme the Muslims would have three big blocks, in the North-West, in East Bengal, and in the Deccan, and a number of small islands scattered all over in the ocean of Hinduism, which would be saved from being submerged by the "goodwill" of their Hindu neighbours. The so-called residuary powers would vest in the federating units, the Central list of subjects would be limited to the barest minimum, such as foreign relations, commerce and defence. Each federating unit would have an army of its own "under the Central supervision," but the navy would be entirely under the control of the Centre. There would be a general exchange of populations, the Muslims to retire to their cultural zones and the Hindus to theirs. But as some Muslims might desire to live in Hindu zones and some Hindus in Muslim zones for commercial, industrial or other purposes, special laws

would be enacted and special officers appointed to protect Hindus in Muslim zones and Muslims in Hindu zones, nullifying thereby the whole idea underlying exchange of populations.¹ He passes over the Islamic duty of proselytisation in silence. If the two cultures are to be segregated, the question of proselytising does not arise. There would be no room for it, for the man who wants to change his religion would have first to migrate from one zone to another. The scheme deprives Islam of one of its essential attributes. In fact, it puts Islam in jail.

Dr. Latif suffers from the limitations of his *Fach*. He is a student of literature, and as such he looks upon the Hindu-Muslim problem as a mere question of culture. This fundamental error vitiates his whole thesis. The two cultures are different, but not so antagonistic as to keep their followers at loggerheads with one another. Had it been so, one of the two must have perished by now. The fact is that though they are different, there is something in their make-up, which has enabled the Hindus and the Muslims to live side by side in mutual sympathy and understanding for so many centuries. That something is the spirit of tolerance which is common to both, which is inherent in both and is absolutely essential to them, without which neither Hindu culture remains truly Hindu nor Muslim culture remains truly Muslim. This is what a European

¹Dr. Beni Prasad, too, has noticed this inner contradiction in Dr. Latif's scheme: *The Hindu-Muslim Questions*, p. 82.

cannot understand, or perhaps does not want to understand, and it is the misfortune of this country that most of our writers and political thinkers and leaders derive their inspiration from Western writers. The Hindu-Muslim question is neither religious nor cultural. It is political, out and out political, and exists only among those who have become innoculated with Western political thought. Those who, owing to their illiteracy or residence in remote villages, have escaped that spell, are not aware of any such problem. Such communities still exist, in spite of the vast network of Congress and Arya Samaj propaganda.

The question is wholly political and may be briefly stated thus : The Hindus claim the right of majority rule. Majority rule means Hindu Raj. Muslims cannot agree to it. With a view to establishing Hindu Raj, the Hindus have declared a "total" war against the Muslims. Muslims must resist. There can be no peace or agreement between the two nations, unless and until the major community abandons the dream of Hindu Raj. The Muslims are not afraid for their culture. What they fear is political oppression, against which segregation in cultural zones is no protection. Dr. Latif leaves much to goodwill. He does not seem to understand that aggressive nationalism knows no goodwill, except such as a rival nationalism may command by force of arms, and Hindu nationalism has proved itself as aggressive as Fascist Italy or Nazi Germany.

But for this aggressiveness of Hindu nationalism, the Hindu-Muslim problem should not be there at all, or at least be much easier to solve.

A Federal Centre, unless the Hindus of their own accord waive their right of majority, of which there is little hope, will necessarily mean Hindu Raj, leading sooner or later to the political extinction of the Muslims. We do not have to imagine it. The Hindu Mahasabha proclaims it from the housetops, and the twenty-seven months of Congress rule in six provinces have proved it and demonstrated the methods they are going to employ for the consummation of their dream. In any case, the Muslims feel that a Federal Centre, dominated as it will be by the Hindus, will be their undoing. Dr. Latif is aware of this fear and suggests two provisions to avoid the danger: namely, that the federating units may maintain armies of their own, and the powers of the Centre should be circumscribed within the narrowest limits. As the provincial armies will be under the supervision of the Centre and the navy will be entirely the Centre's affair, the overlapping, the waste and the resultant futility so far as the protection of the federating units against an aggressive Centre is concerned, reduces the whole scheme to sheer absurdity.

As regards the delimitation of the powers of the Centre, Sir Feroz Khan Noon put forth a similar scheme in a speech at Aligarh in August, 1942, and the two may be considered together. Sir Feroz

proposed the division of India into five "Dominions", (1) Bengal and Assam ; (2) C. P., U. P. and Bihar ; (3) Madras ; (4) Bombay, and (5) the Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan and the N.-W.F.P. These "Dominions" should have a federal central authority for the administration of certain matters, such as defence, customs, foreign relations and currency. The central authority would consist of delegates nominated by the five Dominion Governments. "If at any time any Dominion is dissatisfied with the working of the central authority, that Dominion shall have the power to secede." But where will the 'power to secede' come from if the central authority does not permit it to secede ? There is no tribunal, nor is one ever likely to come into existence, before which an oppressed province may sue the central authority for the right of secession. Will there be a civil war then, or shall we wait for a "friendly invasion from abroad" ?

The history of federal constitutions shows that Federal Governments tend invariably and by imperceptible degrees to usurp the powers and privileges of the federating units, until the latter are reduced to a state of helpless dependency. This has been the case in the U. S. A., Canada, South Africa and Australia, and there is no reason to suppose that it will be any different in India.

In the words of Dr. Beni Prasad : " Every federation must, especially under modern conditions of military strategy and totalitarian war, possess the

power to direct foreign affairs, army, navy, air force, immigration, emigration, nationality and extradition; as a consequence, transport and communications, currency and exchange. For the efficient discharge of these duties it must be empowered to form and execute plans of economic improvement in the whole country, and, therefore, control customs and tariffs, insurance and banking. It must, on the same principle, have the power to legislate on socialisation or social control, including a socio-economic code for labourers, peasants and others. For the same reason, again, it must be responsible for peace and tranquillity in the last resort throughout the land. The federal public debts, services and pensions obviously fall under the jurisdiction of the federation. There are matters in which federal legislation may be preferable to the provincial for the sake of preventing confusion; marriage and divorce, parts of civil and criminal law and procedure. The principle of legislative centralisation *cum* administrative decentratisation can be adopted for a concurrent list of subjects like surveys, census, technical education, archæology, patents, copyrights . . . It will be observed that this is the minimum jurisdiction that every federation, that is to say, every government responsible for defence and tranquillity and inter-provincial co-ordination, must possess."¹ The writer then enumerates provincial subjects, a number of which would be better administered if taken up by

¹ *The Hindu-Muslim Questions*, p. 137 f.

the federal government, so that the provincial governments would be left with the management of burial grounds, theatres and circuses. We have seen the Government of India taking over the responsibility for rationing, price control and control of food-stuffs and all kinds of produce and manufactures all over India. In fact, modern governments, forced by the abolition of distances, by technical improvements in transport and communications, and by modern conditions, tend to be so totalitarian that individuals and provinces have little freedom of choice left to them. And the Muslims do not want to have their life determined by a Centre dominated by the inimical Hindu majority.

The suggestion has come from various quarters that a federal constitution should be introduced experimentally for a period of ten or twenty years, and that, if at the end of that period the Muslims find that they cannot afford to stay within the Federation, the provinces of Muslim majority may secede. For one thing, the experiment of Hindu majority rule has already been tried in six provinces with disastrous consequences for the Muslims, and there is no need to repeat the experiment. Secondly, if the Muslim provinces once enter the Federation, they will never be able to get out of it without the aid of a "friendly invasion from abroad". A people can be crushed and ground into the dust in ten years. Rebellions were possible in the age of swords and spears, but we have left that age far behind.

Modern armaments have made rebellion by subject peoples impossible. Even independent states, which are not large enough for the equipment and maintenance of modern armies, cannot defend themselves against powerful neighbours, let alone a subject people rising in successful rebellion against their oppressors. "Come into my parlour," said the spider to the fly, and we know what happened to the fly when she accepted the invitation. The Muslims of India are not prepared to share the fly's fate.

The late Sir Sikandar Hyat Khan's pamphlet published shortly after Dr. Latif's scheme was concerned more with improvements upon the Federal scheme embodied in the Government of India Act, 1935, than with the Hindu-Muslim problem and is therefore irrelevant to the issue before us. But its publication at a time when schemes of separation were in the air created the impression in the public mind as if it were an alternative to the scheme of Pakistan. It may therefore be briefly examined here.

Sir Sikandar could not look beyond "Dominion Status" which he regarded as the highest stage of political development possible or even desirable for India. He accepted the idea of a Federal Government for India without caring to argue about it. His sole concern, to which he turns ever and anon, is that the powers of the Federal Centre should be confined within the narrowest limits possible, and that the provinces should be secured

against Central interference. This is a hopeless proposition and may be dismissed forthwith. The proviso : "In the event of a doubt or difference of opinion as to whether a subject is Federal, Concurrent, Regional or Provincial (or State), the decision of H. E. the Viceroy and Governor-General in his discretion shall be final," puts the federating units effectively under the thumb of the Centre. He would divide India into seven 'Zones', but the structure he proposed for each Zone could have the effect only of diluting Muslim majorities in the North-West and the North-East without in any way affecting the power of the provinces of Hindu majority. He would have one-third of the Ministers at the Centre to be Muslims. A Muslim nominee of an Indian State could be taken in to complete the Muslim quota. In fact, one Nurie, one Yusuf Sharif, one Hafiz Ibrahim and one Sir Mirza Ismail would have amply satisfied Sir Sikandar. The scheme offers no solution of the Hindu-Muslim problem.

A rather comprehensive scheme prepared by a group of Aligarh men led by Prof. Dr. Syed Zafar-ul-Hasan and Dr. M. A. H. Qadri was published about the same time. It envisaged the division of British India into three wholly independent and Sovereign States, namely :

1. North-West India, including the Punjab, the N.-W. F. P., Sind and Baluchistan, which with the inclusion of Kashmir may be called Pakistan.

2. Bengal, including the adjacent district of Purnea (Bihar) and the Sylhet Division (Assam), but excluding the south-western districts of Howrah and Midnapore (Burdwan), and the north-western district of Darjeeling.

3. Hindustan, comprehending the rest of British India.

Inside Hindustan there must be formed two new autonomous provinces, namely :

(a) Delhi Province, including Delhi, Meerut Division, Rohilkhand Division and the district of Aligarh (Agra Division), and

(b) Malabar Province, consisting of Malabar and adjoining areas on the Malabar coast.

So constituted, Pakistan will have a Muslim population of over 60% and Bengal of 57%, and both will be Muslim States.

The Malabar area has 1·4 millions of virile Muslim population constituting 27% of the total, which can very well look after itself. The newly constituted autonomous province of Delhi will have a Muslim population of 3·5 millions, forming about 28% of the total.

The Indian States situated within the boundaries of any of the three proposed States or exclusively on the frontier of one of them would be attached to that State. Those bordering on more than one of the three States should have the option of joining any of the adjoining States, whereas Hyderabad, with its old dominions of Berar and Karnatik restored to

it, would be a Sovereign State, as historically and legally it at present is.

These three independent States, Pakistan, Bengal and Hindustan, should enter into a defensive and offensive alliance among themselves on the basis of mutual recognition and reciprocity. Also, each of them would have separate treaties of alliance with Great Britain or separate Crown Representatives if any. They would have a joint Court of Arbitration to settle any dispute that might arise between themselves or between them and the Crown.

Hindustan or the Hindu State would still have a Muslim population of twenty-three millions, forming a minority of 10%, and the problem of their protection has engaged the special attention of the framers of the scheme. They insist quite rightly that the Muslims of India constitute one nation, that the Muslims residing in Hindustan should be recognised as a nation in minority and part of the larger nation inhabiting Pakistan and Bengal, and that "an accredited Muslim political organisation will be the sole official representative body of the Muslims in Hindustan." They further suggest that as Muslims in Hindustan largely live in towns, every town in India with a population of 50,000 or over should have the status of a Free City, and Muslims in rural areas of Hindustan should be persuaded not to remain scattered as at present but to aggregate in larger units, so that it may become practicable to protect their cultural and economic interests.

Lastly, they propose : "The Muslim minority in Hindustan and the non-Muslim minority in Pakistan and Bengal will have (i) representation according to population and (ii) separate electorates and representation at every stage, together with effective religious, cultural and political safeguards guaranteed by all the three States."

Protection of the Muslim minority in Hindustan is a very serious problem, and when the details of the final adjustment between Hindu India and Muslim India come to be thrashed, the suggestions made by the authors of the Aligarh scheme will demand very serious consideration.

Whether Ambala Division should be retained in or excluded from the Punjab has been a subject of political discussions for many years. "A Punjabi", author of *Confederacy of India*, summarises¹ the arguments for retention or exclusion as follows :

Retention of Ambala Division and other Hindu tracts of the Eastern Punjab reduces the Muslim majority of the Indus region, especially of the Punjab, while their exclusion enlarges the same. The Ambala Division is very largely Hindu, and the Hindus have the same right of self-determination as the Muslims claim for themselves. Their cultural and religious interests are also different from those of the Muslim majority of Pakistan. These two considerations entitle the Division to claim separation from the Punjab. On the other hand, the

¹ *Separation: A Reply to Critics*, pp. 17-21.

economy of this region, which is wholly agricultural, depends, except for a small tract, on the irrigational resources of the Punjab, without which its economic life would be impossible. This consideration outweighs every other.

"A Punjabi" views the question also from another standpoint. The increase in the Hindu population of Ambala Division was 2·2 per cent in the decade 1921-1931, while the Muslim increase in the same period was 12·35 per cent. In normal conditions there is no reason to suppose that these figures will vary in the future. If they remain as they probably will, "Punjabi" calculates that by 1981 Muslims will become the majority in Ambala Division and Hindus the minority, and by 2011 the present proportion will be completely reversed. In all likelihood the same variations will take place in Delhi and some of the western districts of the U. P., and fifty or sixty years is a small period in the life of nations. What will happen when these reversals in population ratios have taken place? Will the question be reopened? The author suggests that to avoid future complications it would be advisable to constitute these tracts into an autonomous province. The Aligarh scheme specifies the tracts more definitely.

A note of warning may be sounded here. The Sikhs have no tradition of religious tolerance. We cannot forget the sufferings of the Muslims in the brief episode of Sikh rule in the Punjab, during

which a very large number of mosques were turned into Gurdwaras, stables and state godowns, and communal riots caused by Sikh objection to the Muslim call to prayers in villages of Sikh majority are not of infrequent occurrence even to-day. A very sad feature of these occurrences is that Sikh leaders never condemn their co-religionists for this absurd variety of religious fanaticism or even try to restrain it. Modern Hinduism has entirely abandoned its tradition of religious tolerance and replaced it by racial and political aggressiveness. The new spirit, namely, that of the Arya Samaj, the Hindu Mahasabha and the Congress, which inspires the administration in Hindu States as against their Muslim subjects, is not something that can be ignored. They are a foretaste of what the Muslims in India will have to suffer if and when a federal government of Congress *cum* Mahasabha conception is established in India. If a separate State is established in Eastern Punjab as Master Tara Singh demands, its first endeavour will be to eliminate the Muslim element, or at least to suppress it to such a degree that it ceases to be a political factor.

Then there was Dr. Ambedkar's thesis propounded in an enormous work that has been quoted several times in the foregoing pages. He must have been at it for a very long while, though he professes that its preparation was occasioned by the Lahore resolution of the All-India Muslim League of March 26, 1940. His thesis briefly is that the Musalmans

are a very very wicked people¹ and should be expelled from India in the interests of the peace and quiet of the long-suffering Hindus, among whom he counts himself and his untouchable brethren, and that these bad people should be confined in narrow strips of country in Eastern Bengal and North-Western India. His conception of Pakistan, for which he argues scientifically and at great length, is, therefore, exile for the Muslims from India. As according to him it is the Muslims who are the evil lot, he sees no harm in a Muslim minority living under Hindu rule, but he cannot have a Hindu minority living under Muslim rule. If there is a tract in which Muslims constitute just half the population and the other half is a conglomerate of many non-Muslim communities, Ambedkar wants the promiscuous conglomerate to rule over the solid Muslim block of half the population. For instance,

¹ The venom Ambedkar displays for Muslims in this book is a revelation to me. Has he made the bargain he was trying to conclude with the Hindus and the Sikhs a few years ago? He has a great reputation for learning and sports a number of academic titles after his name; but his ignorance of the Muslim period of Indian history is appalling. He is a lawyer and has gone out of his way to build up a prosecuting counsel's case against the Muslims. But he has made one mistake. He has based his whole case on the evidence of one who is a professed anti-Islamic propagandist. This is fatal to the case, as no court of law would give weight to the evidence of a professed enemy. A few years ago, when writing a text-book of Indian history for colleges, I had occasion to examine the whole ancient and modern literature on the subject, but never came across the name of Dr. Titus, and this Christian propagandist is the sole authority of Ambedkar. How awfully innocent of him! And he accuses the Muslims of having introduced political gangsterism in India! Mahasabha leaders have good cause to sue him for torts for depriving them of the honour.

the district of Gurdaspur, bordering upon the district of Sialkot with 62·1% Muslim population according to the census of 1931, has a 50% Muslim population, the other 50% being made up of Hindus, Sikhs, Scheduled Castes and Christians. Ambedkar detaches it from the Muslim territory in his proposed map of Pakistan and includes it in Hindustan. When the figures are published, Gurdaspur will be found to have a clear Muslim majority in the Census of 1941. Every decennial census shows a much larger increase among the Muslims all over India than among the Hindus, so much so that areas, as the province of Bengal for instance, which had a Muslim minority fifty years ago, have a clear Muslim majority to-day. In all territorial adjustments which are intended to have some permanent value, room must be found for these variations of population. Ambedkar's plan is vitiated by the fact that he ignores these natural variations altogether. Had he kept these in mind he would have found that his case for the separation of Amritsar, Jullundhur and Ferozepur districts from Pakistan was very thin indeed, and of Hoshiarpur and Ludhiana not much stronger. Muslim population in these districts according to the census of 1931 respectively was : 46·9%, 44·3%, 44·8%, 32·8% and 35·1%. Dr. Latif's proposal of the exchange of populations is also vitiated by the same circumstance, as he too ignores the natural and other increases in the population of Muslims. Both seem to regard the Hindu-Muslim

proportions as fixed, which is belied by every census.

Following the same principle Ambedkar allots Dinajpur and Khulna, with Muslim populations of 50·5% and 49·3% respectively, to Hindu India !

In Assam, he excludes from the future Muslim State of Eastern Bengal all those districts which do not have a clear Muslim majority and would have them included in Hindu India. The majority of the non-Muslim population in these districts is also not Hindu either by race, religion, culture or language, and there is no reason whatever why these tribal folk should be placed under the rule of the Hindus. Caste-ridden and capitalistic minded as Hinduism is, these people are sure to suffer under Hindu rule as the Scheduled Castes have been suffering from the time Hinduism came to India. They will be branded as untouchable Sudras. But Ambedkar in his scheme of partitioning is aware of only one distinction, Muslim and non-Muslim, and is so blinded by his hatred of the Muslims that, an untouchable though he himself is and should know what the untouchables have suffered at the hands of the Hindus, he forgets the fate that Hinduism reserves for those who are not born within the upper three castes and consigns the simple, primitive tribal folk of Assam to the rule of the Brahman and the Bania !

Ambedkar bases his whole scheme of partition on the distinction of Muslim and non-Muslim and completely ignores economic considerations. He would exclude from Pakistan two whole divisions of

Jullundur and Ambala plus the districts of Gurdaspur and Amritsar. The tracts cover very nearly the area which Master Tara Singh has chalked out for his "Azad Punjab." The districts of Amritsar and Gurdaspur, the Jullundur Division and some of the districts of Ambala Division are so closely interwoven in the economic system of the central and western Punjab, that their separation from Pakistan would spell their economic ruin. It is for this reason that Master Tara Singh's scheme of "Azad Punjab", over which the Muslims have so far observed almost complete silence, has met with severe opposition from the Sikhs themselves. Nor are the Hindus very much in love with it. Ambedkar's scheme of partition, conceived in the hatred of Muslims, has no economic basis and stands rejected by the Sikhs and the Hindus of the area in question.

Then there is Sir Ardeshir Dalal's plan.¹ The Bombay industrialist makes a powerful appeal for the unity of India and says a united India would speak with far greater authority at any future international conference than a divided India could hope to do. I say, India speaking with a powerful voice at an international conference cannot be much of a consolation to a minority which is being crushed under heels, economically as well as politically, by a ruthless inimical majority, such as the Hindus have proved themselves to be. Muslims as a nation can,

¹ *An Alternative to Pakistan*, circulated privately and reviewed in the *Times of India* of June 1, 1943, from which I have taken the details.

in the first place, be interested only in their own security and well-being. What happens to "India", in which they have no place or share, and in the India of Hindu conception they will have none, is no concern of theirs. Until the Muslims' security has been assured, all other considerations must remain irrelevant to them.

Sir Ardeshir prefers the Canadian model of a federal government at the Centre charged with the control only of "the essential minimum" of subjects, including defence, foreign relations, currency, credit, customs and communications, and the residuary powers to vest in the provinces. He would have coalition ministries at the Centre as well as in the provinces. One-third of the Ministers at the Centre must be Muslims elected by their co-religionists in the legislature. "Minority representation might exceed the fixed statutory minimum, but in no case would the collective number of minority Ministers exceed fifty per cent. of the total number of the cabinet." In the federating units all minorities constituting more than a specified percentage of the population agreed to by mutual arrangement would be represented in the provincial cabinets in proportion to their population percentage.

It may be objected at once that Muslims would never agree to a share of less than fifty per cent. at the Centre, for they do not want to be put under the authority of non-Muslims at all. In view of the spirit which the Congress Governments evinced

towards Muslims in provinces of Hindu majority, the general treatment of the Muslims by the Hindus and the oft-proclaimed political ambitions of the latter to establish Hindu Raj in India, it is extremely doubtful whether coalition ministries, unless backed by detailed safeguards, woven into the constitution itself, covering the whole range of the administration and every aspect of civil life, would suffice to protect Muslim interests.

The problem of India is unique and cannot be solved on the analogy of Canada or any other country. No constitution can succeed unless it reflects the character of the people for whom it is meant and unless the latter are willing to work it truly in its spirit. No such willingness is noticeable in this country. In Canada there are British provinces and French provinces. What is the difference between the British and the French beyond the language? Their cultural and economic conceptions are the same, while racial and historical traditions tend to be forgotten in one generation as they have been in the U. S. A. which receives immigrants of many nations. They all get Americanised in a short while. Besides, it is the willingness of the British Canadians to meet the French Canadians on the latter's own terms that has made the Canadian federal constitution so successful. The Hindu majority in India, on the other hand, is not willing to meet the Muslim minority on any fair terms. The Hindus insist on their pound of flesh, which they

say their majority entitles them to. The majority right means Hindu Raj which the Muslims are not prepared to accept.

Europeans and Americans fail to understand the communal problem of India, as they have nothing like it in Europe and America. They have their Jews, no doubt, who have refused to fuse with those in whose midst they have lived for centuries. But the Jews are everywhere in minority, like the Parsis in India, and are ignored as the latter are in India. Had there been a Jewish majority in any country, the same problem would have cropped up there. But our Jews are more Jewish than any Jews in Europe or America in respect of racial exclusiveness. Hindu insistence on the racial principle has made the Indian problem more insoluble than otherwise it might have been. The racial principle has led to perversion of values all over the world. Hinduism means racialism of the extremist form and under the political urge has created some very ugly perversions. The Hindu might pretend to be shocked and the European, from ignorance or unwillingness to see, might talk loftily of six of the one and half a dozen of the other, but the fact is that it is well nigh impossible for the average Muslim to fathom the mind of the average Hindu. The latter often says one thing and means another and holds every lie, every trickery and fraud and every kind of hypocrisy justified so long as it serves the interests of his race. But for this characteristic of the Hindu

India's communal problem would not have proved so baffling. The factors that made the Canadian constitution successful are entirely absent in India.

All modern governments tend to be totalitarian, and all federations tend to usurp the powers of the federating units. The deciding factor is always power, and power in Sir Ardeshir's plan will vest in the Centre. The plan might have a chance of success if a third party, say the British, continued to control the policies of the Centre effectively and also undertook to see that no majority exercised its power to the detriment of the minorities in the provinces. The British are not angels of charity, though they frequently claim to be. If they stay, they will do so for their own good and maintain themselves in power by setting one people against the other. Divide and rule. The present constitution expressly charges the Governors to protect the minorities. But the Governors failed to do so during the Congress regime of twenty-seven months, and they will do so again.

No paper safeguards and no constitutional legerdemain can protect a people against another if the latter is unwilling to respect the same, and it is more than obvious that the Hindus are not willing. Safeguards have meaning only when a people, in whose interest they are created, can enforce them by its own power. This is the meaning of the demand of Pakistan, to which no constitution which gives the Muslims a second place can be an alternative. Sir Ardeshir Dalal's plan will not be acceptable to the

Muslims unless and until Hindu leaders and all educated Hindus dedicate themselves to the eradication of racialism from the hearts of the Hindu race and work ceaselessly to that end for two or three generations—an impossible proposition.

Lastly comes the claim of the All-India Muslim League as embodied in its resolution of March 26, 1940, which has since been popularly called the Pakistan Resolution. The relevant portion reads as follows: "Resolved that it is the considered view of this session of the All-India Muslim League that no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims unless it is designed on the following basic plan, *viz.*, that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted with such territorial adjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the North-Western and Eastern Zones of India should be grouped to constitute 'Independent States', in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign."

The last word 'sovereign' is obviously misplaced as areas which are going to be the constituent units of another sovereign State cannot themselves be sovereign, though they can certainly be autonomous. In fact, the whole final clause is irrelevant and was probably inserted to reassure the representatives of Sind, Baluchistan and the N.-W. F. P. about their own provincial autonomy. The resolution was

intended to define the areas of Pakistan as being distinct from Hindustan and not to state at that stage what the inner structure of the resultant Pakistan State would be.

The Hindu Press has called the scheme embodied in the above resolution 'nebulous' and 'vague', and as is their wont, they think the pinning of an opprobrious epithet or two condemns the whole scheme. It does not. To any one conversant with the geography of India and the distribution of populations in its various regions and provinces the resolution fairly clearly marks out the regions that are intended to be separated from Hindu India. It does not mention the exact boundaries of the regions in question or the districts and areas that are to be retained in or excluded from them. These are always matters for negotiation, to be discussed at a conference table and not laid down arbitrarily in a general resolution of this nature, and the resolution envisages negotiations. The resolution simply lays down the principle which must first be accepted before any negotiations can take place. India shall stand where it is until Hindu India makes up its mind to enter into negotiations.

CHAPTER IX

OBJECTIONS

HINDU objections to the Pakistan scheme may now be examined briefly. In the order of the frequency of statement they are as follows:

1. Mr. Jinnah is a very bad man.
2. The Muslim League does not represent the Muslims of India.
3. Pakistan would weaken the defences of India.
4. Pakistan would not be able to bear the financial burdens of an independent sovereign State and its economic life would be one of utter poverty.

The Hindus have criticised the Pakistan scheme and even ridiculed it, but the whole volume of their abuse has fallen upon the devoted head of Mr. Jinnah. This is bad tactics, for reviling the head of a party, which is more than a mere political party, is not the right way to make friends with that party. But that, unfortunately, is the usual Hindu way of meeting opposition. They deny the good faith of those who differ from them, heap opprobrious epithets on them, and so, by creating prejudice against them in the public mind, seek to score victory upon their political rivals. Hindu India has perfected the technique and followed it persistently and shamelessly for two

decades, but it has solved no problem. It could not. It has only created bitterness and exasperation. And abuse of Mr. Jinnah by the Hindus goes to the heart of every Muslim. The Muslims have found in him the truest leader after the great Sir Syed Ahmad Khan. They have a profound faith in his character, in his clear-headedness and political acumen. Ambedkar who is no friend of the Muslims or admirer of Mr. Jinnah, writes of him : "Mr. Jinnah who represents this ideological transformation (*viz.*, of the Muslims being a separate nation) can never be suspected of being a tool in the hands of the British even by the worst of his enemies . . . It is doubtful if there is a politician in India to whom the adjective incorruptible can be more fittingly applied. Any one who knows what his relations with the British Government have been will admit that he has always been their critic, if, indeed, he has not been their adversary. No one can buy him. For it must be said to his credit that he has never been a soldier of fortune."¹ Love of public applause is a common weakness of political leaders, and Mr. Gandhi the Mahatma would perish of sheer emptiness if he did not create frequent occasions for keeping himself in the public eye. Mr. Jinnah has never cared for this kind of popularity nor ever sought public applause. That is our leader.

Abuse of Mr. Jinnah is also irrelevant. He is not the originator of the two-nation theory which

¹ *Thoughts on Pakistan*, p. 330 f.

has culminated in the demand for Pakistan. He is a convert to it and a late one at that. The great thing about him is that, since he put himself at the head of the Muslim nation in 1937, he has been studying the opinions, sentiments and the psychological make-up of the Muslims very closely and has accepted and to a large extent assimilated the same. Abuse of Mr. Jinnah, in an ultimate analysis, thus turns out to be abuse of the whole Muslim community and of Islam itself which is responsible for their peculiar psychological make-up and their political faith.

In any case, it is for the Muslims to decide whether Mr. Jinnah is a dependable leader or the All-India Muslim League their true representative. Hindu criticisms on this score are simply irrelevant and only create bitterness and exasperation, and that is what they have done. In fact, the greatest aid the Muslim League has received in consolidating its ranks and rallying the Muslims of India under its flag is the abuse the Hindu Press has heaped on Mr. Jinnah and the League.

The proposition that the creation of Pakistan would weaken the defences of India calls for a lot of qualification. For one thing, it will be no concern of Pakistan to look after the defences of Hindustan. We Muslims are interested in the fate of India because we are here. If we were not here, it would be no concern of ours what happened to this country, just as the Mexicans, for instance, are not interested

in the fate of this country. Which means that India is we and we are India, and to us there is no India beyond ourselves. This is a direct implication of the two-nation theory, and if the two nations part company, as by the creation of Pakistan they must, each of them must look after its own defences and not after those of the other. France, for instance, can look after its own defences and is under no obligation to care for those of Italy as well. The objection is therefore absurd.

Secondly, in view of the highly evolved modern armaments, mountain barriers and rivers play—but a secondary part in the defences of a country. In modern warfare, as has been abundantly proved in the present war, the foundations of a country's defences are truly laid in the hearts of its people. If, for instance, a federal government were established in India and the Muslim areas of the North-West remained within the federation, if these areas were dissatisfied with the treatment of the federal Centre and a foreign people tried to invade India through the North-West, hundred to one the North-West would rise in revolt against the federal Centre and throw in its lot with the invaders, the same as Hindu India was preparing in the summer of 1942 to enter into a private treaty with Japan if and when the Japanese armies crossed the eastern borders into India. No question of loyalty arises here, as no nation owes any loyalty to another (except to the extent of treaties if there be any between them),

least of all when that other nation stands for the oppressive tyranny of an alien people, as the rule of the Hindu-dominated federal Centre must be to the Muslims. The same result would follow if there were an independent Pakistan, but dissatisfied with the behaviour of Hindustan.

The creation or non-creation of Pakistan is, therefore, wholly irrelevant to the question of defence. The north-western line of defence can be secured in either of two ways: (1) The hearts of the Muslims of the North-West should be so completely won over by Hindu India by its generosity of treatment that they should, from their own sense of enlightened self-interest, stand shoulder to shoulder with Hindu India and act as their bulwark against all comers; or (2) the Muslims of the North-West should be so completely crushed and their national self so utterly extinguished that they should for ever cease to be a source of danger to Hindu India. The first alternative is unthinkable, unless some miracle intervenes to change the whole mentality and the character of the Hindu race, and such miracles just do not happen. At any rate, we do not see the faintest sign of any such change taking place either in the Hindu mind or in the Hindu character. The trouble with the race is that the Bania wants to have everything his own way without having to make the least little concession in favour of others. Then there is the second alternative and that is the ambition, the goal and the whole trend of the

politics of Hindu India since 1923, if not 1906. It is this thing against which Muslim India is up in arms, and Pakistan is the instrument by which the Muslims desire, before it is too late, to secure their national existence from the fate that Hindu India is forging for them. Hindu India wants to turn the hands of the clock back to where they were before Mahmud of Ghazni invaded India. That is their ambition and a profound longing of their heart. It may be all right for them, but does not suit Muslim India.

Last comes the economic question, on which much ink has been spilt by the opponents of Pakistan. It may be pointed out at the outset as a general principle that no state or nation was ever formed on economic bases, and no state on earth is economically self-sufficient. If they were, there would be no need or occasion for international co-operation. Nations grow and states are formed on other considerations, and when they have been thus formed, they look around for means to satisfy their wants and will create an administrative machinery corresponding to their means and their requirements. It is said with sickening frequency that provinces of the north-west which are proposed to be federated into one sovereign state of Pakistan are deficit areas. Dr. Ambedkar has estimated on the basis of the present figures of income and expenditure that Pakistan will have an annual surplus of six crores. The expenditure does not include the army budget which, in

view of the very expensive modern armaments and other military equipment, will probably be several times six crores. Which means that the financial resources of Pakistan will be inadequate to meet all the commitments of a modern state.

But I say it is fundamentally wrong to discuss the finances of Pakistan on the basis of present figures. They are just irrelevant and I am not going to quote any. We are living under foreign rule, and the administration of a foreign ruler, unless he happens to be an angel of charity, is the most expensive and wasteful of all administrations. He has to purchase a class of people body and soul, their talents, their character and their loyalties, in order that they should do his job as he wants them to do it. For the purchase of stores and the execution and maintenance of public works he has to spend twice, thrice and even four or five times as much as a national government would do. In terms of the per-capita income of the tax-payer, the Indian administration is the most expensive in the world.

Also, the administration, however efficient it may be from the foreign ruler's point of view, is most inefficient and wasteful so far as the good of the country itself is concerned. The individual employee looks to the ruler for preferment and, being part of a machine whose motive centre lies thousands of miles away, soon begins to feel and act as if he had no stake in the country of his birth.

His personal greed, which the system feeds and fattens, roots out all sense of morality and patriotism. That is why corruption, in terms of money and other more abominable forms, is so widespread in this country.

All this will change under a national government of Pakistan. We shall not have to purchase men for our services. They shall receive for their service what the country can afford to pay. There shall be no fancy salaries to corrupt public morals and upset the economic balance of the country. The economy of the country shall be constructed on the national and not the capitalistic basis of a foreign imperialism. Men for the state services shall be trained not merely as efficient hands, but also as decent, patriotic human beings who shall find their highest good in honest service to their country and not in the pleasure of an alien bureaucrat. They shall be public servants and not masters of the public as they are at present. In England one meets a public servant with trust and confidence and is received with courtesy. In India one meets a public servant with fear and is received with frowns and a haughty demeanour. In England, the policeman is one's best friend; in India he is a most hateful tyrant, whatever his rank. All this shall change under the national government of Pakistan. The administration will be inspired with a different spirit and different ideals; the country's economy shall be constructed on a different basis. It is wrong and irrelevant to argue from the present

budgetary position of the North-West about the future finances of Pakistan. Given the power and the freedom, we shall know how to manage our economy and meet our obligations.

It has been said that while Hindu India is rich in mineral wealth, the agricultural North-West has none and, separated from the rest of India, must ever remain poor. Mr. Calvert,¹ a retired Punjab civilian, adduces this very fact as an argument for the separation of the North-West from the rest of India. He argues that "the Muslim North-West as also the rest of northern India is mostly agricultural, while southern India is industrial. As everywhere in the world, the industrial interests are always more influential. They can bribe and influence the legislature and the government into passing measures and adopting policies beneficial for themselves. A government under the influence of rich capitalists may adopt a policy of raising high tariff walls against foreign imports to protect home industry and to afford to the industrialists a fair and easily accessible market for the consumption of their finished goods. If this happened in the case of India (as it did in Australia and the U. S. A.), as it is likely to happen, the agricultural North-West will feel that the southern industrial India is being pampered at its cost. Protection may mean a fair market for the industrialists within India, but to the agricultural

¹ *The Wealth and Welfare of the Punjab.* The argument as cited in the text is summarised by "A Punjabi" in *Separation : A Reply to Critics*, p. 11.

interests it means a restricted market for the sale of their raw materials."

But I do not think Pakistan will for ever remain a purely agricultural State. Her sources of energy and mineral wealth have not yet been tapped, but there is no reason to suppose it will be so always. Besides, we must not forget Japan. That country is no richer, if not positively poorer, than the lands of Pakistan in the matter of mineral wealth, but has become, nevertheless, a first class industrial country and a first class military power. She imports all her raw materials from foreign countries. In this age of international commerce, the wealth of a country, industrial as agricultural, depends in the last analysis on the quality of its workers, and the Pakistani is as good a worker as any in the world.

The late Prof. Gulshan Rai used to talk a lot of the wealth of Hindu India and the comparative poverty of the lands of Pakistan. Hindu India is surely far wealthier. In fact, it makes one's mouth water and reminds one of the English ballad :

The mountain sheep are sweeter,
But the valley sheep are fatter,
We, therefore, deemed it meeter
To carry off the latter.

Hindu India may have larger hoards of silver and gold, but the lands of Pakistan have the finest manhood in India. They are better fed, better clothed and, man for man, better housed than any other people in India. If wealth means comfort

and decent living, we have nothing to hang down our heads for.

Prof. Gulshan Rai, who taught history at a Lahore college, argued that the lands which now constitute the provinces of Oudh and Bihar conquered and ruled over the North-West in the past and, with their greater wealth, would reconquer Pakistan and rule over it. That is a concern for the protagonists of Pakistan, and no opponent need injure his health over it. But the argument is poor history. At the time the Professor speaks of the North-West was a land of petty tribes each living in independence and isolation from others, so that any properly organised state, such as Pataliputra of the Mauryas, could overthrow and subjugate them one by one. That age is long past; the North-West is no longer a land of isolated tribes, and Pakistan will be a well-knit, highly organised modern state, capable of offering united opposition to any would-be conqueror from the east. What is more, Hindu India is herself indefensible from land or sea. If it ever came to a trial of arms, we would smash the country from end to end within three months. Pakistan has no fear on that account. The key to the empire of India shall ever remain in the hands of Pakistan.

Their comparative economic conditions are, in fact, one of the strongest reasons why the Muslim areas should part company with the Hindu area. Before the first World War there was little economic disparity between the Hindus and the

Muslims. If there was any, it was not noticeable. The war upset the equilibrium and, for reasons which it would take us away from our subject to go into, created a definite disparity between the two peoples, and subsequent years only widened the gulf. The present war has enlarged the distance to such an extant, that even if the Muslims struggled ceaselessly for a hundred years they would never be able to catch up with the Hindus. Inflation has made the relative position of the two peoples only worse. It has made the rich richer and the poor poorer. Increased currency has gone to swell the bank balances of the industrialists and big merchants, most of whom are Hindus, while the workers are worse off than ever, and the Muslims on the whole are a community of workers. Thirty years ago there was no capital and labour question in India ; but in India of the future it shall be a major question. Inflation and the sudden expansion of industry are creating a social problem which it will be impossible to solve without a revolution entailing violence and bloodshed. The creation of Pakistan will be a safety valve which will go a very long way to avoid bloodshed and to ensure inner cohesion and unity which might be needed to-morrow to repel a foreign invasion.

The conditions created by the two wars and inflation are of a nature that will make a decent economic life for the Muslims an impossibility. In a federated India of the future, as conceived by the Hindus and their British friends, the entire industry

and commerce of the country will be in the hands of the Hindus, while the Muslims will be a race of workers who for employment in industry will be at the mercy of the Hindus, and we have already pointed out that Hindus have in operation an effective economic boycott of the Muslims and do not employ any Muslim in the establishments under their control. In truth, the whole Hindu conception of independence is freedom to exploit the wealth of India without interference by the British or the Muslims, whereas the Muslim conception is wholly moral. They have no idea of economic exploitation.

This is a very important consideration, as it reflects the difference in the character and cultural outlook of the two peoples, which is in no small degree responsible for the great economic disparity between them. The difference is indeed so profound that if the whole wealth of India were thrown into a common pool one day and then distributed equally between the Hindus and the Muslims, I am positive that within a very short period the old disparity will reassert itself; the Hindus will be as wealthy as before and the Muslims just as poor. It is not that Muslims as a race are spendthrifts. The average Indian Muslim is not half so free with his money as the average Englishman or the average American. The real reason is that the Hindus and the Muslims constitute two separate social units which are governed by different cultural ideals and different

economic conceptions. The Hindu lives to earn and hoard, while the Muslim earns to live and spend. The Hindu's inordinate love of money is a most amazing phenomenon. It governs his whole life and thought and occupies his whole mind till he dies. The food he eats is wretched. He seems to live upon nothing in fact. The Muslim, on the other hand, is a notorious good-eater. When he marries, he looks for a self-contained suite of rooms, where he will enjoy decent privacy and an independent home life. Hindus of equal and even better incomes live promiscuously. A tenement building of fifty rooms might be housing as many as fifty families, and the rooms in Hindu houses are usually small. One might say, they do not live at all; they just earn, save and die. So much love of money is a curse; to individuals and nations it is all round a curse. It creates economic inequalities which lie at the bottom of many a social evil. To the Hindu it has given a peculiar character, a peculiar cast of mind, a habit of thought which we Muslims of northern India just do not understand, and the same is more or less true of the Muslims of other parts of India. Europeans and Americans, too, cannot understand it, for there is nothing like it in their countries, except among the Jews. But, then, Jews are but small minorities in Western lands, whereas our Jews are the overwhelming majority.

No European or American, excepting the Jews, can compete with the Hindus on equal terms. Nor

can the Muslims. With their different values of life and money they must be always at a disadvantage as against the Hindus. If they remain yoked together in one state, federal or any other, the Muslims are bound to suffer. They are bound to become the proverbial hewers of wood and drawers of water. With their different economic values, different casts of mind and different moral conceptions, the two peoples will remain eternally in conflict with each other. They shall never be at peace with each other and shall never become one united people.

The Hindu-Muslim problem is unique. There is nothing like it anywhere else in the world. Hindus and Muslims represent two different cultures, two different civilizations, two different social orders and two different economic systems. The problem has only one solution, namely, that the two peoples should be allowed to part company, so that each may follow its cultural ideals and manage its economy in accordance with its own economic conceptions, in its own sphere, free from any interference by the other. In brief, Pakistan is the Muslims' salvation and the only sure solution of the problem of India's warring nationalities.

APPENDIX

Presidential Address of Dr. Sir Muhammad Iqbal delivered at the Allahabad Session of the All-India Muslim League in December 1930.

GENTLEMEN,

I am deeply grateful to you for the honour you have conferred upon me in inviting me to preside over the deliberations of the All-India Muslim League at one of the most critical moments in the history of Muslim political thought and activity in India. I have no doubt that in this great assembly there are men whose political experience is far more extensive than mine, and for whose knowledge of affairs I have the highest respect. It will, therefore, be presumptuous on my part to claim to guide an assembly of such men in the political decisions which they are called upon to make to-day. I lead no party; I follow no leader. I have given the best part of my life to a careful study of Islam, its law and polity, its culture, its history and its literature. This constant contact with the spirit of Islam, as it unfolds itself in time, has, I think, given me a kind of insight into its significance as a world-fact. It is in the light of this insight, whatever its value, that, while assuming that the Muslims of India are determined to remain true to the spirit of Islam, I propose, not to guide you in your decisions, but to attempt the humbler task of bringing clearly to your consciousness the main principle which, in my opinion, should determine the general character of these decisions.

ISLAM AND NATIONALISM

It cannot be denied that Islam, regarded as an ethical ideal plus a certain kind of polity—by which expression I

mean a social structure regulated by a legal system and animated by a specific ethical ideal—has been the chief formative factor in the life-history of the Muslims of India. It has furnished those basic emotions and loyalties which gradually unify scattered individuals and groups, and finally transform them into a well-defined people, possessing a moral consciousness of their own. Indeed it is no exaggeration to say that India is perhaps the only country in the world where Islam, as a people building force, has worked at its best. In India, as elsewhere, the structure of Islam as a society is almost entirely due to the working of Islam as a culture inspired by a specific ethical ideal. What I mean to say is that Muslim society, with its remarkable homogeneity and inner unity, has grown to be what it is under the pressure of the laws and institutions associated with the culture of Islam. The ideas set free by European political thinking, however, are now rapidly changing the outlook of the present generation of Muslims both in India and outside India. Our younger men, inspired by these ideas, are anxious to see them as living forces in their own countries, without any critical appreciation of the facts which have determined their evolution in Europe. In Europe Christianity was understood to be a purely monastic order which gradually developed into a vast church-organisation. The protest of Luther was directed against this church-organisation, not against any system of polity of a secular nature, for the obvious reason that there was no such polity associated with Christianity. And Luther was perfectly justified in rising in revolt against this organisation; though, I think, he did not realise that in the peculiar conditions which obtained in Europe his revolt would eventually mean the complete displacement of the universal ethics of Jesus by the growth of a plurality of national and hence narrower systems of ethics. Thus the upshot of the intellectual movement initiated by such men as Rousseau and Luther was the break-up of the one into mutually ill-adjusted many, the transformation of a human into a national outlook, requiring a more realistic foundation,

such as the notion of country, and finding expression through varying systems of polity evolved on national lines, i.e., on lines which recognize territory as the only principle of political solidarity. If you begin with the conception of religion as complete other-worldliness, then what has happened to Christianity in Europe is perfectly natural. The universal ethics of Jesus is displaced by national systems of ethics and polity. The conclusion to which Europe is consequently driven is that religion is a private affair of the individual and has nothing to do with what is called man's temporal life. Islam does not bifurcate the unity of man into an irreconcilable duality of spirit and matter. In Islam God and the universe, spirit and matter, church and state, are organic to each other. Man is not the citizen of a profane world to be renounced in the interest of a world of spirit situated elsewhere. To Islam matter is spirit realising itself in space and time. Europe uncritically accepted the duality of spirit and matter probably from Manichæan thought. Her best thinkers are realizing this initial mistake to-day, but her statesmen are indirectly forcing the world to accept it as an unquestionable dogma. It is, then, this mistaken separation of spiritual and temporal which has largely influenced European religious and political thought and has resulted practically in the total exclusion of Christianity from the life of European states. The result is a set of mutually ill-adjusted states dominated by interests not human but national. And these mutually ill-adjusted states, after trampling over the moral and religious convictions of Christianity, are to-day feeling the need of a federated Europe, i.e., the need of a unity which the Christian church-organisation originally gave them, but which, instead of reconstructing it in the light of Christ's vision of human brotherhood, they considered it fit to destroy under the inspiration of Luther. A Luther in the world of Islam, however, is an impossible phenomenon; for here there is no church-organisation, similar to that of Christianity in the Middle Ages, inviting a destroyer. In the world of Islam we have a universal polity whose fundamentals are believed

to have been revealed, but whose structure, owing to our legists' want of contact with the modern world, stands to-day in need of renewed power by fresh adjustments. I do not know what will be the final fate of the national idea in the world of Islam. Whether Islam will assimilate and transform it, as it has assimilated and transformed before many ideas expressive of a different spirit, or allow a radical transformation of its own structure by the force of this idea is hard to predict. Professor Wensinck of Leiden (Holland) wrote to me the other day : "It seems to me that Islam is entering upon a crisis through which Christianity has been passing for more than a century. The great difficulty is how to save the foundations of religion when many antiquated notions have to be given up. It seems to me scarcely possible to state what the outcome will be for Christianity, still less what it will be for Islam." At the present moment the national idea is racialising the outlook of Muslims, and thus materially counteracting the humanising work of Islam. And the growth of racial consciousness may mean the growth of standards different and even opposed to the standards of Islam.

I hope you will pardon me for this apparently academic discussion. To address this session of the All-India Muslim League you have selected a man who is not despaired of Islam as a living force for freeing the outlook of man from its geographical limitations, who believes that religion is a power of the utmost importance in the life of individuals as well as states, and finally who believes that *Islam is itself Destiny and will not suffer a destiny!* Such a man cannot but look at matters from his own point of view. Do not think that the problem I am indicating is a purely theoretical one. It is a very living and practical problem calculated to affect the very fabric of Islam as a system of life and conduct. On a proper solution of it alone depends your future as a distinct cultural unit in India. Never in our history has Islam had to stand a greater trial than the one which confronts it to-day. It is open to a people to modify, reinterpret or reject the foundational principles of their social structure; but it is absolutely

necessary for them to see clearly what they are doing before they undertake to try a fresh experiment. Nor should the way in which I am approaching this important problem lead anybody to think that I intend to quarrel with those who happen to think differently. You are a Muslim assembly and, I suppose, anxious to remain true to the spirit and ideals of Islam. My sole desire, therefore, is to tell you frankly what I honestly believe to be the truth about the present situation. In this way alone is it possible for me to illuminate, according to my light, the avenues of your political action.

THE UNITY OF AN INDIAN NATION

What, then, is the problem and its implications? Is religion a private affair? Would you like to see Islam, as a moral and political ideal, meeting the same fate in the world of Islam as Christianity has already met in Europe? Is it possible to retain Islam as an ethical ideal and to reject it as a polity in favour of national polities, in which religious attitude is not permitted to play any part? This question becomes of special importance in India where the Muslims happen to be in a minority. The proposition that religion is a private individual experience is not surprising on the lips of a European. In Europe the conception of Christianity as a monastic order, renouncing the world of matter and fixing its gaze entirely on the world of spirit, led, by a logical process of thought, to the view embodied in this proposition. The nature of the Prophet's religious experience, as disclosed in the Quran, however, is wholly different. It is not mere experience in the sense of a purely biological event, happening inside the experient and necessitating no reactions on his social environment. It is individual experience creative of a social order. Its immediate outcome is the fundamentals of a polity with implicit legal concepts whose civic significance cannot be belittled merely because their origin is revelational. The religious ideal of Islam, therefore, is organically related to the social order which it has created.

The rejection of the one will eventually involve the rejection of the other. Therefore the construction of a polity on national lines, if it means a displacement of the Islamic principle of solidarity, is simply unthinkable to a Muslim. This is a matter which at the present moment directly concerns the Muslims of India. "Man," says Renan, "is enslaved neither by his race, nor by his religion, nor by the course of rivers, nor by the direction of mountain ranges. A great aggregation of men, sane of mind and warm of heart, creates a moral consciousness which is called a nation." Such a formation is quite possible, though it involves the long and arduous process of practically re-making men and furnishing them with a fresh emotional equipment. It might have been a fact in India if the teaching of Kabir and the Divine Faith of Akbar had seized the imagination of the masses of this country. Experience, however, shows that the various caste-units and religious units in India have shown no inclination to sink their respective individualities in a larger whole. Each group is intensely jealous of its collective existence. The formation of the kind of moral consciousness which constitutes the essence of a nation in Renan's sense demands a price which the peoples of India are not prepared to pay. The unity of an Indian nation, therefore, must be sought, not in the negation, but in the mutual harmony and co-operation of the many. True statesmanship cannot ignore facts, however unpleasant they may be. The only practical course is not to assume the existence of a state of things which does not exist, but to recognize facts as they are, and to exploit them to our greatest advantage. And it is on the discovery of Indian unity in this direction that the fate of India as well as of Asia really depends. India is Asia in miniature. Part of her people have cultural affinities with nations in the east and part with nations in the middle and west of Asia. If an effective principle of co-operation is discovered in India, it will bring peace and mutual good-will to this ancient land which has suffered so long, more because of her

situation in historic space than because of any inherent incapacity of her people. And it will at the same time solve the entire political problem of Asia.

It is, however, painful to observe that our attempts to discover such a principle of internal harmony have so far failed. Why have they failed? Perhaps, we suspect each other's intentions and inwardly aim at dominating each other. Perhaps, in the higher interests of mutual co-operation, we cannot afford to part with the monopolies which circumstances have placed in our hands, and conceal our egoism under the cloak of a nationalism, outwardly stimulating a large-hearted patriotism, but inwardly as narrow-minded as a caste or a tribe. Perhaps, we are unwilling to recognize that each group has a right to free development according to its own cultural traditions. But whatever may be the causes of our failure, I still feel hopeful. Events seem to be tending in the direction of some sort of internal harmony. And as far as I have been able to read the Muslim mind, I have no hesitation in declaring that, if the principle that the Indian Muslim is entitled to full and free development on the lines of his own culture and tradition in his own Indian home-lands is recognized as the basis of a permanent communal settlement, he will be ready to stake his all for the freedom of India. The principle that each group is entitled to free development on its own lines is not inspired by any feeling of narrow communalism. There are communalisms and communalisms. A community which is inspired by feelings of ill-will towards other communities is low and ignoble. I entertain the highest respect for the customs, laws, religious and social institutions of other communities. Nay, it is my duty, according to the teaching of the Quran, even to defend their places of worship if need be. *Yet I love the communal group which is the source of my life and behaviour; and which has formed me what I am by giving me its religion, its literature, its thought, its culture; and thereby recreating its whole past, as a living operative factor, in my present consciousness.* Even the authors of the Nehru

Report recognise the value of this higher aspect of communalism. While discussing the separation of Sind they say: "To say from the larger viewpoint of nationalism that no communal provinces should be created is, in a way, equivalent to saying from the still wider international viewpoint that there should be no separate nations. Both these statements have a measure of truth in them. But the staunchest internationalist recognises that without the fullest national autonomy it is extraordinarily difficult to create the international state. So also, *without the fullest cultural autonomy, and communalism in its better aspect is culture, it will be difficult to create a harmonious nation.*"

MUSLIM INDIA WITHIN INDIA

Communalism, in its higher aspect, then, is indispensable to the formation of a harmonious whole in a country like India. The units of Indian society are not territorial as in European countries. India is a continent of human groups belonging to different races, speaking different languages and professing different religions. Their behaviour is not at all determined by a common race-consciousness. Even the Hindus do not form a homogeneous group. The principle of European democracy cannot be applied to India without recognising the fact of communal groups. The Muslim demand for the creation of a Muslim India within India is, therefore, perfectly justified. The resolution of the All-Parties Muslim Conference at Delhi is, to my mind, wholly inspired by this noble ideal of a harmonious whole which, instead of stifling the respective individualities of its component wholes, affords them chances of fully working out the possibilities that may be latent in them. And I have no doubt that this house will emphatically endorse the Muslim demands embodied in this resolution. Personally I would go further than the demands embodied in it. *I would like to see the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state. Self-Government within the British Empire, or without the British*

Empire, the formation of a consolidated North-West Indian Muslim state appears to me to be the final destiny of the Muslims at least of North-West India. The proposal was put forward before the Nehru Committee. They rejected it on the ground that, if carried into effect, it would give a very unwieldy state. This is true in so far as the area is concerned ; in point of population the state contemplated by the proposal would be much less than some of the present Indian provinces. The exclusion of Ambala Division and perhaps of some districts where non-Muslims predominate, will make it less extensive and more Muslim in population —so that the exclusion suggested will enable this consolidated state to give a more effective protection to non-Muslim minorities within its area. The idea need not alarm the Hindus or the British. India is the greatest Muslim country in the world. The life of Islam as a cultural force in this country very largely depends on its centralisation in a specified territory. This centralisation of the most living portion of the Muslims of India, whose military and police service has, notwithstanding unfair treatment from the British, made the British rule possible in this country, will eventually solve the problem of India as well as of Asia. It will intensify their sense of responsibility and deepen their patriotic feeling. Thus, possessing full opportunity of development within the body politic of India, the North-West India Muslims will prove the best defenders of India against a foreign invasion, be that invasion one of ideas or of bayonets. The Punjab with fifty-six per cent Muslim population supplies fifty-four per cent of the total combatant troops in the Indian army, and if the nineteen thousand Gurkhas recruited from the independent state of Nepal are excluded, the Punjab contingent amounts to sixty-two per cent of the whole Indian Army. This percentage does not take into account nearly six thousand combatants supplied to the Indian Army by the North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan. From this you can easily calculate the possibilities of North-West India Muslims in regard to the defence of

India against foreign aggression. The Right Hon'ble Mr. Srinivasa Sastri thinks that the Muslim demand for the creation of autonomous Muslim states along the North-West border is actuated by a desire "to acquire means of exerting pressure in emergencies on the Government of India." I may frankly tell him that the Muslim demand is not actuated by the kind of motive he imputes to us; it is actuated by a genuine desire for free development which is practically impossible under the type of unitary government contemplated by the nationalist Hindu politicians with a view to secure permanent communal dominance in the whole of India.

Nor should the Hindus fear that the creation of autonomous Muslim states will mean the introduction of a kind of religious rule in such states. I have already indicated to you the meaning of the word religion as applied to Islam. The truth is that Islam is not a church. It is state conceived as a contractual organism long before Rousseau ever thought of such a thing, and animated by an ethical ideal which regards man not as an earth-rooted creature, defined by this or that portion of the earth, but as a spiritual being understood in terms of a social mechanism, and possessing rights and duties as a living factor in that mechanism. The character of a Muslim state can be judged from what the *Times of India* pointed out some time ago in a leader on the Indian Banking Inquiry Committee. "In ancient India," the paper points out, "the state framed laws regulating the rates of interest; but in Muslim times, although Islam clearly forbids the realization of interest on money loaned, Indian Muslim states imposed no restrictions on such rates." I therefore demand the formation of a consolidated Muslim state in the best interests of India and Islam. For India it means security and peace resulting from an internal balance of power; for Islam an opportunity to rid itself of the stamp that Arabian Imperialism was forced to give it, to mobilize its law, its education, its culture, and to bring them into closer contact with its own original spirit and with the

spirit of modern times.

FEDERAL STATES

Thus it is clear that in view of India's infinite variety in climates, races, languages, creeds and social systems, the creation of autonomous states, based on the unity of language, race, history, religion and identity of economic interests, is the only possible way to secure a stable constitutional structure in India. The conception of federation underlying the Simon Report necessitates the abolition of the Central Legislative Assembly as a popular assembly, and makes it an assembly of the representatives of federal states. It further demands a redistribution of territory on the lines which I have indicated. And the Report does recommend both. I give my whole-hearted support to this view of the matter, and venture to suggest that the redistribution recommended in the Simon Report must fulfil two conditions. It must precede the introduction of the new constitution, and must be so devised as to finally solve the communal problem. Proper redistribution will make the question of joint and separate electorates automatically disappear from the constitutional controversy of India. It is the present structure of the provinces that is largely responsible for this controversy. The Hindu thinks that separate electorates are contrary to the spirit of true nationalism, because he understands the word nation to mean a kind of universal amalgamation in which no communal entity ought to retain its private individuality. Such a state of things, however, does not exist. Nor is it desirable that it should exist. India is a land of racial and religious variety. Add to this the general economic inferiority of the Muslims, their enormous debt, especially in the Punjab, and their insufficient majorities in some of the provinces as at present constituted, and you will begin to see clearly the meaning of our anxiety to retain separate electorates. In such a country and in such circumstances territorial electorate cannot

secure adequate representation of all interests, and must inevitably lead to the creation of an oligarchy. The Muslims of India can have no objection to purely territorial electorates if provinces are demarcated so as to secure comparatively homogeneous communities possessing linguistic, racial, cultural and religious unity.

FEDERATION AS UNDERSTOOD IN THE SIMON REPORT

But in so far as the question of the powers of the Central Federal State is concerned, there is a subtle difference of motive in the constitutions proposed by the Pandits of India and the Pandits of England. The Pandits of India do not disturb the central authority as it stands at present. All that they desire is that this authority should become fully responsible to the Central Legislature which they maintain intact, and where their majority will become further reinforced on the nominated element ceasing to exist. The Pandits of England, on the other hand, realizing that democracy in the Centre tends to work contrary to their interests, and is likely to absorb the whole power now in their hands, in case a further advance is made towards responsible government, have shifted the experiment of democracy from the Centre to the provinces. No doubt, they introduce the principle of federation and appear to have made a beginning by making certain proposals ; yet their evaluation of this principle is determined by considerations wholly different to those which determine its value in the eyes of Muslim India. The Muslims demand federation because it is pre-eminently a solution of India's most difficult problem, *i.e.*, the communal problem. The Royal Commissioners' view of federation, though sound in principle, does not seem to aim at responsible government for federal states. Indeed it does not go beyond providing means of escape from the situation which the introduction of democracy in India has created for the British, and wholly

disregards the communal problem by leaving it where it was.

Thus it is clear that, in so far as real federation is concerned, the Simon Report virtually negatives the principle of federation in its true significance. The Nehru Report realizing Hindu majority in the Central Assembly reaches a unitary form of government because such an institution secures Hindu dominance throughout India ; the Simon Report retains the present British dominance behind the thin veneer of an unreal federation, partly because the British are naturally unwilling to part with the power they have so long wielded, and partly because it is possible for them, in the absence of an inter-communal understanding in India, to make out a plausible case for the retention of that power in their own hands. To my mind a unitary form of government is simply unthinkable in a self-governing India. What is called 'residuary powers' must be left entirely to self-governing states, the Central Federal State exercising only those powers which are expressly vested in it by the free consent of federal states. I would never advise the Muslims of India to agree to a system, whether of British or of Indian origin, which virtually negatives the principle of true federation, or fails to recognize them as a distinct political entity.

FEDERAL SCHEME AS DISCUSSED IN THE ROUND TABLE CONFERENCE

The necessity for a structural change in the Central Government was seen probably long before the British discovered the most effective means for introducing this change. That is why at rather a late stage it was announced that the participation of the Indian Princes in the Round Table Conference was essential. It was a kind of surprise to the people of India, particularly the minorities, to see the Indian Princes dramatically expressing their willingness at the Round Table Conference to join an All-India Fede-

ration, and, as a result of their declaration, Hindu delegates—uncompromising advocates of a unitary form of government—quietly agreeing to the evolution of a federal scheme. Even Mr. Sastri who, only a few days before, had severely criticised Sir John Simon for recommending a federal scheme for India, suddenly became a convert and admitted his conversion in the plenary session of the Conference—thus offering the Prime Minister of England an occasion for one of his wittiest observations in his concluding speech. All this has a meaning both for the British who have sought the participation of the Indian Princes, and the Hindus who have unhesitatingly accepted the evolution of an All-India Federation. The truth is that the participation of the Indian Princes—among whom only a few are Muslims—in a federation scheme serves a double purpose. On the one hand, it serves as an all-important factor in maintaining the British power in India practically as it is ; on the other hand it gives overwhelming majority to the Hindus in an All-India Federal Assembly. It appears to me that the Hindu-Muslim differences regarding the ultimate form of the Central Government are being cleverly exploited by British politicians through the agency of the Princes who see in the scheme prospects of better security for their despotic rule. If the Muslims silently agree to any such scheme it will simply hasten their end as a political entity in India. The policy of the Indian Federation, thus created, will be practically controlled by Hindu Princes forming the largest group in the Central Federal Assembly. They will always lend their support to the Crown in matters of Imperial concern ; and in so far as internal administration of the country is concerned, they will help in maintaining and strengthening the supremacy of the Hindus. In other words, the scheme appears to be aiming at a kind of understanding between Hindu India and British Imperialism—you perpetuate me in India, and I in return give you a Hindu oligarchy to keep all other Indian communities in perpetual subjection. If, therefore, the

British Indian provinces are not transformed into really autonomous states, the Princes' participation in a scheme of Indian federation will be interpreted only as a dexterous move on the part of British politicians to satisfy, without parting with any real power, all parties concerned—Muslims with the *word* federation, Hindus with a majority in the Centre, and British Imperialists—whether Tory or Labourite—with the *substance* of real power.

The number of Hindu states in India is far greater than Muslim states ; and it remains to be seen how the Muslim demand for 33 per cent seats in the Central Federal Assembly is to be met with in a House or Houses constituted of representatives taken from British India as well as Indian states. I hope the Muslim delegates are fully aware of the implications of the federal scheme as discussed in the Round Table Conference. The question of Muslim representation in the proposed All-India Federation has not yet been discussed. "The interim report," says Reuter's summary, "contemplates two chambers in the Federal Legislature, each containing representatives both of British India and States, the proportion of which will be a matter of subsequent consideration under the heads which have not yet been referred to the Sub-Committee." In my opinion the question of proportion is of the utmost importance and ought to have been considered simultaneously with the main question of the structure of the Assembly.

The best course, I think, would have been to start with a British Indian Federation only. A federal scheme born of an unholy union between democracy and despotism cannot but keep British India in the same vicious circle of a unitary Central Government. Such a unitary form may be of the greatest advantage to the British, to the majority community in British India and to the Indian Princes ; it can be of no advantage to the Muslims, unless they get majority rights in five out of eleven Indian Provinces with full residuary powers, and one-third share of seats in the total house of the Federal Assembly. In so far as the attain-

ment of sovereign powers by the British Indian Provinces is concerned, the position of H. H. the Ruler of Bhopal, Sir Akbar Hydari and Mr. Jinnah is unassailable. In view, however, of the participation of the Princes in the Indian Federation we must now see our demand for representation in the British Indian Assembly in a new light. The question is not one of Muslim share in a British Indian Assembly, but one which relates to representation of British Indian Muslims in an All-India Federal Assembly. Our demand for 33 per cent must now be taken as a demand for the same proportion in the All-India Federal Assembly exclusive of the share allotted to the Muslim states entering the federation.

THE PROBLEM OF DEFENCE

The other difficult problem which confronts the successful working of a federal system in India is the problem of India's defence. In their discussion of this problem the Royal Commissioners have marshalled all the deficiencies of India in order to make out a case for Imperial administration of the army. "India and Britain," say the Commissioners, "are so related that India's defence cannot *now or in any future which is within sight*, be regarded as a matter of purely Indian concern. The control and direction of such an army must rest in the hands of agents of the Imperial Government." Now, does it necessarily follow from this that further progress towards the realization of responsible Government in British India is barred until the work of defence can be adequately discharged without the help of British officers and British troops? *As things are, there is a block on the line of constitutional advance.* All hopes of evolution in the Central Government towards the ultimate goal described in the declaration of 20th August, 1917, are in danger of being indefinitely frustrated, if the attitude illustrated by the Nehru Report is maintained that any future change involves the putting of the administration of

the army under the authority of an elected Indian Legislature. Further to fortify their argument they emphasize the fact of competing religions and rival races of widely different capacity, and try to make the problem look insoluble by remarking that "the obvious fact that India is not, in the ordinary and natural sense, a single nation is nowhere made more plain than in considering the difference between the martial races of India and the rest." These features of the question have been emphasized in order to demonstrate that the British are not only keeping India secure from foreign menace but are also the "neutral guardians" of internal security. However, in federated India, as I understand federation, the problem will have only one aspect, i.e., external defence. Apart from provincial armies necessary for maintaining internal peace, the Indian Federal Congress can maintain, on the North-West Frontier, a strong Indian Frontier Army, composed of units recruited from all provinces and officered by efficient and experienced military men taken from all communities. I know that India is not in possession of efficient military officers, and this fact is exploited by the Royal Commissioners in the interest of an argument for Imperial administration. On this point I cannot but quote another passage from the Report which, to my mind, furnishes the best argument against the position taken up by the Commissioners. "At the present moment," says the Report, "no Indian holding the King's Commission is of higher army rank than a captain. There are, we believe, 39 captains of whom 25 are in ordinary regimental employ. Some of them are of an age which would prevent their attaining much higher rank, even if they passed the necessary examination before retirement. Most of these have not been through Sandhurst, but got their Commissions during the Great War." Now, however genuine may be the desire, and however earnest the endeavour to work for this transformation, the overriding conditions so forcibly expressed by the Skeen Committee (whose members, apart from the Chairman and the Army Secretary,

were Indian gentlemen) in the words, "Progress . . . must be contingent upon success being secured at each stage and upon military efficiency being maintained, though it must in any case render such development measured and slow. A higher command cannot be evolved at short notice out of existing cadres of Indian officers, all of junior rank and limited experience. Not until the slender trickle of suitable Indian recruits for the officer class—and we earnestly desire an increase in their numbers—flows in much greater volume, not until sufficient Indians have attained the experience and training requisite to provide all the officers for, at any rate, some Indian regiments, not until such units have stood the only test which can possibly determine their efficiency, and not until Indian officers have qualified by a successful army career for high command, will it be possible to develop the policy of Indianisation to a point which will bring a completely Indianised army within sight. Even then years must elapse before the process could be completed."

Now I venture to ask who is responsible for the present state of things? Is it due to some inherent incapacity of our martial races, or to the slowness of the process of military training? The military capacity of our martial races is undeniable. The process of military training may be slow as compared to other processes of human training. I am no military expert to judge this matter. But as a layman I feel that the argument, as stated, assumes the process to be practically endless. This means perpetual bondage for India, and makes it all the more necessary that the Frontier Army, as suggested by the Nehru Report, be entrusted to the charge of a committee of defence the personnel of which may be settled by mutual understanding.

Again, it is significant that the Simon Report has given extraordinary importance to the question of India's land frontier, but has made only passing references to its naval position. India has doubtless had to face invasions from

her land frontier ; but it is obvious that her present masters took possession of her on account of her defenceless sea coast. A self-governing and free India will, in these days, have to take greater care of her sea coast than land frontiers.

I have no doubt that if a Federal Government is established, Muslim federal states will willingly agree, for purposes of India's defence, to the creation of neutral Indian military and naval forces. Such a neutral military force for the defence of India was a reality in the days of Mughal Rule. Indeed in the time of Akbar the Indian frontier was, on the whole, defended by armies officered by Hindu generals. I am perfectly sure that the scheme of a neutral Indian army, based on a federated India, will intensify Muslim patriotic feeling, and finally set at rest the suspicion, if any, of Indian Muslims joining Muslims from beyond the frontier in the event of an invasion.

THE ALTERNATIVE

I have thus tried briefly to indicate the way in which the Muslims of India ought in my opinion to look at the two most important constitutional problems of India. A redistribution of British India, calculated to secure a permanent solution of the communal problem, is the main demand of the Muslims of India. If, however, the Muslim demand of a territorial solution of the communal problem is ignored, then I support, as emphatically as possible, the Muslim demands repeatedly urged by the All-India Muslim League and the All-India Muslim Conference. The Muslims of India cannot agree to any constitutional changes which affect their majority rights, to be secured by separate electorates, in the Punjab and Bengal, or fail to guarantee them 33 per cent representation in any Central Legislature. There were two pitfalls into which Muslim political leaders fell. The first was the repudiated Lucknow Pact which originated in a false view of Indian nationalism, and deprived the Muslims of India of chances of acquiring any political power in

India. The second is the narrow-visioned sacrifice of Islamic solidarity in the interests of what may be called Punjab Ruralism resulting in a proposal which virtually reduces the Punjab Muslims to a position of minority. It is the duty of the League to condemn both the Pact and the proposal.

The Simon Report does great injustice to the Muslims in not recommending a statutory majority for the Punjab and Bengal. It would either make the Muslims stick to the Lucknow Pact or agree to a scheme of joint electorates. The despatch of the Government of India on the Simon Report admits that since the publication of that document the Muslim community has not expressed its willingness to accept any of the alternatives proposed by the Report. The despatch recognizes that it may be a legitimate grievance to deprive the Muslims in the Punjab and Bengal of representation in the councils in proportion to their population merely because of weightage allowed to Muslim minorities elsewhere. But the despatch of the Government of India fails to correct the injustice of the Simon Report. In so far as the Punjab is concerned—and this is the most crucial point—it endorses the so-called ‘carefully balanced scheme’ worked out by the official members of the Punjab Government which gives the Punjab Muslims a majority of two over Hindus and Sikhs combined, and a proportion of 49 per cent of the House as a whole. It is obvious that the Punjab Muslims cannot be satisfied with less than a clear majority in the total House. However, Lord Irwin and his Government do recognize that the justification for communal electorates for majority communities would not cease unless and until by the extention of franchise their voting strength more correctly reflects their population; and further unless a two-third majority of the Muslim members in a provincial council unanimously agree to surrender the right of separate representation. I cannot, however, understand why the Government of India, having recognized the legitimacy of the Muslim grievance, have not had the courage to recom-

mend a statutory majority for the Muslims in the Punjab and Bengal.

Nor can the Muslims of India agree to any such changes which fail to create at least Sind as a separate province, and treat the North-West Frontier Province as a province of inferior political status. I see no reason why Sind should not be united with Baluchistan and turned into a separate province. It has nothing in common with the Bombay Presidency. In point of life and civilization the Royal Commissioners find it more akin to Mesopotamia and Arabia than India. The Muslim geographer Mas'udi noticed this kinship long ago when he said—"Sind is a country *nearer* to the dominions of Islam." The first Omayyad ruler is reported to have said of Egypt—"Egypt has her back towards Africa and face towards Arabia." With necessary alterations the same remark describes the exact situation of Sind. She has her back towards India and face towards Central Asia. Considering further the nature of her agricultural problems which can invoke no sympathy from the Bombay Government, and her infinite commercial possibilities, dependent on the inevitable growth of Karachi into a second metropolis of India, it is unwise to keep her attached to a Presidency which, though friendly to-day, is likely to become a rival at no distant period. Financial difficulties, we are told, stand in the way of separation. I do not know of any definite authoritative pronouncement on the matter. But assuming there are any such difficulties, I see no reason why the Government of India should not give temporary financial help to a promising province in her struggle for independent progress.

As to the North-West Frontier Province, it is painful to note that the Royal Commissioners have practically denied that the people of this province have any right to reforms. They fall far short of the Bray Committee, and the council recommended by them is merely a screen to hide the autocracy of the Chief Commissioner. The inherent right of the Afghan to light a cigarette is curtailed merely because he

happens to be living in a powder house. The Royal Commissioners' epigrammatic argument is pleasant enough, but far from convincing. Political reform is light, not fire; and to light every human being is entitled whether he happens to live in a powder house or a coal mine. Brave, shrewd and determined to suffer for his legitimate aspirations, the Afghan is sure to resent any attempt to deprive him of opportunities of full self-development. To keep such a people contented is in the best interests of both England and India. What has recently happened in that unfortunate province is the result of a step-motherly treatment shown to the people since the introduction of the principle of Self-Government in the rest of India. I only hope that British statesmanship will not obscure its view of the situation by hoodwinking itself into the belief that the present unrest in the province is due to any extraneous causes.

The recommendation for the introduction of a measure of reform in the N.W.F.P. made in the Government of India's despatch is also unsatisfactory. No doubt, the despatch goes farther than the Simon Report in recommending a sort of representative Council and a semi-representative cabinet, but it fails to treat this important Muslim province on equal footing with other Indian Provinces. Indeed, the Afghan is, by instinct, more fitted for democratic institutions than any other people in India.

THE ROUND TABLE CONFERENCE

I think I am now called upon to make a few observations on the Round Table Conference. Personally, I do not feel optimistic as to the results of this Conference. It was hoped that, away from the actual scene of communal strife and in a changed atmosphere, better counsels would prevail and a genuine settlement of the differences between the two major communities of India would bring India's freedom within sight. Actual events, however, tell a different tale. Indeed, the discussion of the communal question in London

has demonstrated more clearly than ever the essential disparity between the two great cultural units of India. Yet the Prime Minister of England apparently refuses to see that the problem of India is international and not national. He is reported to have said that "his Government would find it difficult to submit to Parliament proposals for the maintenance of separate electorates, since joint electorates were much more in accordance with British democratic sentiments." Obviously he does not see that the model of British democracy cannot be of any use in a land of many nations; and that a system of separate electorates is only a poor substitute for a territorial solution of the problem. Nor is the Minorities Sub-Committee likely to reach a satisfactory settlement. The whole question will have to go before the British Parliament; and we can only hope that the keen-sighted representatives of the British nation, unlike most of our Indian politicians, will be able to pierce through the surface of things and see clearly the true fundamentals of peace and security in a country like India. To base a constitution on the concept of a homogeneous India or to apply to India principles dictated by British democratic sentiments is unwittingly to prepare her for a civil war. As far as I can see, there will be no peace in the country until the various peoples that constitute India are given opportunities of free self-development on modern lines without abruptly breaking with their past.

I am glad to be able to say that our Muslim delegates fully realize the importance of a proper solution of what I call Indian international problem. They are perfectly justified in pressing for a solution of the communal question before the question of responsibility in the Central Government is finally settled. No Muslim politician should be sensitive to the taunt embodied in that propaganda word—communalism—expressly devised to exploit what the Prime Minister calls British democratic sentiments, and to mislead England into assuming a state of things which does not really exist in India. Great interests are at stake.

We are seventy millions and far more homogeneous than any other people in India. Indeed the Muslims of India are the only Indian people who can fitly be described as a nation in the modern sense of the word. The Hindus, though ahead of us in almost all respects, have not yet been able to achieve the kind of homogeneity which is necessary for a nation, and which Islam has given you as a free gift. No doubt they are anxious to become a nation, but the process of becoming a nation is a kind of travail, and, in the case of Hindu India, involves a complete overhauling of her social structure. Nor should the Muslim leaders and politicians allow themselves to be carried away by the subtle but fallacious argument that Turkey and Persia and other Muslim countries are progressing on national, *i.e.*, territorial lines. The Muslims of India are differently situated. The countries of Islam outside India are practically wholly Muslim in population. The minorities there belong, in the language of the Quran, to the 'people of the Book.' There are no social barriers between Muslims and the 'people of the Book.' A Jew or a Christian or a Zoroastrian does not pollute the food of a Muslim by touching it, and the Law of Islam allows inter-marriage with the 'people of the Book.' Indeed the first practical step that Islam took towards the realization of a final combination of humanity was to call upon peoples possessing practically the same ethical ideal to come forward and combine. The Quran declares, "O people of the Book ! Come, let us join together on the 'word' (Unity of God), that is common to us all." The wars of Islam and Christianity, and, later, European aggression in its various forms, could not allow the infinite meaning of this verse to work itself out in the world of Islam. To-day it is being gradually realized in the countries of Islam in the shape of what is called Muslim Nationalism.

It is hardly necessary for me to add that the sole test of the success of our delegates is the extent to which they are able to get the non-Muslim delegates of the Conference

to agree to our demands as embodied in the Delhi Resolution. If these demands are not agreed to, then a question of a very great and far-reaching importance will arise for the community. Then will arrive the moment for an independent and concerted political action by the Muslims of India. If you are at all serious about your ideals and aspirations, you must be ready for such an action. Our leading men have done a good deal of political thinking, and their thought has certainly made us, more or less, sensitive to the forces which are now shaping the destinies of peoples in India and outside India. But I ask, has this thinking prepared us for the kind of action demanded by the situation which may arise in the near future? Let me tell you frankly that, at the present moment, the Muslims of India are suffering from two evils. The first is the want of personalities. Sir Malcolm Hailey and Lord Irwin were perfectly correct in their diagnosis when they told the Aligarh University that the community had failed to produce leaders. By leaders I mean men who, by Divine gift or experience, possess a keen perception of the spirit and destiny of Islam, along with an equally keen perception of the trend of modern history. Such men are really the driving forces of a people, but they are God's gift and cannot be made to order. The second evil from which the Muslims of India are suffering is that the community is fast losing what is called the herd instinct. This makes it possible for individuals and groups to start independent careers without contributing to the general thought and activity of the community. We are doing to-day in the domain of politics what we have been doing for centuries in the domain of religion. But sectional bickerings in religion do not do much harm to our solidarity. They at least indicate an interest in what makes the sole principle of our structure as a people. Moreover, this principle is so broadly conceived that it is almost impossible for a group to become rebellious to the extent of wholly detaching itself from the general body of Islam. But diversity in political action, at

a moment when concerted action is needed in the best interests of the very life of our people, may prove fatal. How shall we, then, remedy these two evils ? The remedy of the first evil is not in our hands. As to the second evil I think it is possible to discover a remedy. I have got definite views on the subject ; but I think it is proper to postpone their expression till the apprehended situation actually arises. In case it does arise, leading Muslims of all shades of opinion will have to meet together, not to pass resolutions, but finally to determine the Muslim attitude and to show the path to tangible achievement. In this address I mention this alternative only, because I wish that you may keep it in mind and give some serious thought to it in the meantime.

CONCLUSION

Gentlemen, I have finished. In conclusion I cannot but impress upon you that the present crisis in the history of India demands complete organisation and unity of will and purpose in the Muslim community, both in your own interest as a community, and in the interest of India as a whole. The political bondage of India has been and is a source of infinite misery to the whole of Asia. It has suppressed the spirit of the East and wholly deprived her of that joy of self-expression which once made her the creator of a great and glorious culture. We have a duty towards India where we are destined to live and die. We have a duty towards Asia, especially Muslim Asia. And since seventy millions of Muslims in a single country constitute a far more valuable asset to Islam than all the countries of Muslim Asia put together, we must look at the Indian problem not only from the Muslim point of view but also from the standpoint of the Indian Muslim as such. Our duty towards Asia and India cannot be loyally performed without an organised will fixed on a definite purpose. In your own interest, as a political entity among other political entities of India, such an

equipment is an absolute necessity. Our disorganised condition has already confused political issues vital to the life of the community. I am not hopeless of an inter-communal understanding, but I cannot conceal from you the feeling that in the near future our community may be called upon to adopt an independent line of action to cope with the present crisis. And an independent line of political action, in such a crisis, is possible only to a determined people, possessing a will focalised by a single purpose. Is it possible for you to achieve the organic wholeness of a unified will? Yes, it is. Rise above sectional interests and private ambitions, and learn to determine the value of your individual and collective action, however directed on material ends, in the light of the ideal which you are supposed to represent. Pass from matter to spirit. Matter is diversity; spirit is light, life and unity. One lesson I have learnt from the history of Muslims. At critical moments in their history it is Islam that has saved Muslims and not *vice versa*. If to-day you focus your vision on Islam and seek inspiration from the ever vitalising idea embodied in it, you will be only re-assembling your scattered forces, regaining your lost integrity, and thereby saving yourself from total destruction. One of the profoundest verses in the Holy Quran teaches us that the birth and rebirth of the whole of humanity is like the birth and rebirth of a single individual. Why cannot you who, as a people, can well claim to be the first practical exponents of this superb conception of humanity, live and move and have your being as a single individual? I do not wish to mystify anybody when I say that things in India are not what they appear to be. The meaning of this, however, will dawn upon you only when you have achieved a real collective ego to look at them. In the words of the Quran, "Hold fast to yourself; no one who erreth can hurt you, provided you are well guided," (5: 104).

